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43 
SEX, TRUMP, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
Helen Hershkoff & Elizabeth M. Schneider* 
That President Trump ignores, defies, and might destroy the 
norms long taken for granted in America’s democracy is a view 
expressed by scholars,1 politicians,2 journalists,3 and many 
everyday Americans.4 An obvious example of Trump’s deviant 
 
 * Helen Hershkoff is the Herbert M. and Svetlana Wachtell Professor of 
Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties at New York University School of Law. Elizabeth 
M. Schneider is the Rose L. Hoffer Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School. They thank 
NYU Law students Nicholas Baer, Juan Bedoya, Katrina Feldkamp, Paul Leroux, Allyson 
Scher, Emily Several, Samuel Vitello, and Eric Wang and Brooklyn Law student Bailee 
Brown for research assistance; Gretchen Feltes for library support; and Ian Brydon for 
administrative assistance. Hershkoff’s research was supported by the D’Agostino Faculty 
Research Fund, and Schneider’s research was supported by the Brooklyn Law School 
Faculty Fund. The authors thank Sylvia A. Law and Stephen Loffredo for comments on 
an earlier draft, and Jill Hasday, Distinguished McKnight University Professor and 
Centennial Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, for organizing this 
Symposium and for inviting them to contribute. 
 1.  See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 
2192 (2018) (pointing to various of Trump’s campaign promises as evidence of norm-
violation); see also W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and 
the Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825, 826 (2018) (arguing 
that “the breakdown of institutional norms . . . has consistently undermined the Trump 
Administration’s policy agenda in the courts”); Jack Goldsmith, Will Donald Trump 
Destroy the Presidency?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2017/10/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-presidency/537921/ (observing that 
Trump is “a norm-busting president without parallel”). 
 2. See Press Release, Mark R. Warner, Va. Senator, U.S. Senate, Pelosi, Schumer, 
Schiff, Warner Write Letter to Rosenstein, Wray Demanding They Withstand Pressure to 
Violate DOJ and FBI Norms (June 28, 2018), https://www.warner.senate.gov/public
/index.cfm/2018/6/pelosi-schumer-schiff-warner-write-letter-to-rosenstein-wray-
demanding-they-withstand-pressure-to-violate-doj-and-fbi-norms (discussing pressure on 
Justice Department officials to violate norms that the President disfavors). 
 3. See Emily Bazelon, How Do We Contend with Trump’s Defiance of “Norms”?, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-
contend-with-trumps-defiance-of-norms.html (stating that “Trump defies norms”); see 
also John Moody, Trump Thinks Words Don’t Matter. He’s Wrong, FOX NEWS (Jan. 12, 
2018), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/01/12/trump-thinks-words-dont-matter-hes-
wrong.html (stating that Trump “has rejected the norms of American political life”). 
 4. See Lyla Blake Ward, Letter to the Editor, Trump’s Ignoring Norms Does Matter, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/opinion/letters/trump-
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conduct is his perverse use of the “bully pulpit” to express vulgar 
and degrading statements about women,5 showing more of the 
bully than of the pulpit.6 That these utterances, made as a 
candidate and while in the White House, violate equality and 
dignity norms at the core of constitutional aspiration is an 
understatement.7 Their egocentric quality has triggered questions 
about the President’s psychological stability.8 They also have 
elicited strong negative reaction in the form of global public 
demonstrations9 and have jumpstarted the political campaigns of 
 
presidential-norms.html (responding to an op-ed and questioning the view that norms do 
not matter). 
 5. We are mindful of the limitations of the word women to describe the diversity of 
women. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 
315 (1992) (“This, then, is the project of a postmodern feminist jurisprudence: to 
problematize and reconstruct the many vocabularies within which the law creates 
‘woman.’”). See generally Matthew A. Ritter, The Penile Code: The Gendered Nature of 
the Language of Law, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (1992). Generally, we use sex to refer to a 
biological fact about a person. We use gender in the performative sense and regard it as 
more fluid and less biologically determined than sex. See generally Francisco Valdes, 
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” 
and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 6. See Jeff Shesol, Trump Abandons the Bully Pulpit, NEW YORKER (Aug. 24, 2017) 
(“The bully has, in truth, largely abandoned the pulpit.”); see also Margaret Talbot, The 
Future of Women Under President Trump, NEW YORKER (Dec. 19 & Dec. 26, 2016) 
(“Trump won the Presidency despite a well-documented penchant for the vulgar 
belittlement of women . . . .”).  
 7. See Neil S. Siegel, Political Norms, Constitutional Conventions, and President 
Donald Trump, 93 IND. L.J. 177, 191 (2018) (“Candidate Trump indulged in racism, 
misogyny, Islamophobia, and mockery of the disabled in ways that are extraordinary in 
contemporary American politics.”). 
 8. See Jamal Greene, Trump as a Constitutional Failure, 93 IND. L.J. 93, 93 (2018) 
(referring to Trump as “self-obsessed and aggressive to the point of psychopathy”); 
Stephen B. Presser, Evaluating President Obama’s Appointments of Judges from a 
Conservative Perspective: What Did the Election of Donald Trump Mean for Popular 
Sovereignty?, 60 HOW. L.J. 663, 674 (2017) (quoting Professor Sanford Levinson of Texas 
Law School that President Trump is “a raving narcissist that some describe as a 
sociopath”). Admittedly Professors Greene and Levinson would place themselves in the 
liberal academic camp. From a medical perspective, see Jason Lemon, Trump “Is Mentally 
Ill,” Doctor and Former Vermont Governor Howard Dean Says, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 2, 
2018), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-mentally-ill-former-vermont-governor-says-
1101539 (stating the President’s “narcissism overcomes his ability to know, A, what’s good 
for the country, and B, what’s good for him”); Carlos Lozada, Is Trump Mentally Ill? Or 
Is America? Psychiatrists Weigh in, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/ (reviewing BANDY X. LEE, THE DANGEROUS CASE OF 
DONALD TRUMP: 27 PSYCHIATRISTS AND MENTAL EXPERTS ASSESS A PRESIDENT 
(2017); ALLEN FRANCES, TWILIGHT OF AMERICAN SANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST ANALYZES 
THE AGE OF TRUMP (2017); and KURT ANDERSEN, FANTASYLAND (2017)). 
 9. See Barbara Stark, Mr. Trump’s Contribution to Women’s Human Rights, 24 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 317, 317 (2018) (“The day after Donald Trump’s inauguration, 
women and their supporters marched across the United States (and around the world), in 
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women—Democratic, Republican, and Democratic Socialist—to 
run for state or federal office.10 On a parallel track—but fueled by 
Trump’s election11—women have mobilized about sexual 
harassment through the social media campaign called #MeToo,12 
and companies and government offices have felt compelled to 
clean house.13 In highly publicized incidents, CEOs and 
 
what was probably the largest single day of protest in American history.”); see also 
Maureen Johnson, Trickle-Down Bullying and the Truly Great American Response: Can 
Responsible Rhetoric in Judicial Advocacy and Decision-Making Help Heal the 
Divisiveness of the Trump Presidency?, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 445, 450 
(2017) (“No one could have predicted that so many different groups and their allies would 
come together in enormous numbers to demand equality for all.”). 
 10. See The Backfire Effect: Women Could Be the Undoing of Donald Trump, 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 17, 2018) (“Amid the rancour of American politics, the large number 
of first-time women candidates the Democrats will field is unequivocally positive.”); 
Rebecca Nelson, Trump Has Spurred Hundreds of Women to Run for Office. Guess What? 
Some Are Republican, WASH. POST MAGAZINE (May 29, 2018); Michelle Goldberg, The 
Millennial Socialists Are Coming, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018) (discussing first-time 
Democratic Socialists running for office). Globally, the United States ranks 93 out of 181 
for women in the national legislature. See HEIDI HARTMANN, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE U.S.: WHAT HAS CHANGED IN 
THE LAST 20 – 40 YEARS (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GAO-
Research-Presentation-March-2018_Heidi-Hartmann.pdf. Women who run for office face 
unique barriers. See Maggie Astor, Women in Politics Often Must Run a Gantlet of Vile 
Intimidation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2018, at A1 (illustrating problem with example of 2016 
female candidate for California congressional seat who received tens of thousands of 
messages via the Internet suggesting she be gang-raped and then have her head bashed in). 
 11. See Alex Shephard, Is Donald Trump’s #MeToo Immunity Coming to an End?, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 2017), https://newrepublic.com/minutes/146199/donald-trumps-
metoo-immunity-coming-end (“One of the ironies of this moment is that Trump’s election 
played a crucial role in instigating the flood of sexual misconduct allegations that have 
rocked workplaces across the country.”). 
 12. “Me Too” was coined in 2006 by Tarana Burke, a Black feminist who heads Just 
Be Inc., a non-profit organization that provides services and assistance to persons who 
have been sexually harassed or sexually assaulted. See Elizabeth Wagmeister, How Me 
Too Founder Tarana Burke Wants to Shift the Movement’s Narrative, VARIETY (Apr. 10, 
2018), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news/tarana-burke-me-too-founder-sexual-violence-
1202748012/ (discussing the origins of the MeToo movement); Sandra E. Garcia, The 
Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017) (same). 
Initial credit, however, was given to Alyssa Milano, a white actress. See Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, What About #Us Too?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128 Yale 
L.J.F. 105 (2018). On the surge in “#MeToo” tweets post-Trump, see Jonah Engel 
Bromwich, “The Silence Breakers” Named Time’s Person of the Year for 2017, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 6, 2017) (discussing the #MeToo movement, involving tweets by millions of women 
who were sexually assaulted or harassed in the workplace).  
 13. Even within the White House, one staffer resigned because of allegations of 
sexual misconduct. See Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, Rob Porter, White House Aide, 
Resigns After Accusations of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2018). But see Danny Westneat, 
Why Is Trump off the Hook in MeToo Movement? Because We Let Him Off, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/why-is-trump-
off-the-hook-in-metoo-movement-because-we-let-him-off/ (reporting that a dozen women 
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government officials have resigned,14 been fired,15 been 
investigated by the FBI,16 or face criminal prosecution because of 
sexual misdeeds17—and the list grows longer.18 The establishment 
of Time’s Up—founded by female farmworkers and celebrities 
committed to using status and wealth on behalf of gender issues—
signals further development of a growing “resistance” in civil 
society that strategically combines social opprobrium with civil 
litigation,19 and steadily is expanding from women who are white 
professional elites to women of color, women in low-wage jobs, 
gender non-conforming women, and trans persons.20 
 
have accused Trump of sexual misconduct, but Trump “can tweet away in the White House 
without much of a care about women”). 
 14. E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Yamiche Alcindor & Nicholas Fandos, Al Franken to 
Resign from Senate amid Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-
harassment.html. 
 15. E.g., Tom Huddleston Jr., Roger Ailes Resigns: A Timeline of His Downfall, 
FORTUNE (July 21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/21/roger-ailes-resigned-scandal-
timeline. 
 16. See Peggy Orenstein, We Can’t Just Let Boys Be Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2018, 
at 4 (discussing FBI investigation of sexual assault allegations that surfaced during the 
Senate confirmation hearing of Brett Kavanaugh to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States). For criticisms of the investigation, see Robert Barnes & Emily 
Guskin, More Americans Disapprove of Kavanaugh’s Confirmation than Support It, New 
Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/more-
americans-disapprove-of-kavanaughs-confirmation-than-support-it-new-poll-shows/2018/
10/12/18dbf872-cd93-11e8-a3e644daa3d35ede_story.html?utm_term=.b2f347c56a83 
(reporting that “half of Americans do not think the Senate did enough to investigate 
allegations that Kavanaugh committed sexual misconduct in high school and college”). 
 17. E.g., Eric Levenson & Aaron Cooper, Bill Cosby Sentenced to 3 to 10 Years in 
Prison for Sexual Assault, CNN (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/25/us/bill-
cosby-sentence-assault/index.html (reporting that the sentencing judge called sexual 
assault a “serious crime”); Merrit Kennedy, New Charges Filed Against Harvey Weinstein 
Involving a Third Woman, NPR (July 2, 2018) (rape charges against Hollywood executive). 
On the radiating effects of the Weinstein scandal, see Rochelle Dornatt, Thank You 
Harvey Weinstein, 29 Hastings Women’s L.J. 3 (2018) (“I do not know exactly what the 
trigger was to make all those women come forward and confront their bully, but it is 
liberating to see it happen.”). 
 18. See 252 Celebrities, Politicians, CEOs, and Others Who Have Been Accused of 
Sexual Misconduct Since April 2017, VOX, https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-
assault-allegations-list (last updated Oct. 8, 2018). 
 19. Compare Josh Blackman, The Legal Resistance, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 45, 46 
(2017) (discussing the role of civil litigation to resist policies of the Trump Administration, 
and focusing on court actions to challenge immigration policies). See also Anonymous, I 
Am Part of the Resistance Inside the Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/opinion/trump-white-house-anonymous-
resistance.html. 
 20. See Molly Lambert, Lisa Borders Is Ready for the Next Phase of Gender Parity, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/magazine/lisa-borders-is-
ready-for-the-next-phase-of-gender-parity.html (recounting the establishment of Time’s 
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Trump campaigned for the White House on a platform of 
disruption,21 urging America’s return to a golden time when white 
men of privilege ruled home and country.22 In the greatest of 
ironies—proof-positive of the law of unintended 
consequences23—the President’s best legacy may end up as a 
change-agent of gender norms. At least at the level of discourse, 
there’s no question that what Americans talk about when they 
talk about women has changed since Trump became President.24 
Features of gender relations that for decades have been 
suppressed or side stepped are now front and center.25 It is not 
simply that Trump’s coarse and violent language has spotlighted 
 
Up); see also Rachel Abrams, Delivering a Message to McDonald’s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2018, at B1 (reporting that McDonald’s employees organized the first strike “in more than 
100 years” to protest sexual harassment); Riki Wilchins, Trans Men Are Leading the 
Resistance, ADVOCATE (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2017/3/02/
trans-men-are-leading-resistance; see also Sandra M. Gilbert, In the Labyrinth of #MeToo, 
87.3 AM. SCHOLAR 14 (2018) (“Fortunately, #MeToo is broadening its scope to tell tales 
of people’s livelihoods . . . that expand our understanding of . . . sexual harrassment.”). See 
generally Dean Spade, Intersectional Resistance and Law Reform, 38 SIGNS: J. WOMEN 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 1031, 1050 (2013) (“[R]esistance conceived through single-axis 
frameworks can never transform conditions of intersectional violence and harm, and 
failure to depart from single-axis analysis produces reforms that contribute to and 
collaborate with those conditions). 
 21. Chris Cillizza, Trump Promised Disruption. That’s Exactly What He’s Delivering, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), http://wapo.st/2jKWesV?tid=ss_mail&utm_term=.
2eca5f30ccd1. 
 22. See Jim VandeHei, Donald Trump, a 1990s Man, AXIOS (Feb. 26, 2018), 
https://www.axios.com/donald-trump-worldview-past-success-1950s-china-4e778596-
522e-43f8-9fdb-3235c0568427.html (ascribing a “Mad Men” mentality to the President). 
 23. See Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social 
Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894 (1936). 
 24. Cf. RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT 
LOVE (1981). 
 25. See Suzannah Lessard, Kennedy’s Woman Problem, Women’s Kennedy Problem, 
WASH. MONTHLY 10 (Dec. 1979), http://www.unz.com/print/WashingtonMonthly-
1979dec-00010 (“Philandering, like heavy drinking, traditionally has been one of those 
activities that the boys in the press keep mum about when reporting on the boys on the 
Hill, or the boy in the White House, or any boy for that matter.”). Compare Joan 
McCarter, The Senate’s Quietest Rock Star Has Some Very Tough Questions for Trump’s 
Supreme Court Nominee, DAILY KOS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.dailykos.com
/stories/2018/8/10/1787278/-The-Senate-s-quietest-rock-star-has-some-very-tough-
questions-for-Trump-s-SCOTUS-nominee?detail=emaildksp (reporting that Senator 
Mazie Hirono (D-Haw.) planned to ask President Trump’s judicial nominees this pair of 
questions: “Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted requests for 
sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual 
nature?”; “Have you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind 
of conduct?”). 
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his own misogyny and the persistence of sex-role stereotyping.26 
Even more, he has lifted the curtain on the “dirty secret”27 about 
women and work: that the workplace too often is a gendered 
arena in which countless women are targets of physical abuse, 
sexual exploitation, psychological domination, and reduced 
opportunity simply because they are women and typically due to 
the misconduct of men,28 who often, but not always, are in 
superior employment positions.29 Energized by the 
Administration’s extreme positions, women have refused to draw 
that curtain closed.30 Each woman may be differently situated in 
the workplace, but as a person who is not a man each shares what 
Professor Kathryn Abrams described twenty years ago as “a 
continuing history of being subject to exclusion and 
devaluation.”31 
 
 26. E.g., Nick Corasaniti & Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Suggests “Second 
Amendment People” Could Act Against Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton.html. 
 27. Anita F. Hill, Sexual Harrassment: The Nature of the Beast, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1445, 1446 (1992). 
 28. The media and social media have begun to report incidents of younger men 
accusing older women in powerful positions of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Aaron Feis, 
Asia Argento Accused of Paying Hush Money to Silence Sexual Assault Allegations, PAGE 
SIX (Aug. 19, 2018), https://pagesix.com/2018/08/19/asia-argento-accused-of-paying-hush-
money-to-silence-sexual-assault-allegations (reporting harassment involving famous older 
female actress and younger male actor); Zoe Greenberg, What Happens to #MeToo When 
a Feminist Is the Accused?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/13/nyregion/sexual-harassment-nyu-female-professor.html (reporting sexual 
harassment involving philosophy professor and graduate student); see also Rebecca K. 
Lee, Beyond the Rhetoric: What It Means to Lead in a Diverse and Unequal World, 71 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 110 (2018) (describing incidents of sexual harassment within 
organizations run by women). 
 29. See Vicki Schultz, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment 
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 19 (2018) (“[H]arassment is 
more about upholding gendered status and identity than it is about expressing sexual desire 
or sexuality.”); see also Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable 
Discrimination, 29 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 61 (2018) (“[W]omen across a wide range 
of employment settings face obstacles that inhibit their advancement at work through 
policies and practices not reached by traditional antidiscrimination laws.”); Ann C. 
McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 99 (2018) (arguing 
that harassment should not be equated with “romantic or sexual desire,” but rather 
involves the perpetrator wanting to prove “masculinity”). 
 30. See Hilary Weaver & Katey Rich, Galvanized by #MeToo and a Year of Trump, 
the Women’s March Returns to the Streets, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/style/2018/01/womens-march-2018. 
 31. Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 881–82 
(1997). See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
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The theme of this Symposium is the Constitution in the age 
of Trump. Across fields, commentators have questioned whether 
America’s constitutional regime is adequate to meet current 
concerns.32 President Trump’s toxic attitudes about women make 
us ask: Does it remain appropriate for the Constitution to omit all 
mention of women from the text,33 or to limit women’s 
constitutional possibility to the rights and liberties deemed 
significant by the male (and white) Founding Fathers?34 To be 
sure, before Trump entered the White House, the Court’s 
interpretation of the federal Constitution with respect to sex 
discrimination had slowly begun to shift from a formal approach 
that compares essentialized men with essentialized women, to one 
that more broadly probes why social practices and legal 
requirements accommodate the needs of some persons (usually 
male) and not those of others (usually female),35 and, further, that 
interrogates a unitary vision of men and women as white, elite, 
and conformist.36 But the interpretive movement was not all 
forward. During this period the Court also impeded women’s 
 
 32. E.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Trump, Trust, and the Future of the Constitutional 
Order, 77 MD. L. REV. 161, 179 (2017) (“[T]he future of the constitutional order is likely 
to depend on political elites growing more comfortable with the notion of reforming the 
Constitution . . . .”); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights in the Trump 
Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
611, 665 (2017) (“By consistently announcing extreme immigration policy measures that 
test constitutional limits, the Trump administration may ultimately force the Supreme 
Court to squarely reconsider the plenary power doctrine.”). 
 33. The twentieth-century amendment extending the franchise refers to sex. See U.S. 
CONST. AMDT. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”). See also Kathleen 
M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 735 (2002) (“The 
U.S. Constitution is the only major written constitution that includes a bill of rights but 
lacks a provision explicitly declaring the equality of the sexes.”); Reva B. Siegel, She the 
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 947, 953 (2002) (“The modern law of sex discrimination is built on the 
understanding that there is no constitutional history of relevance to the question of 
women’s citizenship.”). 
 34. See Ruth Rubio-Marín & Wen-Chen Chang, Sites of Constitutional Struggle for 
Women’s Equality, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301, 302 
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that late recognition of women’s equality 
meant that rights “universalized the male condition”). 
 35. E.g., Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy as a Normal Condition of Employment: 
Comparative and Role-Based Accounts of Discrimination, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 969, 
1006 (2018) (discussing pregnancy accommodation as a “bridge issue”). 
 36. Admittedly, most of intersectional analysis is still confined to the media and to 
academic circles, and not the courts. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1290 (1991) (emphasizing the 
inadequacy of the sameness/difference model for women of color). 
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advancement by making it more difficult for Congress to create 
and enforce social and economic rights that are critical to 
meaningful and not merely formal equality.37 
Looking forward, many commentators expect President 
Trump’s policy agenda to harm women across multiple 
dimensions, contributing to a loss of physical autonomy, 
decreased financial status, and increased social vulnerability. In 
addition, these approaches will disproportionately worsen the 
lives of women of color, of women whose sexual identity does not 
conform to a male/female divide, and of women who are poor or 
in low-wage jobs.38 Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the 
Constitution likely will provide women with neither a sword nor 
a shield against mounting gendered inequality; to the contrary, 
the Trump Court more than likely will raise the Constitution as a 
cudgel against women.39 Many of Trump’s deregulatory initiatives 
that impact women will be impervious to constitutional challenge 
because of the weak standard of rationality review that the 
Supreme Court applies to social and economic regulation.40 Nor 
is it likely that the Constitution will be applied to support 
affirmative claims against the government; unlike the 
constitutions of the states or of most industrialized liberal 
democracies, the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the 
health, education, housing, or employment of its citizens,41 and it 
 
 37. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 
Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 
1943 (2003) (describing and criticizing the Court’s enforcement model of the Section 5 
power of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of 
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2403 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court now stands as an impediment to 
legislative efforts to protect women and minorities against private violence.”). 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. See Robin Abcarian, For Trump, #MeToo Is #SoWhat? Yet Again, His Attitude 
and Hires Show Deep Antipathy Toward Women, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2018), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-abcarian-womens-rights-20180710-
story.html (“President Trump wants a Supreme Court that will overturn Roe vs. Wade.”). 
 40. See generally Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1277 (1993). Challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act, federal 
statutes, and state law remain viable. 
 41. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
Every state has its own constitution, and courts in some states have declared and enforced 
state constitutional rights to specific items of assistance to the needy, such as emergency 
housing. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-
Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923 (2011); 
see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal 
Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999). On “positive” rights in constitutions 
abroad, see, e.g., Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American 
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has not been interpreted to hold the government accountable for 
economic inequality, whether gendered or racialized, that 
government action does not directly cause.42 Although the Due 
Process Clause so far protects women’s reproductive choices, the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence could further jeopardize 
women’s liberty interests and cut more deeply against a federal 
right to reproductive choice.43 Moreover, for some Justices, 
respect for gender equality has been viewed as tantamount to 
taking “sides in the culture wars” and not as a principle of 
constitutional merit.44 
Part I of this Article contextualizes women’s current 
resistance to the Trump Administration’s policies, discussing how 
women’s absence from the Constitution coincides with their 
economic and social inferiority, especially since the economic 
meltdown of the early twenty-first century. The problems 
identified in this Part were an entrenched feature of American life 
before Trump became President but elected officials frequently 
overlooked or pushed them to the side. 
Part II turns to the Trump Administration’s policy agenda, 
which has privileged financial elites, cut back worker protections, 
and sought to dismantle health and welfare protection, including 
those that bear on women’s reproductive choice. Looking at an 
illustrative sample of the President’s policies, we examine their 
anticipated impact on women and show that they are likely to 
exacerbate gendered trends of social and economic disadvantage. 
Part III takes an unusual turn, at least for a symposium that 
is focused on constitutional law. We look not at the Supreme 
Court, but at the lower federal courts, and explore not the 
Constitution and the substantive law of gender equality, but the 
 
Exceptionalism, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 84, 89–91 (Sujit 
Choudhry ed., 2006) (discussing positive constitutional rights as an aspect of “inherent 
human dignity”). 
 42. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: 
Now More Than Ever, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 569, 573 (2014) (referring to “the 
perception that the Constitution addresses state action while economic inequality is mainly 
produced by (what is regarded as) private action”). 
 43. E.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) 
(invalidating requirement that licensed clinics disseminate notice of existence of publicly-
funded family-planning services). 
 44. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2622 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the Court’s recognition of marriage equality, and asking, “If an unvarying social institution 
enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can?”). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules involve basic 
litigation devices such as arbitration agreements, motions to 
dismiss, summary judgment, and class certification. Our focus on 
procedure should not be regarded as “a technical affair” or off the 
mark for those interested in gender equality.45 Constitutional 
scholars, studying the Civil Rights Movement and the campaign 
for marriage equality, have argued that popular mobilization can 
motivate and legitimate the progressive reordering of 
constitutional doctrine.46 Procedural rules—long regarded as 
critical to rights and liberty47—provide a pathway through which 
social movements translate constitutional aspirations into 
constitutional doctrine. Civil procedure plays this role by 
shaping, channeling, and encouraging—or discouraging—the 
flow of information to and from the court and ultimately to the 
public.48 Activism in resistance to President Trump’s policies 
concerning women offer interpretive resources that are critical to 
the reframing of constitutional narrative.49 As we show, there is 
a danger that information about women’s experiences will be 
filtered from public knowledge through procedural decisions that 
seem distant from constitutional struggles. In our view, anyone 
seriously interested in the transformative power of women’s 
mobilization must take account of procedural rulings that 
 
 45. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 27 (Stewart 
Macaulay ed., 2012) (noting the view that “all procedure … is a technical affair”). We leave 
to the side—despite its importance—the question of who creates the rules, and the 
demographic profile of the rule makers. See Brooke D. Coleman, #SoWhiteMale: Federal 
Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U.L. REV. 407 (2018) (urging greater attention to diversity in 
appointments to the Civil Rules Committee); see also Melissa Heelan Stanzione, #So White 
Male: Civil Rules Group’s Makeup Limits Its Work, 86 U.S.L.W. 1712 (2018) (reporting 
that of the 136 members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules appointed in its 82-
year history, 116 have been men). 
 46. See generally Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 360 (2018) (“Within US legal scholarship, it is the moment of social 
movement.”). 
 47. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.) (“The 
history of liberty has largely been the history of the observance of procedural 
safeguards.”). 
 48. We define social movement as allied with Bruce Ackerman’s conception of a 
“revolution on a human scale”: “a self-conscious effort to mobilize the relevant community 
to reject currently dominant beliefs and practices in one or another area of social life,” to 
which we underscore the affirmative duty of providing a constructive alternative.  Bruce 
Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2283 (1999). 
 49. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (arguing 
that “constitutional culture channels social movement conflict to produce enforceable 
constitutional understandings”). 
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potentially blunt the communicative force of a social movement 
and thereby diminish its legal and political potential.50  
This Article certainly is not the first to associate the 
application of federal procedural rules with gendered effects.51 
Some would argue that these judicial trends are evidence of 
stealth activism—not by liberal judges seeking to adapt the 
Constitution to current concerns, but by conservative judges 
cutting back on equality-favoring laws enacted by earlier political 
coalitions.52 Others might equate them with an unspoken 
assumption that “women’s issues” are not worth the federal 
courts’ time and trouble—consistent, for example, with the 
exclusion of domestic-relation cases from federal jurisdiction.53 
Our contribution is to examine the linkage between adjudicative 
procedure and the potential impact of social mobilization on 
constitutional culture. We raise the question whether procedural 
decisions, by failing to engage with the facts of women’s 
experiences, inadvertently undermine what Elizabeth Winkler 
has referred to as women’s “epistemological authority,” and so 
diminish or block women’s contribution to legal discourse.54 
 
 50. One federal judge has described the judiciary’s application of procedure as 
“kabuki rituals in which the plaintiffs, and plaintiffs alone, regularly lose long before trial.” 
Judge Nancy Gertner (Ret.), The “Lower” Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump, 93 
IND. L.J. 83, 86 (2018). 
 51. We build upon feminist procedural scholarship that earlier identified the ways in 
which federal procedure and jurisdiction systematically disadvantage or ignore women. 
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2196 
(1993) (“Teaching about the federal courts has not insulated me from having to ask about 
the relationship between law and women and thus has not shielded me from whatever taint 
comes with being ‘visible on women’s issues.’”); Judith Resnik, Revising the Canon: 
Feminist Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1193 (1993) (observing 
“how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves contribute to the ideology that 
women are absent from the federal courts”). See also Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 37, 50 (2000) (“A relation between women and complaints is part of 
the larger struggle of women’s liberation.”). 
 52. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law 
Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827 (1993). 
 53. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 
IOWA L. REV. 1073 (1994) (discussing the exclusion of family law disputes from federal 
diversity jurisdiction); Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, 
and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991) (discussing the marginalization of 
women in the federal courts and focusing on the exclusion of domestic-relation cases from 
federal diversity jurisdiction). 
 54. Elizabeth Winkler, Denying Women’s Ability to Know, NEW PUB. (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/151614/denying-womens-ability-know. 
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Part IV is normative and prescriptive. Trump’s presidency 
has triggered a national conversation about women;55 his policies 
are likely to impede women’s advances, and his appointments to 
the Supreme Court are allied with his vision. Even before the 
current crisis, some commentators urged a renewed effort at 
amending the Constitution to give women an explicit place in its 
text and to commit the nation to a substantive conception of 
equality and liberty.56 In our view, the Constitution is sufficiently 
capacious to remedy structural forms of gender inequality and to 
recognize the sorts of social and economic claims that are now 
typical of contemporary constitutions. But we have little optimism 
that the Supreme Court will embrace this approach without a 
constitutional amendment. In these times, mobilizing to ensure 
that the Constitution will protect persons regardless of gender is 
critically important, to be combined with grassroots mobilization, 
participation in state and local elections, and pursuing 
enforcement actions in agencies and state and federal courts. 
Procedure can support or subvert substantive goals, but in the end 
the substantive law of gender equality could itself benefit from 
repair. In this Part we sketch out the ways in which an equal rights 
amendment could expand women’s constitutional possibilities 
and improve America overall.57 We then briefly conclude. 
 
 55. See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, Stormy Daniels, Feminist Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2018, 
at 2 (discussing pornographic film star who has accused the President of extra-marital 
infidelity and other misconduct, and stating “the country is . . . watching her dogged refusal 
to be quiet and her unflagging insistence that she isn’t the one who should be 
embarrassed”). 
 56. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 42, at 569 (arguing that the Constitution and 
statutes have “gone about as far as they will or can to produce equality of the sexes in 
life”). 
 57. The current version of the Equal Rights Amendment provides: “Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State 
on account of sex.” Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment on March 22, 1972, and 
its adoption required approval by legislatures of 38 of the 50 states. On May 30, 2018, 
Illinois became the 37th state to ratify the ERA. See EQUAL RTS. AMEND., 
https://www.equalrightsamendment.org (last visited Nov. 1, 2018); Ned Oliver, Only One 
More State Needs to Ratify the Equal Rights Amendment. Will It Be Virginia?, VA. 
MERCURY (July 25, 2018); see also Bettina Hager, A New Urgency to Ratify the Equal 
Rights Amendment, HILL (July 13, 2018) (reporting 94% of persons polled support the 
amendment, but 80% believed the Constitution already includes a provision protecting the 
equal rights of women). Our argument is not tethered to the language of the existing ERA. 
3 - HERSHKOFF & SCHNEIDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:30 PM 
2019] SEX, TRUMP, AND CHANGE 55 
 
I. GENDER INEQUALITY AT THE TIME OF THE 2016 
ELECTION 
The 2016 Presidential election focused extraordinary 
attention on the fact that Hillary Clinton, the Democratic Party 
candidate, is a woman—a first for a major party in American 
history.58 Trump, as a candidate, notoriously claimed that his 
opponent did not look presidential (code for not male).59 Some 
commentators have tried to explain Trump’s victory as the result 
of the status anxiety of white male voters about women’s changed 
position in American society.60 To be sure, American society has 
changed a lot in the last two decades. Half of the workforce is now 
female;61 a higher percentage of women have college degrees than 
men.62 Trump proved adept at using a faux-populist rhetoric that 
resonated with men who felt marginalized in an economy 
negatively impacted by decades of deregulation, attacks on 
unions, and out-sourcing.63 Candidate Trump made no effort 
during his campaign to connect with the group that has been 
especially hard hit—women, and especially women of color, who 
continue to be relegated to low-wage, part-time, no-benefit jobs 
with reduced opportunities for advancement or asset formation. 
In this Part, we offer a snapshot of women’s social and economic 
position in the wake of the 2007 meltdown and in the lead-up to 
the 2016 presidential election.64 
 
 58. Victoria Woodhull was the first female presidential candidate, running on the 
Equal Rights Party against Ulysses S. Grant in 1872, but she did not campaign because she 
was in prison. See JoEllen Lind, The Clinton/Palin Phenomenon and Young Women 
Voters, 30 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 513, 517 (2009) (discussing Woodhull’s candidacy); 
Susan E. Gallagher, Privacy and Conformity: Rethinking “the Right Most Valued by 
Civilized Men,” 33 TOURO L. REV. 159, 168 (2017) (discussing reasons for Woodhull’s 
imprisonment). 
 59. See Jessica Lussenhop, Presidential Debate 2016: Four Ways Gender Played a 
Role, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-37481754. 
 60. See Ben Hecht, Reflections on the 2016 Election, HUFFPOST (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-hecht/reflections-on-the-2016-e_b_13057038.html. 
 61. Labor force participation has converged over time, with men’s labor force 
participation declining to 69.1% and women’s increasing to 57.0% by 2016. See Hartmann, 
supra note 10. 
 62. See Hecht, supra note 60. 
 63. See Male Voters: Sometimes It’s Hard, ECONOMIST 22 (July 21, 2018) (explaining 
that male voters for Trump are retaining their allegiance to the Republican Party because 
of a perceived “status threat” from women). See also John Hudak, A Reality Check on 
2016’s Economically Marginalized, BROOKINGS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/fixgov/2016/11/16/economic-marginalization-reality-check (unpacking categories 
of economic marginalization). 
 64. For an overview of social and economic conditions since the 2008 financial 
meltdown, see INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF 
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A. EMPLOYMENT AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP 
In 2007, the United States economy experienced a significant 
downturn;65 it took women longer than men to recover from its 
effects, which came on top of their earlier cumulative 
disadvantages in the workplace and financial sector.66 On the eve 
of the Trump Administration, women’s work force participation 
was high (although lower than in 2014),67 but women’s wages, 
earnings, and benefits lagged behind those of men. In 2016, 
women who worked full time, year-round in all career fields made 
an average of $41,554, 80% of the male equivalent of $51,640.68 
That means every week a man took home on average $170 more 
than a woman did.69 Women of color faced a particularly steep 
earnings gap.70 Overall, even accounting for occupation, industry, 
hours worked, and education, a substantial pay gap remained 
 
WOMEN IN THE STATES (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/R532-
National-Fact-Sheet_Final.pdf. 
 65. See Maria Cancian & Sheldon Danziger, Changing Poverty and Changing 
Antipoverty Policies, in CHANGING POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 1 (Maria Cancian & 
Sheldon Danziger eds., 2009) (reporting that “the severe economic downturn that began 
in late 2007 reduced employment and earnings and raised the official poverty rate”). 
 66. The effects of the recession on women’s labor force participation lasted nine 
months longer than they did for men, ending around October 2010. See Hartmann, supra 
note 10. For the concept of cumulative disadvantage, see Carroll L. Estes, Women’s Rights, 
Women’s Status, Women’s Resistance in the Age of Trump, 41 GENERATIONS 36, 37–38 
(2017). 
 67. See Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (April 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/2016/home.htm (reporting that 
women’s labor force participation in 2015 was 56.7%, down from 57.0% in 2014). 
 68. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY 
GAP 6 (Spring ed. 2018) [hereinafter AAUW]. 
 69. ARIANE HEGEWISCH & EMMA WILLIAMS-BARON, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY 
RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 2017 EARNINGS DIFFERENCES BY RACE AND 
ETHNICITY 1 (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/C464_Gender-Wage-
Gap-2.pdf. A recent projection found that if college-educated millennials experience 
earnings growth at rates similar to the cohort that preceded them, college-educated 
millennial women will make $1,066,721 less between ages 25 and 60 than college-educated 
millennial men. See Jeff Hayes & Heidi Hartmann, Wage Gap Will Cost Millennial Women 
$1 Million Over Their Careers, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://iwpr.org/publications/wage-gap-cost-millennial-women-1-million-over-careers/. 
 70. Compared to the average white man working full-time, year-round, the average 
Latina makes 54%, the average American Indian or Alaska Native woman makes 60%, 
the average Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander woman makes 60%, the average African-
American woman makes 65%, the average white woman makes 77%, and the average 
Asian-American woman makes 87%. ASHA DUMONTHIER ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S 
POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 27 tbl. 2.3 
(2017), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/The-Status-of-Black-Women-
6.26.17.pdf. 
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between women and men.71 As the Institute for Women’s Policy 
Research reported in April 2018: “Women’s median earnings are 
lower than men’s in nearly all occupations, whether they work in 
occupations predominantly done by women, occupations 
predominantly done by men, or occupations with more even mix 
of men and women.”72 Indeed, to the extent the gender wage gap 
remained stable, it was largely because most male salaries were 
stagnant.73 
A key factor in the gender wage gap relates to the kinds of 
jobs that women on average hold.74 Women are more likely than 
men to work in hourly jobs,75 more than twice as likely to work in 
part time jobs,76 and more than eight times as likely to work in 
occupations with poverty level wages.77 Black women during this 
period had high rates of labor force participation—62.2%—but 
their 2014 median annual earnings of $34,000 for full-time, year 
round jobs was lower than that of most other gender/race 
combinations, in part because more than a quarter of employed 
Black women worked in service occupations, which had the 
lowest income of any occupational group.78 
 
 71. AAUW, supra note 68. 
 72. Hegewisch & Williams-Baron, supra note 69. An earnings gap exists between 
women based on their education; between 1985 and 2017, earnings generally remained flat 
for less educated, low-wage workers between 1985 and 2017. See Pamela J. Loprest & 
Demetra Smith Nightingale, Six Ways the Changing Nature of Work Challenges the Safety 
Net, URB. INST. (July 23, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/six-ways-changing-
nature-work-challenges-safety-net. From 1981 to 2007, the earnings gap between female 
college graduates and female high school graduates increased from 28% to 49%. CTR. FOR 
CMTY. CHANGE & OLDER WOMEN’S ECON. SEC. TASK FORCE, EXPANDING SOCIAL 
SECURITY BENEFITS FOR FINANCIALLY VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 13 (2013) 
[hereinafter CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE], https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/
files/iwpr-export/publications/cccfinalweb10_29.pdf. 
 73. See 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know, STAN. CTR. 
POVERTY & INEQ. (2011), https://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-us-
inequality-everyone-should-know. 
 74. See The Gender Gap, ECONOMIST, Oct. 7, 2017, at 61 (“The gender pay gap 
would shrink if men moved into female-dominated jobs and vice versa.”). 
 75. Sunny Frothingham & Shilpa Phadke, 100 Days, 100 Ways the Trump 
Administration Is Harming Women and Families, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 25, 
2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/reports/2017/04/25/430969/100-
days-100-ways-trump-administration-harming-women-families/. 
 76. JOAN ENTMACHER ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., OVERCOMING BARRIERS 
TO RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR WOMEN: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (2016), 
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_49.pdf. 
 77. Hegewisch & Williams-Baron, supra note 69. 
 78. DUMONTHIER ET AL., supra note 70. 
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All of this translated into a gender wage gap of 20%, meaning 
a female worker earned 80 cents on every dollar paid to a male 
worker. Looking only at Black women, the average gender gap 
was a difference annually of $21,698, or 63 cents for every dollar 
paid to a white, non-Hispanic man;79 Latinas received 54 cents for 
every dollar paid.80 Significantly, the trend was somewhat 
different for women who were members of public sector unions. 
Women, indeed women of color, comprise the majority and more 
than half of union-represented workers. Women in full-time, 
year-round public sector unionized jobs earned 83 cents on the 
dollar paid to male workers, or a gender wage gap of 17%. In 
addition, women in public sector unionized jobs had greater 
access to health insurance than non-unionized women workers.81 
For this reason, the 2007 economic meltdown, which caused states 
and cities to cut public sector jobs, had severe effects on women, 
and especially on women of color.82 
Job type translated into other forms of gendered inequality. 
One measure of the quality of a job is the nature of benefits that 
accompany the wages paid.83 In the United States, workers in the 
bottom 25% of the wage distribution have lower access to benefits 
such as health insurance, retirement benefits, paid sick leave and 
 
 79. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BLACK WOMEN AND THE WAGE GAP 
1, 3 (2018). Closing that gap would significantly improve quality of life and expand 
opportunity, translating year-round into: “[t]wo and a half years of child care; [n]early 2.5 
additional years of tuition and fees for a four-year public university, or the full cost of 
tuition and fees for a two-year community college; 159 more weeks of food . . . ; [m]ore 
than 14 additional months of mortgage and utilities payments; or [t]wenty-two more 
months of rent.” Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted). 
 80. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, LATINAS AND THE WAGE GAP 1 (2018). 
 81. KAYLA PATRICK, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS 
PROMOTE ECONOMIC SECURITY AND EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 2 (2018). 
 82. See DAVID COOPER, MARY GABLE & ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY 
INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 339, THE PUBLIC-SECTOR JOBS CRISIS 13 (2012) (“The high 
concentration of women and African Americans working in the public sector, and the 
greater wage equity many experience there, make cuts to state and local government 
especially painful for both groups.”). 
 83. See Eileen Appelbaum et al., Introduction and Overview, in LOW-WAGE WORK 
IN THE WEALTHY WORLD 3 (Jérôme Gautié & John Schmitt eds., 2010): 
Most analyses of the key determinants of job quality focus on: compensation, 
including benefits or social entitlements (such as health insurance, pension, paid 
vacation, parental leave, paid sick days, and other nonwage compensation); 
contractual status, in particular whether the job is permanent or temporary (one 
of the fundamental determinants of job security); training and career 
opportunities; task discretion and other aspects of job design, such as work pace; 
health and safety conditions; and work schedules including the scope for finding 
a balance between work and family life. 
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paid vacation than those in the top 25%. Part-time workers are 
twice as likely to have an irregular work schedule or on-call shifts, 
making it difficult to count on stable earnings, creating challenges 
to work-life balance, and raising barriers to payment for 
overtime.84 
Where did candidate Trump stand on the issue of low wages 
and the gender wage gap? He argued that wages are “too high” in 
the United States, and urged that the federal minimum wage—
which provides a critical floor for women’s wages—be rolled 
back.85 He consistently focused on declines in traditionally male-
dominated industries, such as coal mining and steel work, without 
mentioning comparable declines in traditionally female-
dominated industries, such as service and retail.86 And his rhetoric 
manipulated status anxiety and prejudice about women and 
people of color to divert attention from the pressing economic 
problems that have not been fixed since the economic meltdown.87 
B. INCOME INEQUALITY, GENDERED HOMEWORK, AND ASSET 
FORMATION 
The gender wage gap also reflected the effects of societal 
expectations about women’s work inside the home as an 
uncompensated caregiver, whether for children or the elderly or 
disabled.88 The United States is the only industrialized country 
without a national paid family leave policy.89 Even unpaid leave 
under the Family Medical Leave Act is available to only 60% of 
 
 84. See Loprest & Nightingale, supra note 72; Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75. 
 85. See Maggie Haberman, Donald Trump Insists that Wages Are “Too High,” N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/11/11/donald-
trump-insists-that-wages-are-too-high/ (reporting candidate Trump’s comments about the 
minimum wage). The candidate back-pedaled on this position. See Bryce Covert, Donald 
Trump Takes 3 Different Positions on the Minimum Wage in Less than 30 Seconds, 
THINKPROGRESS (July 27, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org/donald-trump-takes-3-
different-positions-on-the-minimum-wage-in-less-than-30-seconds-d88c8d8648ba/. 
 86. See generally Derek Thompson, The Silent Crisis of Retail Employment, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/the-
silent-crisis-of-retail-employment/523428/. 
 87. See Tom Jacobs, Research Finds that Racism, Sexism, and Status Fears Drove 
Trump Voters, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 24, 2018), https://psmag.com/news/research-finds-
that-racism-sexism-and-status-fears-drove-trump-voters. 
 88. See generally Dianne Avery & Martha T. McCluskey, When Caring Is Work: 
Home, Health, and the Invisible Workforce Introduction, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 253 (2013). 
 89. See State Family and Medical Leave Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 19, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/
state-family-and-medical-leave-laws.aspx. 
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workers.90 A 2013 report found that there were roughly 65.7 
million people providing unpaid caregiver services to disabled and 
elderly Americans, of whom 66% were women.91 Because of these 
unpaid domestic responsibilities, working women tend to work 
fewer hours for wage labor than men, and are more likely to take 
time out of the workforce.92 Over the course of a lifetime, caring 
for a disabled or elderly individual can result in an average of 4.6 
years out of the labor market during peak working years.93 The 
gendered privatization of “care” work contributed to the 
gendered wage gap which snowballed into a gendered asset gap: 
women owned 32 cents on the dollar compared with men.94 The 
wealth gap for women of color was severe. According to a 2015 
study, while the median wealth of a single white man between 
ages 18 and 64 was $28,900 and the median wealth for a single 
white woman between ages 18 and 64 was $15,640, that figure was 
just $200 for Black women and $100 for Hispanic women.95 
Candidate Trump conspicuously did not speak about child 
care or acknowledge the work-related barriers that home-care 
responsibilities create for women—instead, he assigned that chore 
to First Daughter Ivanka Trump as the spokesperson on 
childcare.96 The campaign’s initial proposal depended on tax 
deductions, and was widely criticized as being of little use to low-
wage families that have insufficient income to benefit from this 
regulatory approach.97 
 
 90. See Sarah E. Crippen, Ashleigh M. Leitch & Joel P. Schroeder, What L&E 
Attorneys Need to Know About the Trump Administration, 64-JUL. FED. LAW. 46, 47 
(2017) (quoting statistic). 
 91. CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, supra note 72, at 9. 
 92. AAUW, supra note 68, at 18–19. Twenty-seven percent of employed mothers of 
children under age 3 work part-time, compared with just 6% of employed fathers of 
children under age 3. ENTMACHER ET AL., supra note 76, at 7. 
 93. CTR. FOR CMTY. CHANGE, supra note 72, at 9. 
 94. Robert Reich & Heather McCulloch, Wealth, Not Just Wages, Is the Way to 
Measure Women’s Equality, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/
op-ed/la-oe-reich-mcculloch-womens-wealth-gap-20170825-story.html#. 
 95. MARIKO CHANG, ASSET FUNDERS NETWORK, WOMEN AND WEALTH INSIGHTS 
FOR GRANTMAKERS 6 (2015), http://www.mariko-chang.com/AFN_Women_and_Wealth
_Brief_2015.pdf. 
 96. See Patricia Garcia, The Problem with Ivanka Trump’s Proposed Childcare Plan, 
VOGUE (March 14, 2017), https://www.vogue.com/article/ivanka-trump-childcare-plan 
(discussing Ivanka Trump’s role as a spokesperson about affordable childcare). 
 97. See Danielle Paquette & Damian Paletta, Trump Changes Course on Child-Care 
Benefit After Criticism He Would Mainly Help Well-Off Families, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/25/trump-changes-course
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C. RATES OF POVERTY AND SAFETY NET PROGRAMS 
During this period, poverty rates tended to be higher among 
female- than male-headed families, which contributed to a greater 
overall need for public assistance, even when women worked or 
had significant work histories.98 About 42% of U.S. mothers were 
the primary breadwinners for their families.99 Twenty-six percent 
of all families were headed by a single mother, and almost two-
fifths of these families lived in poverty.100 Women who spent at 
least ten years as a single mother were more likely to experience 
poverty when they became seniors.101 
Despite the need for public support to fill income gaps, the 
safety net provided only limited assistance. For example, although 
the lack of safe, affordable housing has been found by the World 
Health Organization to put women and children at risk for both 
violent victimization and depression,102 only one in five eligible 
renter households received any government assistance.103 Child 
care assistance reached only one in six eligible children.104 Food 
support programs likewise did not cover all nutritional needs. The 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), known 
colloquially as food stamps, fell short in 99% of U.S. counties of 
what it costs a low-income individual or family to buy food.105 
WIC, a food assistance program targeted for pregnant and 
lactating women, as well as infants and children, served only about 
four-fifths of those who were eligible because of underfunding.106 




 98. AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., POVERTY IN 
THE UNITED STATES: 50-YEAR TRENDS AND SAFETY NET IMPACTS (March 2016), at 23–
24. 
 99. AAUW, supra note 68, at 5. 
 100. ENTMACHER ET AL., supra note 76, at 7–8. 
 101. Id. at 7. See generally Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2018) (discussing impact of tax and other laws on asset formation by differently arranged 
adults and children). 
 102. Am. Psychological Ass’n, WOMEN & SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS (2018), 
http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-women.pdf. 
 103. Loprest & Nightingale, supra note 72. 
 104. Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75. 
 105. Loprest & Nightingale, supra note 72. 
 106. WIC is the acronym for the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women and 
Infant Children, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771–93. See Martha Burk, Trump’s Starvation 
Budget, MS. MAG. BLOG (June 14, 2017), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2017/06/14/trumps-
starvation-budget/. 
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they depended on loans to pay tuition. Although more women 
than men received Pell Grants,107 grants covered just 29% of the 
average cost of tuition, fees, room, and board at a public  four-
year college, the lowest level in four decades.108 
During old age, greater rates of poverty among women 
relative to men increased women’s dependency on Social Security 
benefits as their source of income.109 More than a quarter of 
elderly women—27%—depended on Social Security as 90 
percent or more of their income,110 compared with 21% of men.111 
At the same time, women received on average a Social Security 
payment that was 77% that of men, and 38% of retired female 
workers (versus 18% of men) received payments that placed them 
below the poverty line, i.e., below $950 a month.112 Women also 
were more likely to have disabilities and poor women had a higher 
rate of dependence on benefits through the Supplemental 
Security Insurance program.113 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized in 1954 the 
secure position of particular social welfare programs in American 
political life: 
Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, 
unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm 
programs, you would not hear of that party again in our 
political history. There is a tiny splinter group, of course, that 
believes you can do these things. Among them are . . . Texas oil 
millionaires, and an occasional political or business man . . . . 
Their number is negligible and they are stupid.114 
 
 107. Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75. 
 108. Spiros Protopsaltis & Sharon Parrott, Pell Grants – a Key Tool for Expanding 
College Access and Economic Opportunity – Need Strengthening, Not Cuts, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (July 27, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-
budget/pell-grants-a-key-tool-for-expanding-college-access-and-economic-opportunity. 
 109. Sixteen percent of unmarried senior women and 4.4% of married senior women 
lived in poverty, compared with 11.8% of unmarried senior men and 4.2% of married 
senior men. Hispanic seniors are the most likely to be poor (18.7%), followed by Black 
seniors (17.3%), Asian American seniors (11.7%), and finally white seniors (6.7%). CTR. 
FOR CMTY. CHANGE, supra note 72, at 13, 20 fig. 8. 
 110. ENTMACHER ET AL., supra note 76, at 3. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Estes, supra note 66; Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75. 
 114. Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edgar Newton Eisenhower (Nov. 8, 1954), 
in The Presidential Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, EISENHOWER MEMORIAL, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051124190902/http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/preside
ntial-papers/first-term/documents/1147.cfm. 
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In keeping with this script, the Trump campaign promised not to 
cut Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid. However, the 
campaign concurrently announced plans to block-grant Medicaid, 
which would reduce benefits provided by states under the existing 
program. The campaign called for the elimination of the 
Department of Education.115 And during campaign rallies, Trump 
talked about the need to “roll back the number of people on food 
stamps,” seriously misstating the program’s enrollment figures.116 
D. HEALTH STATUS, HEALTH CARE, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
Overall, during this period women were expected to live 
longer than men, but life expectancy rates varied by 
socioeconomic status.117 However, across socioeconomic status, 
women generally needed more health care than men.118 Lack of 
health care is associated with adverse physical and mental effects, 
including obesity, depression, and death or impairment from 
treatable conditions, such as cancer, heart disease, addiction, and 
 
 115. Trump-O-Meter: Tracking Trump’s Campaign Promises, POLITIFACT, 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/browse/ (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2018). 
 116. See Jordyn Phelps, Trump Says “Seriously Overweight” Protester Upset Over Talk 
of Food Stamps, ABC NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-
overweight-protester-upset-talk-food-stamps/story?id=35293941. 
 117. A woman at age 65 is expected to live another 20.3 years; a man, 17.8 years. 
However, there is a wide age-expectancy gap between rich and poor women. In 1970, there 
was a 4.7 year difference between the life expectancy of a 50-year old woman in the top 
10% of earners and one in the bottom 10% of earners. By 2000, that difference had 
expanded to 13 years. Sabrina Tavernise, Disparity in Life Spans of the Rich and the Poor 
Is Growing, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016), https://nyti.ms/1RwgE6h. 
 118. Women accounted for 60% of outpatient visits and 60% of ER visits. Women 
were 70% more likely than men to have had an inpatient hospital stay, and 40% more 
likely to have had mental health care needs. Sixty-two percent of insurance plans on the 
individual market prior to enactment of the Affordable Care Act did not cover maternity 
care. See Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75. 
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pregnancy.119 Prior to the election (in 2014), 16% of nonelderly 
Black women lacked health insurance.120 
Over a lifetime, a woman’s access to health care impacts 
reproductive choice which affects economic and social status in 
multiple ways. Disparities in access to contraception lead to 
unplanned pregnancies that can dramatically alter a woman’s life 
plans (the most commonly cited reason to seek contraceptive 
services is inability to afford a baby’s care).121  Black women also 
experienced the highest rates of unintended pregnancies, which 
were attributed in part to disparities in access to contraceptive 
care and counseling.122 Women with incomes below the poverty 
level experienced unplanned pregnancy at five times the rate of 
those living at 200% of poverty.123 In 2014, 49% of women who 
obtained abortions had income below the poverty level.124 This 
means that abortion restrictions disproportionately impacted 
poor women who already suffered multiple and cumulative 
disadvantage.125 Infants born to Black mothers had a mortality 
rate twice that of white infants during the first year of life, even in 
 
 119. Low-income women who have no insurance have the lowest rates of 
mammography screening among women ages 40-64, and women of lower socio-economic 
status with breast cancer are 11% more likely to die. Obesity, risk of becoming obese, and 
staying obese through young adulthood are all strongly correlated with poverty among 
women. Women with HIV have disproportionately lower income than men with HIV, and 
poverty is the most significant indicator of whether heterosexuals “living in the inner city” 
will develop the AIDS virus. Women of lower socio-economic status report more 
depressive symptoms during pregnancy and at 2 and 3 months postpartum. Insecure 
employment is linked to higher levels of chronic stress, and lower employment rank is a 
strong predictor of depression. Low-income women are also more likely to develop 
problems with drinking and drug addiction. Am. Psychological Ass’n, supra note 102. 
 120. Black women’s average annual heart disease mortality rate was the highest 
among the largest racial and ethnic groups of women. Black women had the second highest 
rate of lung cancer mortality among the largest racial and ethnic groups of women. Black 
women had an incidence of AIDS five times that of any other racial and ethnic group of 
women, and 40% of Black women experienced intimate partner violence, compared with 
31.5% of all women. See DUMONTHIER ET AL., supra note 70, at xix. 
 121. Adam Sonfield, What Women Already Know: Documenting the Social and 
Economic Benefits of Family Planning, GUTTMACHER POLICY REV., Winter 2013, at 8, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/article_files/gpr160108.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 2. 
 123. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states#8-12a. 
 124. JENNA JERMAN ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. 
ABORTION PATIENTS IN 2014 AND CHANGES SINCE 2008 (2016), https://www.guttmacher.
org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/characteristics-us-abortion-patients-2014.pdf. 
 125. Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. 
(Feb. 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/targeted-regulation-
abortion-providers-trap-laws. 
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cases in which the Black mother had an educational advantage 
over the white mother.126 Moreover, relative to white women, 
Black women were three to four times more likely to die during 
pregnancy or childbirth.127 
Trump’s campaign offered a full-throttle assault on public-
supported health care services. He called for the end to the 
Affordable Care Act, calling it a “total disaster,”128 and 
announced that he would never support “socialized medicine,” 
yet promised that under his health plan the government would 
take care of “everybody.”129 He stated he is “pro-life” and that he 
would nominate Justices to the Supreme Court of the United 
States who would overturn Roe v. Wade.130 And he urged the 
dismantlement of veterans’ health care and its replacement with 
a market-based plan.131 What was most salient about the 
campaign’s health proposals was its utter disregard for the 
importance of health care to women—proposing to end the 
Affordable Care Act without any reasonable substitute ensuring 
care and coverage for women’s health conditions.132 
 
 126. See The Decline in Mortality Among Black Babies Has Stopped, ECONOMIST 
(July 15, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/07/15/the-decline-in-
mortality-among-black-babies-has-stopped. 
 127. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, BLACK WOMEN’S MATERNAL 
HEALTH: A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO ADDRESSING PERSISTENT AND DIRE 
HEALTH DISPARITIES 1 (2018), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/
maternal-health/black-womens-maternal-health-issue-brief.pdf. 
 128. Sy Mukherjee, Donald Trump Says Obamacare Is a “Total Disaster.” Here’s the 
Truth, FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/10/donald-trump-obamacare-
debate/. 
 129. Avik Roy, The Most Important Thing About Donald Trump’s Health Reform 
Plan Is That Trump Didn’t Write It, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/theapothecary/2016/03/03/the-most-important-thing-about-donald-trumps-health-
reform-plan-is-that-donald-didnt-write-it/#fce7fbc5e662; see also John Merline, Trump 
Was For Socialized Medicine Before He Was, Sort Of, Against It, INV.’S BUS. DAILY (Aug. 
7, 2015), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/trump-praises-single-payer-
health-care-in-debate/. 
 130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll Appoint Supreme 
Court Justices to Overturn Roe v. Wade Abortion Case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/trump-ill-appoint-supreme-court-justices-to-overturn-
roe-v-wade-abortion-case.html. 
 131. Promises About Veterans on Trump-O-Meter, POLITIFACT, https://www.politifact
.com/truth-o-meter/promises/trumpometer/subjects/veterans/. 
 132. Caroline Rosenzweig, Usha Ranji & Alina Salganicoff, Health and the 2016 
Election: Implications for Women, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/perspective/health-and-the-2016-election-
implications-for-women/. 
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II. TRUMP’S POLICY AGENDA AND GENDERED 
INEQUALITY 
In the previous Part, we described the gendered (and 
racialized) nature of economic marginalization as it existed on the 
eve of the 2016 presidential election—marginalization that 
resulted from social and economic arrangements structured by 
law, maintained by the government, and enforced through courts 
and social norms.133 Every indication is that the Trump 
Administration, unconstrained, will further exacerbate women’s 
unequal status. Certainly the messages in the early months of the 
Administration were not favorable. To consider a few examples: 
The Council on Women and Girls, established by the Obama 
Administration to coordinate work across agencies, did not 
announce any initiatives during the Trump Presidency other than 
to remove from the White House website a 2014 report on sexual 
violence;134 the President’s appointments have been 
predominantly male (and white);135 and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention banned from budget documents the 
words vulnerable, diversity, and fetus—which one commentator 
said amounts to “a license to discriminate.”136 
 
 133. See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE WELFARE STATE: A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 13 (2016) (“[F]ar from being natural or spontaneous, free-market 
economic arrangements had to be forcibly established by government action that 
overturned customary laws, set aside traditional safeguards, and abolished long-standing 
rights of common.”); see also ANDREA FLYNN, ROOSEVELT INST., JUSTICE DOESN’T 
TRICKLE DOWN: HOW RACIALIZED AND GENDERED RULES ARE HOLDING WOMEN 
BACK 4 (2017) (stating that gendered and racialized disparities and inequities “are not the 
result of individual ambition or aptitudes, as conservatives often suggest, but rather an 
outgrowth of . . . policies, institutions, and practices”). 
 134. See Tara Palmeri, White House Council for Women and Girls Goes Dark Under 
Trump, POLITICO (June 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/30/donald-
trump-white-house-council-for-women-and-girls-239979; Alanna Vagianos, Sexual 
Assault Report Drops from White House Site, Remains on Obama Archive, HUFFPOST 
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/white-house-quietly-removes-
sexual-assault-report-from-website_us_59a6c322e4b084581a14ab59. 
 135. “The White House has named twice as many men as women to administration 
positions. This gender skew is both broad and deep: In no department do female 
appointees outnumber male appointees, and in some cases men outnumber women four 
or five to one. Moreover, men significantly outnumber women in low-level positions as 
well as in high-level ones, with Trump’s Cabinet currently composed of 19 men and five 
women.” Annie Lowrey & Steven Johnson, The Very Male Trump Administration, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/03/the-very-
male-trump-administration/556568. 
 136. Sabrina Siddiqui, How Has Donald Trump’s First Year Affected Women?, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/18/how-has-
donald-trumps-first-year-affected-women; see also Lena H. Sun & Juliet Eilperin, CDC 
Gets List of Forbidden Words: Fetus, Transgender, Diversity, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), 
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In this Part, we survey some of the Administration’s key 
policy efforts. We are selective, illustrative, and do not claim to be 
comprehensive in our description of Trump’s policies as they 
affect women. The President’s major initiative so far has been tax 
revision137—which he touted as a lifeline to working families.138 
For those working families that depend on women’s work, the 
statute in fact could cut that line.139 The statute repealed the 
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act, making it easier 
for insurance carriers to withhold or increase the cost of coverage 
for preexisting conditions or maternity care;140 and, it redesigned 
tax brackets and deductions, making corporate tax cuts 
permanent, but sun set individual tax cuts in 2025, making it likely 
that over time budget deficits will be invoked to reduce services 
that low-income families headed by women need.141 The 
Administration’s other initiatives, apart from a relentless assault 
on the Affordable Care Act, have been either less visible to the 
public or less obvious in their effects on gender equality, but the 
trend does not favor women.142 As examples, we focus on the 
Administration’s position on overtime workplace rules, 





 137. See Individual Tax Reform and Alternative Minimum Tax, Pub. L. 115-97, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 138. See Ben Chu, Would Donald Trump’s Tax Plan Really Help Ordinary Working 
Americans and Boost US Growth?, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/donald-trump-tax-plan-us-economy-growth-help-blue-collar-
working-americans-a8091501.html. 
 139. Maya Rhodan, Meet the Winners and Losers of the GOP Tax Reform Bill, TIME 
(Nov, 2, 2017), http://time.com/5007611/trump-tax-plan-republican-reform/ (discussing 
growth of national debt and phase out of estate tax). 
 140. See Sy Mukherjee, The GOP Tax Bill Repeals Obamacare’s Individual Mandate. 
Here’s What That Means for You, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com
/2017/12/20/tax-bill-individual-mandate-obamacare/. 
 141. See Erik Sherman, CBO: Senate Tax Bill Is Even Worse for Low-Income People 
than Thought, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2017/
11/27/cbo-senate-tax-bill-is-even-worse-for-low-incomes-than-before/#47fe6b1f503c (“By 
2027, everyone making less than $75,000 would provide a net savings to the government, 
whether through higher taxes, lower amounts spent on services, or both.”). 
 142. See Siddiqui, supra note 136 (“A year since women marched across the world in 
protest of Trump, many view his presidency as ‘the worst we’ve ever seen for women[.]’”); 
Burk, supra note 106 (describing the Administration’s proposed budget and stating, 
“there’s no doubt its main target—programs benefiting women, kids and the poor—will 
remain in the crosshairs”); Frothingham & Phadke, supra note 75 (“It has only been 100 
days, and millions of women are already feeling the negative impacts of the Trump 
administration and its misguided agenda.”). 
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We then turn to the Administration’s efforts to eliminate 
affordable health care, which we see as a way to entrench gender 
stereotypes and to erode a democratic “commons” that is integral 
to a liberal constitutional order.143 
A. WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Shortly after winning the Republican nomination to be the 
presidential candidate, Trump was asked how his leadership 
would affect the direction of his political party. The Washington 
Post reported: “‘Five, 10 years from now—different party,’ Trump 
predicted. ‘You’re going to have a workers’ party.’”144 Rhetoric 
aside, that prediction invites skepticism.145 The Trump 
Administration’s policies on wages and discrimination not only 
run counter to workers’ interests, but also entrench gender 
stereotypes and widen the gender wage gap.146 We offer two 
examples. 
Wages: The Trump Administration’s attitude toward wage 
equity can be summed up in its decision to block a requirement 
that companies with one hundred or more employees 
confidentially report pay rates by gender, race, ethnicity, and job 
category. EEO-1 is a survey document that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission has required employers 
to complete for the last fifty years. The data that EEO-1 generates 
provide a basis for the EEOC’s policy development and also are 
a resource for litigants in employment discrimination suits and 
 
 143. Compare Richard A. Epstein, The Wrong Rights, or: The Inescapable Weaknesses 
of Modern Liberal Constitutionalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2018), with Tom Ginsburg, 
Aziz Z. Huq & Mila Versteeg, The Coming Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 239 (2018). 
 144. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Trump’s Policies Offer Plutocracy on Steroids, Not 
Economic Populism, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/trumps-policies-offer-plutocracy-on-steroids-not-economic-populism/2018/01/09
/0bc83768-f495-11e7-a9e3-ab18ce41436a_story.html?utm_term=.12ce25ba78ed. See also 
David A. Graham, A Trumpist Workers’ Party Manifesto, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/trump-workers-party/484469/ 
(“Abandoning the low-tax, small-government orthodoxy of the GOP, its nominee says he 
envisions the Republican Party of the future as a ‘“workers” party.’”). 
 145. See Robert Kuttner, Trump, the Globalist Plutocrat, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 30, 
2018), http://prospect.org/article/trump-globalist-plutocrat (discussing the President’s 
address at the World Economic Forum and stating that “[s]trip the racism from his 
nationalist appeal and . . . [i]t’s camouflage for his service to the global billionaire class 
from which he comes”). 
 146. Cf. Andrea Flynn, The Supreme Court’s War on Women Is Also a War on 
Workers, WASH. POST (July 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post
everything/wp/2018/07/23/the-supreme-courts-war-on-women-is-also-a-war-on-workers/. 
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researchers.147 During the Obama Administration, the EEOC 
revised the form, effective 2018, with the specific goal of 
identifying pay disparities.148 As then-EEOC Chair Jenny Yang 
announced, “[collecting pay data is] a significant step forward to 
address pay inequality in the workplace.”149 However, in August 
2017, without prior notice to the public,150 the Office of 
Management and Budget announced an “immediate stay” of the 
revised rule, explaining that in its view “some aspects of the 
revised collection of information lack practical utility, are 
unnecessarily burdensome, and do not adequately address 
privacy and confidentiality issues.”151 
While stifling efforts to make gender pay disparities more 
transparent, the Trump Administration also made it more 
difficult for women to receive overtime for hours worked beyond 
the ordinary work day. The issue is important because female 
wages traditionally have been lower, given barriers to their 
receiving overtime payment under the Fair Labor Standards 
 
 147. See ROBERT W. SIKKEL, EEO-1 REPORTS: WHAT DO THEY REALLY TELL US 
(2003), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-aba-annual/papers/2003/sikkel.pdf. See also 
Julie A. Kmec & Sheryl L. Skaggs, The “State” of Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
and Managerial Gender Diversity, 61 SOC. PROBS. 530 (2014) (examining state mandates 
in the context of EEO-1 data). 
 148. In February 2016 the EEOC issued revisions to EEO-1 followed by a 60-day 
comment period and held public hearings in March 2016. The EEOC modified the form in 
response to comments, which was then followed by a further comment period at the OMB, 
which received more than 1,000 comments. The OMB approved the revised form on Sept. 
29, 2016. See Agency Information Collection Activities: Revision of the Employer 
Information Report (EEO-1) and Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 5113 (Feb. 1, 2016). 
 149. Remarks of Chair Jenny R. Yang at the White House Equal Pay Event, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
newsroom/release/chair-remarks-1-19-2016.cfm. 
 150. The abrupt action triggered a Freedom of Information Law suit by the ACLU to 
uncover the basis for the decision. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Who Was Behind the Move to 
Halt Reporting Rules on Equal Pay?, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/who-was-behind-move-halt-reporting-rules-
equal-pay (“The decision, reached behind closed doors, without public input, and lacking 
any evidentiary support, stands in sharp contrast to the rigorous, multi-year deliberative 
process that led to the EEOC’s adoption of the new EEO-1.”). 
 151. Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Victoria Lipnic, Acting Chair, Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017); see also What You Should Know: Statement of Acting Chair 
Victoria A. Lipnic About OMB Decision on EEO-1 Pay Data Collection, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/eeo1-pay-
data.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
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Act.152 During the Obama Administration, the President directed 
the U.S. Department of Labor to “modernize and streamline” 
then-existing regulations implementing statutory requirements.153 
In response, the Department published a final rule, effective 
December 1, 2016, raising the overtime threshold, thereby 
extending overtime coverage to previously excluded wage 
laborers.154 Half of the newly eligible workers would have been 
female—3.2 million women, many of them single mothers and 
women of color.155 The Trump Administration announced its 
intention to withdraw the regulations, which later were 
challenged by a group of states and business groups. Ten days 
before the regulations were to take effect, a Texas district court 
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction,156 and on August 31, 
2017 that injunction became permanent.157 So far, the Trump 
Administration has not published new rules.158 
The Trump Administration also pushed to eliminate 
Department of Labor regulations protecting billions in tip 
income, regulations that largely benefited women who work in the 
restaurant and hospitality industry. In 2011, the Department of 
Labor published regulations that allow restaurants to pool tips, 
 
 152. See Celine McNicholas, Heidi Shierholz & Marni von Wilpert, Workers’ Health 
Safety, and Pay Are Among the Casualties of Trump’s War on Regulations, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/deregulation-year-in-review/. 
 153. Presidential Memorandum of March 13, 2014; Updating and Modernizing 
Overtime Regulations, 79 Fed. Reg. 18,737 (Apr. 3, 2014). 
 154. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.600; see also Final Rule: Overtime, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE & 
HOUR DIVISION, https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/final2016/. 
 155. HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH & 
MOMSRISING, HOW THE NEW OVERTIME RULE WILL HELP WOMEN & FAMILIES 2 
(2015), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/iwpr-export/publications/
Women%20and%20Overtime%20(Final).pdf. 
 156. See Nevada v. Dep’t of Labor, 218 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Tex. 2016). In a later 
proceeding, the court denied the motion of the AFL-CIO to intervene, finding the motion 
was not timely and that the government defendants adequately represented the interests 
of the union, notwithstanding statements of the in-coming Secretary of Labor that the 
department “‘may’ amend or repeal the Final Rule.” See Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
No. 4:16-CV-731, 2017 WL 3780085, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2017). 
 157. Nevada v. Dep’t of Labor, 275 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
 158. On July 26, 2017, the Department of Labor published a Request for Information, 
Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, 
Outside Sales and Computer Employees. Overtime Pay: Request for Information, U.S. 
DEP’T LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/rfi2016.htm. See 
Stephen Miller, Overtime Rule Changes Are Coming, but Will They Be in Time?, SOC’Y 
FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Mar. 24 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/compensation/pages/overtime-rule-changes-coming.aspx (“If the DOL doesn’t 
finalize a new rule before the 2020 elections, all bets are off[.]”). 
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but require them to share the tips only with workers who 
customarily receive tips—the employer could not retain the 
tips.159 The Trump Department of Labor recommended that the 
tip rule be revised to enable tips to be shared with workers who 
do not ordinarily receive tips, such as dishwashers—but did not 
bar the employer from retaining the tips.160 The Economic Policy 
Institute estimated that under the revised rule, employers would 
likely pocket $5.8 billion of their workers’ tips each year, and that 
80% would be diverted from women, each of whom would lose 
around $1000 a year.161 To compound the injury, the Department 
of Labor altered the methodology used in its analysis of the roll-
back’s effect, and in public discussion omitted any mention of the 
adverse impact of the proposal.162 In the end, the Trump 
Administration did not succeed in changing the tip rule.163 
Employment Discrimination: Gender stereotypes are 
acknowledged to reflect not only entrenched notions about the 
appropriate social roles of men and women, but also social norms 
about the meaning of manhood and womanhood.164 For this 
reason, discrimination against those whose genders do not 
conform to the conventional male/female divide should be 
 
 159. 76 Fed. Reg. 18831 (Apr. 5, 2011), updating regulations issued under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act; Final Rule. 
 160. See Ben Penn, Labor Department Proposes Killing Obama Tip Pooling Rule, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.bna.com/labor-department-proposes-
n73014472723. 
 161. Heidi Shierholz, David Cooper, Julia Wolfe & Ben Zipperer, Women Would 
Lose $4.6 Billion in Earned Tips if the Administration’s “Tip Stealing” Rule Is Finalized, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/women-would-lose-4-
6-billion-in-earned-tips-if-the-administrations-tip-stealing-rule-is-finalized-overall-
tipped-workers-would-lose-5-8-billion/. 
 162. See Whitney Filloon, Tip-Pooling Will Cost Workers Billions, According to 
Hidden Labor Department Data, EATER (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.eater.com/2018
/2/1/16959342/tipping-tip-pooling-dol-data-hidden-cost-workers-billions. 
 163. See Paul Ausick, Tipped Workers Will Get to Keep Their Tips, 24/7 WALL ST 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://247wallst.com/energy-business/2018/03/22/tipped-workers-will-
get-to-keep-their-tips/ (reporting that the omnibus budget bill contained the following 
language: “An employer may not keep tips received by its employees for any purposes, 
including allowing managers or supervisors to keep any portion of employees’ tips, 
regardless of whether or not the employer takes a tip credit.”). 
 164. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. 
L. REV. 187, 232 (1988) (“[H]eterosexism reinforces the social meaning of gender by 
affirming a sex-differentiated, patriarchal conception of marriage.”); see also Nancy Levit, 
Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
1037 (1996) (discussing ways in which men are harmed by gender stereotypes). 
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considered a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.165 
Nevertheless, the Trump Administration has taken the position 
that anti-discrimination laws do not encompass non-conforming 
gender. The Department of Justice in October 2017 released a 
guidance announcing that in all future litigation it would argue 
that “Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses 
discrimination between men and women but does not encompass 
discrimination based on gender identity per se, including 
transgender status.”166 Earlier, the United States had appeared 
amicus curiae in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that 
Title VII did not cover sexual orientation,167 a position which a 
divided appeals court, en banc, rejected, finding instead that “an 
employee’s sex is necessarily a motivating factor in discrimination 
based on sexual orientation”: 
Looking first to the text of Title VII, the most natural reading 
of the statute’s prohibition on discrimination “because of . . . 
sex” is that it extends to sexual orientation discrimination 
because sex is necessarily a factor in sexual orientation. This 
statutory reading is reinforced by considering the question 
from the perspective of sex stereotyping because sexual 
orientation discrimination is predicated on assumptions about 
how persons of a certain sex can or should be, which is an 
impermissible basis for adverse employment actions. In 
addition, looking at the question from the perspective of 
associational discrimination, sexual orientation 
discrimination—which is motivated by an employer’s 
opposition to romantic association between particular sexes—
is discrimination based on the employee’s own sex.168 
 
 165. Some commentary sees stereotype theory as a problematic basis for Title VII 
liability. See, e.g., Drew Culler, The Price of Price Waterhouse: How Title VII Reduces the 
Lives of LGBT Americans to Sex and Gender Stereotypes, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 509, 511 (2017) (“Since sexual orientation is not expressly included among 
Title VII’s other protected classes, courts have tried to fit a square peg in a round hole by 
likening sexual orientation to sex or sex stereotypes.”); Brian Soucek, Perceived 
Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715 (2014) (discussing 
gender stereotyping under Title VII as applied to homosexuals in the workplace). 
 166. Memorandum from the Attorney General on Revised Treatment of Transgender 
Employment Discrimination Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to 
United States Attorneys and Heads of Department Components (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4067437-Sessions-memo-reversing-gender-
identity-civil.html. 
 167. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (No. 15-3775); see also Daniel Wiessner, States Ask SCOTUS 
to Rule that Title VII Does Not Ban Transgender Bias, REUTERS LEGAL (Aug. 28, 2018). 
 168. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13. 
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The Justice Department’s action followed the President’s 
earlier initiative, announced in a tweet, that the Armed Services 
would ban transgendered persons, reversing President Obama’s 
2016 decision to permit transgendered persons to serve.169 These 
were only initial salvos in the effort to deprive trans persons of 
legal existence. Other agencies have withdrawn Obama-era 
protections for those with non-conforming gender identity, and 
have made a frontal assault to treat gender as biologically 
determined and fixed throughout a person’s lifetime.170 
At the same time, the Attorney General, pursuant to an 
Executive Order,171 issued a guidance on religious liberty, stating 
that “to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, 
religious observance and practice should be reasonably 
accommodated in all government activity, including employment, 
contracting, and programming.”172 Although we recognize the 
 
 169. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/890196164313833472?lang=en (“After 
consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United 
States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity 
in the U.S. Military.”); see Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security on Military Service by Transgender Individuals (Aug. 25, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/25/presidential-memorandum
-secretary-defense-and-secretary-homeland. For a discussion of the ways in which gender 
and class converge with respect to trans persons, see Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, 
Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 53 (2009); see 
also Dean Spade, Keynote Address: Trans Law & Politics on a Neoliberal Landscape, 18 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 358 (2009) (“Trans people are disproportionately 
poor because of employment discrimination, family rejection, [and] troubles accessing 
school, medical are, and social services.”). 
 170. See Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, Trump Administration Eyes 
Defining Transgender Out of Existence, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-sex-definition.html 
(“The Trump administration is considering narrowly defining gender as a biological, 
immutable condition determined by genitalia at birth, the most drastic move yet in a 
governmentwide effort to roll back recognition and protections of transgender people 
under federal civil rights law.”). 
 171. Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 21,675 (May 9, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/05/09/2017-
09574/promoting-free-speech-and-religious-liberty. 
 172. Memorandum from the Attorney General on Federal Law Protections for 
Religious Liberty to All Executive Departments and Agencies 1 (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/download?utm_medium=email&
utm_source=govdelivery; see also Memorandum from the Attorney General on 
Implementation of Memorandum on Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty to All 
Component Heads and United States Attorneys (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001886/download	 ?utm_medium=email&
utm_source=govdelivery. 
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importance of faith,173 legitimate concerns may be raised as to 
whether the Administration potentially has tilted the scale in 
favor of those who would invoke religion to exclude pregnant 
women from the workplace,174 to deny health coverage for 
contraception,175 and to discriminate across-the-board against 
gender-non-conforming persons.176 
B. FUNDING AND OTHER CUTS TO FOOD AND EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS 
The Trump Administration also has used a variety of 
techniques to rescind regulatory protections and to reduce access 
to safety net programs, both of which would adversely affect 
women. We provide two examples. 
Food Assistance: The Trump Administration’s 2019 budget 
would radically reconfigure the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program, colloquially known as SNAP or food stamps. 
SNAP currently is structured to enhance the purchasing power of 
eligible households to purchase groceries and a few food-related 
items in approved grocery stores. The program depends on a 
market mechanism that works to boost the agricultural sector of 
the economy, improves nutrition for participating households, 
and assists local economies.177 To be sure, SNAP benefits are not 
sufficient in many locales to meet all food needs.178 However, the 
program historically has been proved effective in ameliorating 
 
 173. See Katrina Rose Myers, Little Sisters’ Sorrow: Conversations About 
Contraception and Reproductive Justice, 24 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 337, 339 (2018) 
(discussing how reproductive justice advocates might “accommodate the Sisters’ religious 
exercise, while ensuring that all women receive full health coverage”). 
 174. For an analysis that precedes the Attorney General’s action, see Jessica L. Waters 
& Leandra N. Carrasco, Untangling the Reproductive Rights and Religious Liberty Knot, 
26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (2014). 
 175. See Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER 
L. & POL’Y 139 (2006). 
 176. See Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of 
LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 177. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., MEASURING THE EFFECT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SNAP) PARTICIPATION ON FOOD SECURITY (2013), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/Measuring2013Sum.pdf (finding that 
participation in SNAP improved food security for all groups). 
 178. The average benefit is $1.40 per meal per person. See Chart Book: SNAP Helps 
Struggling Families Put Food on the Table, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 
14, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/chart-book-snap-helps-
struggling-families-put-food-on-the-table. 
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poverty-caused hunger.179 In 2015, more than half of the recipients 
were women (57%) and three-quarters of households in the 
program included a child.180 The Trump Administration has 
proposed to revamp SNAP into a modified commodities 
distribution program—dressed up in the language of “harvest 
boxes”181—that would include no fresh foods, only pantry staples 
like cereal, peanut butter, and canned fruit.182 Moreover, the 
proposal attaches work conditions to SNAP participation.183 The 
Trump proposal has been called “insulting,”184 “paternalistic,”185 
and likely to “cause hunger to soar”186—and its adverse effects 
would be borne by women and children who make up the majority 
of the program’s participants. In response, the Administration 
defended the proposal as a cost saving device—but its cost 
estimates did not include shipping door-to-door for all recipients 
or the health deficits from a lack of fresh fruit and vegetables.187 
Moreover, in calculating costs, the Administration simply ignored 
the positive effects of SNAP on the communities in which poor 
women live; the program bolsters retail store sales and improves 
 
 179. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REACHING THOSE IN NEED: HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE 
FOOD STAMP PROGRAM? (Jan. 12, 2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/
files/ops/howefsum.pdf (reporting data); see also SNAP MATTERS: HOW FOOD STAMPS 
AFFECT HEALTH AND WELL-BEING 68 (Judith Bartfeld, Craig Gundersen, Anthony M. 
Smeeding & James P. Ziliak eds., 2016) (stating that data show that SNAP is “the most 
effective antipoverty program among the nonelderly”). 
 180. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., REPORT NO. SNAP-16-CHAR, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HOUSEHOLDS: FISCAL YEAR 2015, 
at xvi (2016). 
 181. Sasha Abramsky, “America’s Harvest Box” Captures the Trumpian Attitude 
Toward Poverty, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/
business/currency/americas-harvest-box-captures-the-trumpian-attitude-toward-poverty. 
 182. See Erica Hunzinger et al., Trump Administration Wants To Decide What Food 
SNAP Recipients Will Get, NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2018/02/12/585130274/trump-administration-wants-to-decide-what-food-snap-
recipients-will-get. 
 183. See GREGORY ACS, LAURA WHEATON & ELAINE WAXMAN, URB. INST., 
ASSESSING CHANGES TO SNAP WORK REQUIREMENTS IN THE 2018 FARM BILL (2018). 
 184. Sidney Fussell, Trump’s Insulting Food Stamps Plan Is Nothing Like Blue Apron, 
GIZMODO (Feb. 13, 2018), https://gizmodo.com/trumps-insulting-food-stamps-plan-is-
nothing-like-blue-1822968283. 
 185. Miles Howard, You Can’t Eat That: Trump’s Paternalistic Approach to Food 
Assistance, WBUR (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2018/02/14/food-
stamps-miles-howard. 
 186. Dan Lesser, President Trump’s “Harvest Box” Plan Will Cause Hunger to Soar, 
SHRIVER CTR. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://theshriverbrief.org/president-trumps-harvest-box-
plan-will-cause-hunger-to-soar-2811eb2f93d8. 
 187. See Helena Bottemiller Evich, Trump Pitches Plan to Replace Food Stamps with 
Food Boxes, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/12/food-
stamps-trump-administration-343245. 
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nutrition for non-SNAP recipients, because participating grocery 
stores stock healthier foods.188 So far, the business community, 
advocates, and government officials have responded negatively to 
the “harvest box” proposal,189 and the Administration has 
acknowledged that the plan has virtually “no chance” of being 
implemented.190 But what the proposal does signal is the 
Administration’s desire to reduce benefits for the poor—
adversely affecting many women—and to impose work 
restrictions that would exacerbate the existing adverse gendered 
pattern of employment. 
Education: Women relative to men disproportionately rely 
on loans to finance higher education; however, women generally 
earn less than men after graduation, and their default rates are 
higher.191 The scale of the problem is deep and pervasive.192 With 
44 million borrowers and $1.3 trillion in outstanding loans, women 
hold two-thirds of that debt,193 and Black women carry the most 
student debt.194 Some loans are made directly by the federal 
government; other loans are made by private creditors. Federal 
loans issued before 2010 through the Federal Family Education 
Loan Program are administered by private entities known as 
 
 188. Phil Lempert, USDA’s America’s Harvest Box Is A Terrible Idea For All, FORBES 
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/phillempert/2018/02/23/ag-secretary-sonny-
perdue-its-time-to-think-and-ask-others-about-snap-before-you-say-
anything/#36c169ab485a (reporting that 13 to 30% of local grocery store sales come from 
SNAP recipients). 
 189. See Elizabeth Crawford, Proposed Changes to SNAP Benefits Could Halve How 
Much Recipients Spend at Participating Retailers, FOOD (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2018/02/13/Proposed-changes-to-SNAP-
benefits-could-halve-how-much-recipients-spend-at-participating-retailers#. 
 190. Glenn Thrush, Trump’s “Harvest Box” Isn’t Viable in SNAP Overhaul, Officials 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/us/harvest-box-
snap-food-stamps.html; see also Matthew Diller & Susan Welber, Why Congress May Shut 
Down Trump’s War on the Poor, CNN (Sept. 7, 2018) (reporting “pushback” in Congress 
on work requirements, but noting that a “new War on the Poor” has begun). 
 191. Amy Martyn, Women Bear Disproportionate Burden of Student Debt Crisis, 
Report Finds, CONSUMER AFF. (June 6, 2018), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/
women-bear-disproportionate-burden-of-student-debt-crisis-report-finds-060618.html. 
 192. Judith Scott-Clayton, The Looming Student Loan Default Crisis Is Worse than 
We Thought, BROOKINGS (Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that cumulative default rates continue 
to rise, and that 40% of borrowers may default by 2023). 
 193. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, DEEPER IN DEBT: WOMEN AND STUDENT 
LOANS (May 2017), https://www.aauw.org/files/2017/05/DeeperInDebt_Executive
Summary-nsa.pdf. 
 194. Paula Rogo, Study Finds that Black Women Graduate with the Most Student Loan 
Debt, ESSENCE (July 11, 2018), https://www.essence.com/news/study-black-women-most-
student-loan-debt/. 
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guaranty agencies, and during the Obama Administration these 
agencies were barred from imposing collection fees on debtors 
who respond to a default notice within 60 days and enter into and 
abide by a repayment agreement.195 The Department of 
Education in March 2017 rescinded the no-fee rule,196 a change 
that negatively impacts almost seven million debtors.197 
At the same time, the Trump Department of Education has 
taken steps to protect for-profit proprietary schools against claims 
by students for misrepresentation and contractual breach.198 For-
profit schools overall have lower student enrollment than other 
colleges and universities, but they disproportionately recruit, 
attract, and enroll women, people of color, and persons with 
limited income. Their higher tuition, inferior academic programs, 
and lower placement rate thus disproportionately affect women 
of color, who graduate with higher levels of debt.199 Among its 
rollbacks, the Education Secretary rescinded an Obama 
Administration rule that would have forgiven loans of debtors 
who were enrolled at schools that violated state requirements or 
misrepresented job and other metrics to students.200 Indeed, the 
Administration put the fox in charge of the hen house, appointing 
 
 195. Kaitlin Mulhere, The Feds Just Rolled Back a Rule Protecting You from 
Overzealous Student Debt Collectors, MONEY (Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://time.com/money/4705199/student-debt-default-collection-fees/. 
 196. LYNN B. MAHAFFIE, ACTING ASSISTANT SEC’Y, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY 
EDUC., GEN-17-02, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: WITHDRAWAL OF DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER (DCL) 15-14 (Mar. 16, 2017), https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/attachments/
GEN1702.pdf. 
 197. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections for 
People in Default on Student Loans, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/03/17/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-
for-people-in-default-on-student-loans/?utm_term=.dc223534e86a. 
 198. See Patricia Cohen, For-Profit Schools, an Obama Target, See New Day Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/business/for-
profit-education-trump-devos.html. 
 199. Women’s Student Debt Crisis in the United States, AAUW, https://www.aauw.org/
research/deeper-in-debt/ (last updated May 2018). 
 200. See Laura Meckler & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump Administration Moves 
to Make It Harder for Defrauded Students to Erase Debt, CHI. TRIB. (July 25, 2018), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-devos-student-debt-20180725-
story.html. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia challenged the Department’s 
decision, which the district court in the District of Columbia enjoined as arbitrary and 
capricious. See Bauer v. DeVos, 325 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2018). 
3 - HERSHKOFF & SCHNEIDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:30 PM 
78 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:43 
 
a former for-profit college official to head the Department of 
Education’s anti-fraud initiative.201 
C. REDUCING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND IMPEDING 
REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE 
The politically polarized disputes about health care, funding 
for reproductive services, and abortion are complex, deep seated, 
and predate the Trump Administration.202 What is clear is that the 
Affordable Care Act provided Trump as a candidate and as 
President with a large target for attack. Trump’s opposition to 
President Obama’s signature legislative achievement was loud 
and visceral. He quickly announced a plan to repeal the statute, 
replace the statute, eliminate the statute, or let the statute “crash 
& burn.”203 
The Affordable Care Act facilitates the ability of women to 
obtain health insurance by lowering the costs of coverage.204 The 
statute also improves the range and quality of care, recognizing 
the need for preventive care, including mammograms, “well-
women” visits, breastfeeding support, and contraception.205 
Moreover, it explicitly bars the denial of coverage because of 
preexisting “woman’s” conditions such as breast cancer or 
pregnancy.206 The Administration has tried to weaken or damage 
 
 201. See Michael Stratford, Trump and DeVos Fuel a For-Profit College Comeback, 
POLITICO (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/31/devos-trump-
forprofit-college-education-242193. 
 202. For one perspective, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 373 (2007). 
 203. David A. Graham, “As I Have Always Said”: Trump’s Ever-Changing Positions 
on Health Care, ATLANTIC (July 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2017/07/as-i-have-always-said-trumps-ever-changing-position-on-health-care/535293/. 
 204. See Jamila Taylor, How Women Would Be Hurt by ACA Repeal and Defunding 
of Planned Parenthood, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/women/news/2017/01/18/296705/how-women-would-be-hurt-by-aca-
repeal-and-defunding-of-planned-parenthood/ (reporting that 9.5 million previously 
uninsured women gained coverage through the ACA). 
 205. See Joseph Denker et al., Health Care Access: Access After Health Care Reform, 
18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 599, 617–32 (2017) (discussing ACA provisions pertinent to 
women). 
 206. See Munira Z. Gunja et al., How the Affordable Care Act Has Helped Women 
Gain Insurance and Improved Their Ability to Get Health Care: Findings from the 
Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance Survey, 2016, COMMONWEALTH FUND 
(Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-
briefs/2017/aug/how-affordable-care-act-has-helped-women-gain-insurance-and, 
reporting: 
To insurers, women’s gender was, in effect, a preexisting condition that signaled 
the potential for higher health care use and higher costs. That is why in most 
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the statute in a number of ways. Significantly, the Administration 
declined to defend the statute against challenges brought by 
Texas and other states;207 the President insisted that tax reform, 
by eliminating the individual mandate, effectively repealed the 
statute;208 and agency regulations extended an exemption for 
religiously-motivated employers to withhold contraception from 
workplace coverage.209 
The President’s actions and attitudes leave many women 
vulnerable to inadequate health care because of financial barriers, 
preexisting medical conditions, and restrictions on contraception 
and necessary preventive screenings. Moreover, the assault on the 
Affordable Care Act is only one feature of a broader agenda that 
undermines women’s autonomy by removing access to 
reproductive choice and basic health care. The President has 
proposed defunding Planned Parenthood210 and making budget 
cuts to the WIC program;211 the White House opposed a global 
 
states insurers selling plans in the individual market charged young women higher 
premiums than young men—to protect themselves from this greater risk. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office found in 2013 that in 38 states, 
individual-market plans with the lowest premiums charged a nonsmoking 30-
year-old single woman a higher premium than they charged her male 
counterpart. 
 207. See Amy Goldstein, Trump Administration Won’t Defend Obamacare in Case 
Brought by Texas and Other GOP States, TEX. TRIB. (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/06/08/trump-administration-wont-defend-obamacare-
case-brought-texas-and-othe/; see also Nate Raymond, Four U.S. Cities Sue Over Trump’s 
“Sabotage” of Obamacare, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2018) (quoting from complaint). 
 208. See Brian Bennett, “We have essentially repealed Obamacare,” Trump Says After 
Tax Bill Passes, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la
-na-pol-essential-washington-updates-trump-sees-an-end-to-obamacare-in-the-
1513794883-htmlstory.html. 
 209. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 210. See Julie Rovner, What Does Trump’s Proposal to Cut Planned Parenthood 
Funds Mean?, NPR (May 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/05/18/612445385/what-does-trumps-proposal-to-cut-planned-parenthood-
funds-mean. Planned Parenthood serves 41% of all Title X patients. Seventy-eight percent 
of Title X patients have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level. Twenty-one 
percent of Title X patients identify as Black or African American and 32% identify as 
Hispanic or Latino. Title X: The Nation’s Program for Affordable Birth Control and 
Reproductive Health Care, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood
action.org/issues/health-care-equity/title-x?_ga=2.204435540.537288164.1531663434-
2127331114.1530327070. 
 211. See Washington Update: Trump FY 2019 Budget Requests Funding for WIC to 
“Serve All Projected Participants,” NAT’L WIC ASS’N (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nwica.org/blog/washington-update-trump-fy-2019-budget-requests-funding-
for-wic-to-serve-all-projected-participants#.W2IOcLgpCM8 (reporting proposed budget 
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resolution in favor of breast feeding of infants;212 and the 
Administration has imposed work requirements on Medicaid 
recipients that do little to improve employability and seem 
calculated to block eligible persons from benefits and services that 
they need to survive.213 These actions, as commentators have 
emphasized, already have harmed or “will directly harm millions 
of poor Americans”—especially, women and women of color—
and, “in the worst cases, the results include mass-scale 
preventable deaths.”214 They threaten to dismantle the public 
health infrastructure, and to withhold critical medicines by 
making them unaffordable.215 Above all, as discussed later, 
President Trump has made plain his opposition to reproductive 
rights and has succeeded in his goal of appointing Justices to the 
Supreme Court who apparently do not accept the precedential 
integrity of Roe v. Wade.216 
III. FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERAL PROCEDURE, AND 
GENDER NORMS 
So far we have shown that even before Trump’s election, 
certain structural features of the American economy—
authorized, maintained, and enforced through law—placed 
women in subordinate social and economic positions. Trump’s 
 
cuts for the evaluation and monitoring of breastfeeding programs consistent with the 
Administration’s “broader attempts to limit funding for scientific research”). 
 212. See Andrew Jacobs, Opposition to Breast-Feeding Resolution by U.S. Stuns World 
Health Officials, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/health/
world-health-breastfeeding-ecuador-trump.html?login=email&auth=login-email. 
 213. See Robert Pear, Advisers Sound an Alarm After Thousands Are Dropped from 
Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2018, at A15 (reporting that work requirements resulted 
in the loss of benefits for 4,350 low-income people in Arkansas). 
 214. Michelle Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 
YALE L.J. 1270, 1275 (2018). 
 215. See Laurie Garrett, Trump’s Battle Against Breastfeeding Is a Small Part of a 
Wider War, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 16, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/16/trumps-
battle-against-breastfeeding-is-a-small-part-of-a-bigger-war/ (“With escalating drug prices 
and growing vaccine paranoia, American populism is taking down the edifice of global 
public health.”). 
 216. See Tucker Higgins, In Leaked Email, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh 
Challenged Roe v. Wade Precedent, and Said “Court Can Always Overrule,” CNBC (Sept. 
6, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/scotus-nom-brett-kavanaugh-challenged-roe-v-
wade-precedent-said-court-can-always-overrule.html; see also Jon Swaine, The Anti-
Abortion Conservative Quietly Guiding Trump’s Supreme Court Pick, GUARDIAN (July 6, 
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/jul/06/leonard-leo-supreme-court-replace
ment-trump-justice-nomination-abortion (referring to efforts to “create the court’s first 
dependable conservative majority in half a century” that will “outlaw abortion”). 
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policies can be expected to exacerbate these effects. Our question 
in this part is whether and how a growing women’s resistance will 
affect legal doctrine involving equality, liberty, and dignity. Given 
that focus, one might expect the discussion to turn to the Supreme 
Court and to theories of constitutional interpretation. Instead, we 
shift attention to the lower federal courts and to the ways in which 
the rules of civil procedure, traditionally the guardian of rights 
and liberties, shape, channel, and—in our view—potentially 
obstruct dialogue between “social movements” and Article III 
courts in ways that are subversive of constitutional aspiration. 
Our starting point treats civil litigation as a public good that 
contributes to a common base of knowledge217 and constructs a 
shared narrative framework for what members of a polity “take 
for granted” or what “goes without saying.”218 In this sense, 
judicial decisions potentially ratify, entrench, interrogate, or 
reorient existing norms.219 As we show, the procedural decisions 
of federal courts—enforcing confidentiality agreements, 
dismissing discrimination complaints before discovery, 
characterizing degrading working conditions as not evidence of 
sexual harassment, and refusing to acknowledge the collective 
nature of gendered workplace conditions—have sent false signals 
to the public about women’s issues. These practices, unabated, 
potentially could blunt the transformative significance of the 
social movement of which #MeToo and Time’s Up are a part by 
blocking or distorting the information they otherwise would 
contribute to constitutional culture. 
 
 217. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 507, 541–42 (2011) (discussing information effects of litigation). 
 218. For example, Professor Charles L. Black, Jr. described it as “common 
knowledge” that racial segregation was intended to discriminate against African 
Americans and to render them politically and socially powerless. See Charles L. Black, Jr., 
The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960) (“Our question 
is whether discrimination inheres in that segregation which is imposed by law in the 
twentieth century in certain specific states in the American Union. And that question has 
meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge 
about the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid.”); see also Charles R. Lawrence 
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 
STANFORD L. REV. 317, 363 (1987) (discussing Black’s view of “common knowledge” as 
cultural fact). 
 219. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional 
Decisions, and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263 (2010) (rejecting the reflectionist 
thesis of constitutional interpretation and arguing that courts can provide or withhold 
adjudicative space from competing arguments that reframe social practices). 
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A. COURTS AS INFORMATION GENERATORS 
Federal judges play an educative role in American politics; 
like all judges, as Judge Frank H. Easterbrook succinctly put it, 
they directly or indirectly “influence conduct.”220 Some examples 
of judicial influence are obvious: courts impose judgments that 
deter behavior, they sentence the convicted and offer lessons 
about punishment and rehabilitation, and they write decisions 
that justify imposing liability for actions or leaving the injured 
without remedy. Social movements potentially disrupt or support 
these judicial messages, offering information that questions or 
reframes doctrinal narratives or overcomes professional biases.221 
Outside the courthouse, social media can amplify a group’s 
political message and encourage legal engagement, translating 
injuries into claims.222 Within the courthouse, rules of civil 
procedure—crucial to determining who wins and who loses—
constitute the micro-pathways through which claimants 
communicate information about social problems, individual 
situations, and public attitudes. As Professor Karl N. Llewellyn 
famously said, “[P]rocedural regulations are the door, and the 
only door, to make real what is laid down by substantive law.”223 
The rules authorize such activities as the filing of a complaint, 
access to the discovery process, and public trials. The availability 
of these procedures does not mean that the opportunities they 
provide are available to all litigants. Rather, courts have 
discretion in how they apply procedural rules, and these 
procedural decisions significantly impact the flow of information 
to and from the court, as well as the credibility and salience of a 
mobilized group.224 To the extent that common law development 
 
 220. Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 
773, 774 (1990). See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative 
Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 961 (1992). 
 221. Scott L. Cummings, The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 
64 UCLA L. REV. 1554, 1556 (2017). Social movements also can be engines of conservative 
goals. See DAVID COLE, ENGINES OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO 
MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016). 
 222. See Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to Transform 
Law, 105 KY. L.J. 413 (2017) (describing relation between activism and social media); see 
also Jessica Campisi & Saeed Ahmed, Anita Hill on #MeToo: “I Didn’t Have a Hashtag,” 
CNN (June 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/11/us/anita-hill-hashtag-metoo-
trnd/index.html. 
 223. LLEWELLYN, supra note 45, at 19. 
 224. See Scott L. Cummings, Law and Social Movements: An Interdisciplinary 
Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 233, 263 (Conny 
Roggeband & Bert Klandermans eds., 2017) (“[T]he idea that law is relatively ineffective 
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has been likened to a chain novel,225 rules of procedure may block 
a social movement’s new or revised chapter from entering the 
system or from becoming a part of the collective record.226 
B. PROCEDURAL RULES AND WOMEN’S EXPERIENCE 
In this Part, we examine how the federal judiciary’s 
application of procedural rules involving arbitration, motions to 
dismiss, summary judgment, and class actions has slowly but 
persistently removed various of women’s experiences from the 
judicial record. We look primarily at district court and, in some 
instances, appellate court decisions. Common law decisions 
typically rely on facts drawn from the parties and from 
information obtained through the discovery process; as we show, 
federal courts increasingly have relied on their own unstated 
assumptions about women’s experiences—assumptions that, in 
some cases, may camouflage impermissible stereotypes about 
gender roles.227 In this sense, the judiciary’s use of procedure has 
been “jurispathic,” in the sense of blocking women from 
contributing to public knowledge and from influencing 
constitutional understanding.228 
1. Arbitration and Confidentiality Agreements 
Current activism has made public the widespread use and 
judicial endorsement of two kinds of contractual agreements that 
 
in shaping opinion in positive ways is . . . empirically contested.”). The literature largely 
has focused on the role of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., James W. Stoutenborough, Donald 
P. Haider-Markel & Mahalley D. Allen, Reassessing the Impact of Supreme Court 
Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419 (2006) (finding 
a conditional effect of Court decisions on public opinion that supports the legitimation 
hypothesis and structural effects model). For an application of this view with respect to 
court-involved educational reform, see William H. Clune, Courts and Legislatures as 
Arbitrators of Social Change, 93 YALE L.J. 763, 779 (1984) (“Courts can help a minority 
group if it is not too minor.”). 
 225. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–38 (1986). 
 226. Eskridge, supra note 37, at 2065 (arguing that identity-based social movements 
“brought constitutional litigation that required the Court to apply old constitutional texts 
and precedents to new circumstances, not just in a single case, but in a string of cases that 
ran like a chain novel whose audience shifted in the course of narration”). 
 227. Cf. Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 83 
(2018) (describing sexual harassment as “gender policing” and reporting that many cases 
about sexual harassment are “[s]cant on facts”); see generally Jason R. Bent, P-Values, 
Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination Law, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2015) (defining 
priors as “unstated assumptions” about the world). 
 228. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 
(1983) (discussing the jurispathic role of courts). 
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suppress information about workplace conditions and hide 
women’s exposure to sexual misconduct: mandatory arbitration 
clauses and confidentiality agreements.229 Trump, both before and 
after he entered the White House, was no stranger to these 
provisions, which he used to silence employees—including 
government employees—and sex partners.230 These devices were 
no secret among lawyers, academics, and the courts, and they 
were criticized—as Professor Minna Kotkin extensively has 
explained—for making gender discrimination invisible, “lending 
credence to claims that discrimination in the workplace largely 
has been eradicated.”231 Arbitration clauses that contract around 
federal statutes, or bar the use of class-wide remedies, compound 
the problem by putting circles of private life outside public 
protection and threatening to make the workplace a law-free 
zone.232 
The autonomy argument in favor of contractual solutions is 
that they enable the participants to engage in a form of self-
governance. No doubt there are important privacy interests at 
stake in employment discrimination suits and especially those that 
allege sexual harassment and other forms of predatory conduct.233 
Women subject to such abuse may prefer not to expose 
 
 229. See Shut Out by the Small Print, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2018, at 10 (reporting that 
more than half of non-unionized private employees are subject to mandatory-arbitration 
agreements, and that in the early 1990s, only 2% were covered). 
 230. Jeannie Suk Gersen, Trump’s Affairs and the Future of the Nondisclosure 
Agreement, NEW YORKER (March 30, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/trumps-affairs-and-the-future-of-the-nondisclosure-agreement (discussing Trump’s 
use of nondisclosure agreements with sex partners); Let’s Not Make a Deal, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 24, 2018, at 22 (discussing Trump’s draft non-disclosure agreement for federal 
employees, and observing that the contracts “are probably both unenforceable and 
unconstitutional”). 
 231. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
927, 927 (2006). 
 232. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); see also Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private 
Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371. 
 233. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 465 (1991) (“A legal system that does not recognize the 
right to keep private matters private raises images of an Orwellian society in which Big 
Brother knows all.”). In other contexts, courts have been able to balance the privacy 
interests associated with the disclosure of ethical violations with the public’s context-
specific need to know the information. See, e.g., Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 898 F.3d 
51 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (records of alleged ethical violations of assistant U.S. Attorney, 
although related to criminal case, was not automatically exempt from FOIA disclosure as 
law-enforcement records). 
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themselves to public scrutiny.234 Pragmatically, some argue that 
wrongdoers are likely not to settle a sexual harrassment claim 
without a secrecy clause, which would push women into 
unreceptive courthouses or cause them to retreat into silence. But 
the costs to society of such mechanisms are high: the public has a 
distorted sense of the incidence of the problem, predators are left 
on the loose to prey on other workers, and financial stake-
holders—whether shareholders, equity holders, taxpayers, or 
insurance rate payers—foot the bill for the initial settlement and 
recidivist settlements.235 
For centuries, women have been relegated to private spaces 
within the family, excluded from political participation, and exiled 
from the protection of public law. Professor Reva Siegel has 
shown that legal reform paradoxically may preserve status quo 
norms by transforming them “into a more contemporary, and less 
controversial, social idiom.”236 Thus, she explained, the rule of 
chastisement, which protected the husband’s prerogative to use 
corporal punishment on his wife, persisted for many years in the 
new form of spousal battery, protected by the shield of marital 
privacy. Although the rationale and rhetoric have changed, the 
use of secret arbitral tribunals and confidentiality agreements 
creates a similar subordinating dynamic: withholding public 
regulatory protections from women who are relegated to a 
separate, private sphere in which the rules of the dominant gender 
govern.237 Dominance comes not only from the social status 
accorded maleness, but also from the economic status typically 
enjoyed by the harasser—described by Professor Rachel Arnow-
 
 234. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment 
Settlements, NATION (Jan. 12, 2018) (reporting statement of plaintiff’s lawyer that 
confidentiality for some clients is “alluring” and that they do not want details of their 
experience exposed through Google). 
 235. A proposed “intermediate reform” seeks to harvest the benefits of these 
agreements while limiting the “shielding of serial offenders.” See Ian Ayres, Targeting 
Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 76, 78 (2018). 
 236. Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996). 
 237. Cf. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Beyond the Pronoun: Toward an Anti-Subordinating 
Method of Process, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 7 (2000 (“Women have reason to be 
concerned about process, because they historically have been excluded from the public 
realm, which designs the procedural systems that govern their lives.”). 
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Richman as a “top dog,” protected contractually from the at-will 
regime that most workers endure.238 
#MeToo has mobilized public attention on the role of 
arbitration and confidentiality agreements in shielding sexual 
harassers from view. It further spotlighted the fact that the Article 
III courts were no exceptions from this practice. By design or 
omission the federal courts likewise had wrapped judicial sexual 
misconduct in a cloak of confidentiality. In particular, the 
employment agreements of judicial clerks and other court 
personnel contained confidentiality provisions that could be 
understood to bar or at least to discourage victims from reporting 
inappropriate behavior; inappropriate behavior was not defined 
explicitly to include sexual misconduct; and information about the 
judiciary’s Employment Dispute Resolution Plan was not 
publicized, was difficult to locate, and restricted the filing of a 
complaint to a 30-day limitations period. Moreover, the judiciary 
did not segregate sexual misconduct complaints from aggregate 
data about workplace complaints against judges.239 
The public conversation about sexual harassment, 
confidentiality, and the federal courts shifted when former 
judicial clerks made public in 2017 that Judge Alex Kozinski of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allegedly subjected female 
(and sometimes male) clerks to coarse humor, lewd suggestions, 
and pornographic photos.240 Rather than defend against the 
 
 238. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-
Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85, 92 (2018) (calling for the adoption of a “proportionate 
discipline protocol” for low-level workers accused of sexual harassment). 
 239. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING 
GROUP TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (2018). For a retired 
judge’s views of the judiciary’s process and proposals to reform it, see Nancy Gertner, 
Sexual Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2018). 
 240. Heidi Bond, who clerked for Judge Kozinski from 2006 to 2007, alleged that the 
judge “called her into his office several times and pulled up pornography on his computer, 
asking if she thought it was photoshopped or if it aroused her sexually.” Matt Zapotosky, 
Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-
appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-
d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term=.fbfe81376e5b. Bond is one of six 
women—all former clerks or externs—who alleged that Judge Kozinski acted in sexually 
inappropriate ways towards them. Id. Nine more women came forward, including a law 
student, clerk, lawyer, law professor, and a former U.S. Court of Federal Claims judge. See 
Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge Subjected Them to Inappropriate Behavior, 
Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-
subjected-them-to-inappropriate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-
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charges in an internal proceeding, Judge Kozinski abruptly 
resigned.241 In response to Judge Kozinski’s resignation, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States set up a 
Working Group to assess the sufficiency of safeguards within the 
Article III courts to protect court employees and judicial clerks 
from inappropriate conduct.242 The report acknowledged that 
confidentiality provisions in employment agreements may have 
created disincentives for reporting inappropriate conduct; it 
recognized that judicial clerks and court personnel are in a 
subordinate position relative to life tenured judges that further 
discourages women from pressing their concerns; and it criticized 
the 30-day period for filing charges as too short.243 The report’s 
recommendations and reforms are important and comendable.244 
However, until this point, procedural rules made it seem as if all 
was well for women within the judicial workplace—a narrative 
that erased women’s actual experiences from the public record. 
2. Pretrial Claim Termination Under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) 
Long before #MeToo, some judges and academics (including 
one of these authors) drew attention to the effect of “Twiqbal” on 
civil rights lawsuits involving gender discrimination and other 
claims that affect women’s position in the workplace.245 Twiqbal 
is the short hand name for the Supreme Court’s pair of cases that 
radically shifted the standard for assessing the sufficiency of a 




 241. See Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual 
Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/
us/alex-kozinski-retires.html. 
 242. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT WORKING 
GROUP, supra note 239. The Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group was 
formed on January 12, 2018, with the goal of ensuring “an exemplary workplace for every 
judge and every court employee.” Id. at 1. The Working Group, chaired by the Director of 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, was comprised of eight federal 
judges and court administrators. Id. at 1–2. 
 243. Id. at 20–40. 
 244. See James C. Duff, The Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group, 
57 No. 4 JUDGES’ J. 8 (Fall 2018) (discussing reforms). 
 245. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Hon. Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on 
the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 776 (2012/2013) (discussing the 
substantive implications of motions to dismiss on gender claims). 
 246. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009). 
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accepted standard of notice pleading,247 the Court directed the 
district courts to dismiss a complaint that does not plausibly state 
a claim, and to make that assessment prior to discovery, informed 
by “judicial experience and common sense.”248 Although the 
empirical evidence on overall case effects remains contested,249 
there is a growing consensus that the plausibility standard has 
produced a higher rate of pretrial dismissal of civil rights claims.250 
Concerns of efficiency and fairness may argue for early 
termination of lawsuits that are so preposterous as to have a near-
zero likelihood of success.251 However, there is no evidence that 
women’s complaints are more likely than others to be filed for 
their nuisance value or an easy settlement.252 Indeed, the number 
of discrimination case-filings had decreased significantly even 
prior to Twiqbal, suggesting that litigators make rational decisions 
 
 247. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 248. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 
2007) (Newman, J.)). 
 249. See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil 
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203 (2013). The Federal Judicial Center’s 2011 report 
showed that in 2010, claims were dismissed in whole or in part in 70% of employment 
discrimination cases and 75% of all cases examined, excluding prisoner and pro se cases, 
and that in 2006, 67.4% of employment discrimination cases and 65.9% of all cases 
examined were dismissed. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL (2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/motioniqbal_1.pdf. 
 250. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S 
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW (2017); see also Raymond H. Brescia & 
Edward J. Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical Analysis of Motion Practice 
in Civil Rights Litigation Under the New Plausibility Standard, 47 AKRON L. REV. 329 
(2014) (reporting higher rates of dismissal of Rule 12(b)(6) claims, and especially by white 
male judges appointed by Republican Presidents); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of 
Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010) 
(examining rates of dismissal before and after Twombly and Iqbal and finding that the 
rates of dismissal involving constitutional civil rights claims increased from Conley (50%) 
to Twombly (55%) and Iqbal (60%)); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of 
Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015) (based on a subset from full years 2006 
and 2010, finding in 2010 66% of civil rights cases were dismissed, 52% of employment 
discrimination cases, and 41% of contract claims). 
 251. Compare Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of 
Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) (ascribing social value to meritless cases), with 
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 81 (2007) (arguing that 
litigation should be allowed to go forward, at least in antitrust suits, “only when the 
likelihood of a positive case is high enough to justify . . . the enormous costs of discovery”). 
 252. For a discussion of the gap between perception and reality on this topic, see 
Kotkin, supra note 231, at 931. 
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about the likelihood of a successful suit before undertaking the 
costs of representation.253 
Twiqbal requires the district court to accept the truth of the 
facts that are alleged in the complaint, but to ignore allegations 
that are merely conclusory or legal conclusions in disguise.254 
Given the porous boundary between law and fact, the standard 
gives the judge a great deal of discretion when deciding the 
motion.255 Dismissing the complaint significantly affects the flow 
and quality of information about women’s experiences—to the 
plaintiff, to the court, and to the public—in two inter-related 
ways. First, dismissal cuts off plaintiff’s access to facts specific to 
the events at issue in the lawsuit, called adjudicative facts (the 
“who-what-where-when-and-what” of the complaint).256 Second, 
 
 253. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) 
(reporting case filing data). 
 254. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 830 (2010) (stating Twiqbal test). 
 255. In some of these decisions, the court credits the woman’s factual allegations, in 
the sense of accepting them to be true, but declines to find the illicit conduct sufficiently 
pervasive or severe to warrant sanction under Title VII. We offer three examples to 
illustrate judicial inferences that, in our view, rely upon unstated but questionable forms 
of common sense: 
  Example 1: Plaintiff alleged that her employer called her “Is,” which she and her 
co-workers understood to mean “ignorant slut.” Other employees kept notepads with 
plaintiff’s proper name and “Is” written on them. The court acknowledged that the name-
calling was directed at plaintiff because of her gender, but that the complaint did not 
plausibly state a claim for sexual harassment because the conduct was “not so severe or 
pervasive as to have altered the conditions of her employment.” Walters v. MedBest Med. 
Mgmt., Inc., No. 5:14-CV-0572 (LEK/ATB), 2015 WL 860759, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 
2015). 
  Example 2: Plaintiff, a deputy sheriff jailor, alleged that she was compelled to 
watch live sex in the workplace—a female visitor masturbating in front of a male inmate’s 
cell—while her male co-workers called out offensive statements. The court held that the 
complaint did not show that comments were made “because of” plaintiff’s gender and that 
a Title VII claim was not plausibly alleged. Kleehammer v. Monroe Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 
175, 184 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 
  Example 3: Plaintiff, an administrative specialist, alleged that the managing 
director stated at the office holiday party that “you won’t sit on my lap and keep me warm” 
and “you are too young for me,” and further that on another occasion an associate director 
“made inappropriate comments and grabbed her arm,” and afterwards explained that he 
was joking. Plaintiff reported the incident to her supervisor who did not make a written 
report. Later the associate director was asked to resign. The court reasoned that although 
a single incident of rape would create an abusive work environment, the incident with the 
associate director—the only one credited as “described in detail”—did not rise to the 
requisite severity. Milne v. Navigant Consulting, No. 08 Civ. 8964 (NRB), 2009 WL 
4437412 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 256. The law of evidence defines adjudicative facts as “facts about the particular event 
which gave rise to the lawsuit and, like all adjudicative facts, they help[] explain who did 
3 - HERSHKOFF & SCHNEIDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:30 PM 
90 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:43 
 
dismissal takes for granted the judge’s world view of sexual 
relationships even when the matter is contested, stereotyped, or 
not supported by facts. A world view can include any fact that is 
not specific to the individual case. These facts can range from the 
assumption that March 1 always follows February 28, to the faith 
that markets act in rational ways, to the view that children are best 
raised in the comfort of a nuclear home. These facts straddle 
policy judgments, encompass normative assumptions, and reflect 
belief systems; they are first cousins to “legislative facts”257 or 
“social facts”—“broader facts about society, the world, and 
institutional and human behavior.”258 
As to the facts specific to the case, cutting off plaintiff’s access 
to discovery is of special importance in civil rights suits, which 
often turn on questions of intent, motivation, or comparative 
treatment—all of which are easy for defendant to conceal.259 In 
the run of the mill case, a plaintiff in a sex discrimination case will 
not have access to many facts about her case because they are 
within defendant’s exclusive custody; even private investigators 
will not be able to uncover such facts. As Professor Arthur R. 
Miller has explained: 
Think about employment discrimination cases as an example. 
The plaintiff has been fired. One of the first rules of discharging 
someone is don’t tell the employee why he or she is being fired. 
If facts must be pleaded to state a claim for discriminatory 
 
what, when, where, how, and with what motive and intent.” KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 328 (7th ed. 2014); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, An 
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 
(1942). 
 257. See Davis, supra note 256, at 404, 402 (defining legislative facts as facts that 
“inform[] a court’s legislative judgment on questions of law and policy,” and contrasted 
with adjudicative facts concerning “what the parties did, what the circumstances were, 
what the background conditions were”). 
 258. Kylie Burns, “In This Day and Age”: Social Facts, Common Sense and Cognition 
in Tort Law Judging in the United Kingdom, 45 J.L. & SOC’Y 226, 227 (2018). The terms 
are to be distinguished from the facts that Congress considers when it enacts a statute, also 
called legislative facts. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting) (“To the extent ‘legislative facts’ are relevant to a judicial determination, 
Congress is well equipped to investigate them, and such determinations are of course 
entitled to due respect.”).  Social fact in this context also differs from social-fact testimony 
that is specific to a case. See Annika L. Jones, Implicit Bias as Social-Framework Evidence 
in Employment Discrimination, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1221, 1231 (2017) (defining social fact 
within the framework of social framework theory). 
 259. See Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 
1161 (discussing the role of motive in employment discrimination suits and stating that 
“[m]otives can be concealed or fabricated”). 
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discharge or failure to promote or some other nefarious 
practice, how can the plaintiff surmount the newly minted 
pleading requirement? How does the plaintiff show 
discriminatory conduct let alone a pattern of discrimination—
whether it’s race, gender, age, or disability—without access to 
the history of the employer’s conduct regarding other 
employees? A look at the statistics of employment 
discrimination cases shows that in some parts of the nation they 
are not being instituted anymore.260 
By terminating a gender claim at the motion to dismiss stage, 
the court prevents the plaintiff from moving to discovery and 
marshalling information needed to make out the claim—and to 
present information in a public space that potentially informs 
public opinion about workplace and other situations that affect 
women’s rights.261 Instead, the public remains in the dark about 
the details of the incident; one more decision finding a woman’s 
claim to be implausible is added to the pile that makes it seem as 
if gendered misconduct did not occur. 
Twiqbal also impacts the construction of social facts—the 
ways in which the public frames its understanding of events in the 
world262—by shaping them according to the judge’s judicial 
experience and common sense. To be sure, there is nothing new 
in a court’s looking to social facts on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; when 
considering the common law demurrer, judges inevitably took 
account of the world as they thought it existed.263 As Professor 
James B. Thayer stated in his 1898 treatise on evidence, “[i]n 
conducting a process of judicial reasoning, as of other reasoning, 
not a step can be taken without assuming something which has not 
 
 260. Arthur R. Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing? What’s Happened 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 596–97 (2011). 
 261. Discovery material is not automatically available to the public, but becomes 
available when the parties file the material with the court. See Richard L. Marcus, A 
Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that 
Discovery is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006). 
 262. See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social 
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987) (explaining that social frameworks provide 
“a frame of reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the 
resolution of a specific case,” and are different from both adjudicative facts and legislative 
facts). 
 263. See Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 288 (1944) 
(“Nothing is more common than reliance by a court upon judicially known facts in 
condemning or sustaining a pleading on demurrer.”); see also Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 
264 U.S. 543, 548–49 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact 
that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law . . . .”). 
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been proved.”264 Indeed, it would be absurd for a court to jettison 
common-sense understandings from its legal determinations.265 
What is questionable, however, is the court’s reliance on self-
referential common sense as a bar to certain kinds of women’s 
claims.266 
The earliest references to experience and common sense in 
American reported decisions use those words unmodified by the 
word “judicial”—the common law judge was expected to consider 
what the jury thought about the world; the court was not the 
exclusive arbiter of social meaning.267 As Judge Robert E. Keeton 
aptly put it: “A judge is obliged to apply not his or her own norms 
but the community’s norms, as developed in authoritative sources 
 
 264. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 279 (1898) (quoted in Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. 
REV. 945, 949 (1955)); see In re Asbestos Litig., 829 F.2d 1233, 1248 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, 
J., concurring) (“Common law courts could not fashion rules grounded in reality if they 
were obliged to proceed without aid of legislative facts.”). 
 265. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981) (Weinstein, J.) (“The law ignores the common sense of a situation at the peril of 
becoming irrelevant as an institution.”). 
 266. One study found that judges invoke the “common sense” gloss more than any 
other part of the Twiqbal test. See Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: 
An Empirical Study of District Court Interpretation of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 401, 431 (2011). A different study, looking only at employment discrimination cases 
(including race and ethnicity as well as gender) found a higher rate of dismissal, but that 
lower courts were neither invoking the plausibility standard nor referring to their own 
experience and common sense as a basis for decision—suggesting, according to the author, 
“that the subjective elements of the plausibility standard, even if not being invoked 
explicitly, may be creeping into judicial decision-making nonetheless.” Raymond H. 
Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and 
Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 286 (2011–2012). The author raised 
further questions: 
Perhaps these findings raise more questions than they answer. Do they suggest 
that courts are ignoring the substance of the heightened pleading standard, yet 
interpreting Twombly and Iqbal as license to dismiss cases more readily? Does 
the nature of the standard leave judges with broad discretion to dismiss cases that 
do not comport with their “experience and common sense?” 
Id. at 241. 
 267. E.g., Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131, 136–37 (1867): 
These facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a jury in inferring 
from them the fact of negligence, by reasoning in the ordinary way, according to 
the natural and proper relations of things, and consistently with the common 
sense and experience of mankind—1 Greenl. Ev., §§ 44, 48; Smith v. Hann. & St. 
Jo. R. R. Co., 37 Mo., 292. A jury is not to be left or permitted to act or reason in 
any other way on such facts. Where it is plain that the jury could not find a verdict 
on the evidence offered without reasoning irrationally, against all ordinary 
common sense, and against all proper notions of justice and right, or against law, 
or without being influenced by undue sympathy, prejudice, gross mis-judgment 
or mistaken impression of the law and facts of the case, the court will declare, as 
a matter of law, that there is no competent evidence to be submitted to the jury. 
3 - HERSHKOFF & SCHNEIDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:30 PM 
2019] SEX, TRUMP, AND CHANGE 93 
 
. . . .”268 Indeed, reliance on the jury’s sense of the world was the 
practice even in equity cases that did not invoke the civil jury 
right.269 As many commentators have noted, Twiqbal effectively 
shifts the jury’s authority to find the facts to the judge, who alone 
decides whether a factual allegation is to be accepted as true or 
ignored as conclusory or implausible.270 This shift is particularly 
problematic in civil rights lawsuits where perspectives and 
frameworks may be freighted with stereotyped assumptions about 
gender roles and social practices.271 
 
 268. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed 
Premise Facts, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1988). 
 269. Memorandum from Allyson Scher to Professors Helen Hershkoff and Elizabeth 
M. Schneider on the Earliest Uses of the Terms Common Sense and Experience (on file 
with the authors); see, e.g., Lee v. Beatty, 38 Ky. 204, 212–13 (1839), discussing the chancery 
court’s referring “doubtful questions” to juries, and noting that the practice “is not 
confined to those cases where witnesses are to be introduced; but when the chancellor is 
perplexed with doubtful questions of fact, he may have the aid of a jury”: 
The more satisfactory ascertainment of doubtful facts by extrinsic evidence, may 
frequently, perhaps generally, be one chief motive for summoning a jury in 
chancery. But the quotation from Maddock and the doctrines recognized in many 
adjudged cases show clearly, that this is not always the only object of the 
Chancellor, but that, not unfrequently, another end is to be effected by it; and 
that is, to satisfy the conscience of the Judge; give more confidence and 
satisfaction to the parties, and thus increase the chance for justice and content in 
a case perplexed by doubtful facts, which the common sense and experience of 
twelve intelligent jurors peculiarly qualify such a tribunal to decide correctly and 
satisfactorily. 
See also Oppenheim v. Wolf, 3 Sand. Ch. 571, 576–77 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (finding that “upon 
common sense and experience” the loss from a missing vessel “occurred within the longest 
usual duration of a voyage from the port of departure, to that of the ship’s destination; 
because a loss within that time is far more probable than that the vessel after becoming 
disabled, should have drifted about for any considerable period, at the mercy of the waves, 
without encountering some other vessel, or ultimately reaching the land”). 
 270. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 30 (2010) (“This process is uncomfortably 
close to a weighing of the evidence and an invasion of the jury’s domain, suggesting that 
the Court’s decisions represent a potentially significant change in the division of functions 
between judge and jury.”); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative 
Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 410 (1999) (discussing 
the role of the jury in making “normative judgments” in tort law and across the common 
law). On the distinction between lay sense and professional sense, see Dan M. Kahan, 
David Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci & Katherine Cheng, 
“Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning 
and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 434 (2016) (explaining the distinction 
and describing experimental results that “d[id] not furnish support . . . for the hypothesis 
that either the professional judgment characteristic of lawyers and judges or the experience 
of being a judge meaningfully counteracts identity-protective reasoning for out-of-domain 
judgments”). 
 271. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, 
Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123 (1992). 
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As is broadly recognized, civil rights legislation aims to 
overcome cultural stereotypes which persist despite social 
reality.272 Professor Vicki Schultz has explained, “Advancing 
workplace equality has meant taking on common sense 
assumptions about who ‘women’ are, what they want, and what 
they should do (while implicitly disputing parallel assumptions 
about men).”273 The history of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
masterfully told by Professor Reva Siegel, well illustrates the role 
that “common sense” assumptions about women and the family 
played in political arguments about the franchise. In brief, at the 
beginning of the campaign, opponents of suffrage relied explicitly 
upon the “common sense” proposition that men adequately 
represented the interests of their wives in the public sphere. 
Economic activity, combined with social mobilization, altered the 
background assumptions that courts brought to bear on their 
decision making.274 “[A]s women organized to contest traditional 
understandings of gender roles, common sense began to evolve. 
Discrimination based on sex came to seem unreasonable.”275 
The literature for decades has warned against a mode of 
judicial decision making in which the court’s “unreflective 
‘common sense’ ideas about ‘real’ differences between women 
and men outweigh actual evidence about the possibility of 
changing traditional sex roles and their associated behavior 
patterns.”276 Some may argue that it is not practical to ask judges 
to be explicit in their decisions about implicit biases that are sub-
 
 272. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (discussing the inability of current 
anti-discrimination law to deal with unconscious bias, especially when coupled with 
flexible workplaces); see also Burns, supra note 258, at 227 (referring to social facts as 
“fertile ground for the introduction of cognitive bias into tort judging”). 
 273. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 999 
(2015). 
 274. Siegel, supra note 33, at 997 (“It is important to observe what counts as common 
sense in this story: American constitutional culture followed the common law of coverture 
in reasoning about the family as an institution of governance in which men have authority 
over women and the authority to represent women in public and in private dealings with 
other men.”); id. at 1007 (“By the end of the campaign, the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
supporters could appeal to forms of ‘common sense’ that simply did not exist in the 
aftermath of the Civil War.”). 
 275. Post & Siegel, supra note 202, at 382. 
 276. Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 
YALE L.J. 913, 937 (1983); see also Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and 
Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1233 (2010) (discussing the 
Court’s common sense assumption of abortion regret). 
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conscious and below the surface.277 This concern ignores the 
judiciary’s own acknowledgement of implicit bias and the steps it 
has taken to develop debiasing strategies.278 Moreover, 
procedural rules already exist for surfacing a judge’s assumptions 
and making them known to the parties. In theory, the district 
judge is not permitted to go outside the four corners of the 
complaint without converting the motion to that of summary 
judgment. However, in practice, courts exercise discretion to 
consider (or to ignore) information outside the pleadings279—a 
process formally known as “judicial notice.”280 When courts take 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts, they are supposed to give the 
litigants an opportunity to be heard on the “nature of the fact to 
be noticed.”281 The problem arises when courts take judicial notice 
of social facts, for no process is in place to inform and engage the 
parties.282 Even before the Court went off course in Twiqbal, 
 
 277. But see Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New 
Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193, 227 (2018) (arguing that “the ability to control implicit 
bias [is] now well established”). 
 278. For a discussion of efforts by the National Center for State Courts, see Judge 
Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit Bias?, 54 No. 4 JUDGES’ J. 20 (2015). 
See also A.BA., Resolution, Adopted by the House of Delegates (Aug. 14-15, 2017) (“That 
the American Bar Association urges all courts to develop plans of action to make de-
biasing training an important part of both initial training and continuing judicial education 
. . . .”). 
 279. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1931 
(1998) (reporting observations of experienced circuit judge of the number of cases in the 
D.C. Circuit “in which the judge either used, or declined to use, outside material in motions 
granted under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(c), and 12(b)(6)”). 
 280. Harold N. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 
1088–89 (1966). As Professor Harold L. Korn explained, judicial notice has a “dual aspect”: 
In one aspect it refers to the determination of questions by the court; in the other, 
to the court’s means of acquiring information pertinent to the determination. 
Thus, the statement that the court judicially notices certain classes of facts means 
both that the court determines these facts even though the case is one in which 
“the facts” are triable as of right by the jury, and that the court may acquire 
information pertinent to the determination through independent investigation 
outside the formal trial process. 
The law on judicial notice has not acquired greater clarity since Professor Korn wrote his 
article. 
 281. FED. R. EVID. 201. Of course, given plaintiff’s burden on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts is not likely to save an otherwise defective complaint 
from dismissal. 
 282. See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, 
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 486 (1986) (stating that the 
Federal Rules of Evidence “do not address independent judicial investigation,” but an 
Advisory Committee Note “reflects [the] view that courts should be free to initiate an 
independent search for legislative facts and to take judicial notice of whatever they find”). 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, a strong proponent of judicial notice of legislative facts, 
recognized the need for a court to give the parties “an appropriate opportunity to apply 
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judicial notice of legislative facts was considered “willy nilly” and 
“haphazard”283; as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis put it, courts 
took “judicial notice of what the Supreme Court calls ‘common 
experience,’ without mentioning any facts, and directly in the face 
of a dissenter’s abundant and convincing evidence to the 
contrary.”284 Critics singled out family law disputes as particularly 
problematic.285 
Nevertheless, “best practices” regarding use of judicial notice 
can be gleaned from federal decisions. A model comes from Judge 
Jack Weinstein in a case involving whether under Federal Rule 
12(b)(2) a foreign corporation was subject to personal jurisdiction 
in the New York forum based on the activity of its in-state 
subsidiaries.286 Judge Weinstein set forth an approach to judicial 
notice of social facts that may be transferred to other threshold 
and merits determinations in cases involving women’s issues: 
There is always a danger in the superficial sociological musings 
of lawyers and judges who must perforce be relatively ignorant 
of the realities underlying the diverse situations with which 
they must deal and which they must try to understand. Yet, 
whether we explore the economic, political or social settings to 
which the law must be applied explicitly, or suppress our 
assumptions by failing to take note of them, we cannot apply 
the law in a way that has any hope of making sense unless we 
attempt to visualize the actual world with which it interacts and 
this effort requires judicial notice to educate the court. 
A court’s power to resort to less well known and accepted 
sources of data to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative 
and general evidential hypothesis purposes must be accepted 
 
their testing processes to the facts that influence either the findings or the decision.” Davis, 
supra note 264, at 984; see also Henry S. Noyes, The Rise of the Common Law of Federal 
Pleading: Iqbal, Twombly, and the Application of Judicial Experience, 56 VILL. L. REV. 
857, 897 (2012) (“It is unfair and improper to resolve a dispute on grounds which the 
parties had no chance to contest and offer evidence and argument.”). 
 283. Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 111, 113, 126 (1988). 
 284. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1986). 
 285. E.g., Peggy C. Davis, “There Is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial 
Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987) (discussing the problems 
of judicial absorption of legislative facts in the context of custody disputes under the best 
interest standard); Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 933 
(1980) (discussing unstated assumptions about unmarried mothers in Caban v. 
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)). 
 286. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); 
Keeton, supra note 268, at 15 (discussing and endorsing Judge Weinstein’s approach). 
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because it is essential to the judicial process. Here flexible 
judicial notice is required first, in interpreting [state 
jurisdictional statutes], and, second, in understanding the 
relationship of the Japanese parent to its American 
subsidiaries. 
In view of the extensive judicial notice taken, based partly upon 
the court’s own research, the court issued a preliminary 
memorandum and invited the parties to be heard on the 
“propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter 
noticed” upon motion made within ten days. This procedure 
complies with the spirit of Rule 201(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence reading as follows: 
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon timely 
request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of 
taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In 
the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after 
judicial notice has been taken. 
Inviting parties to participate in such ongoing colloquy has the 
advantage of reducing the possibility of egregious errors by the 
court and increases the probability that the parties may believe 
they were fairly treated, even if some of them are dissatisfied 
with the result.287 
As Judge Weinstein’s approach demonstrates, it clearly is 
feasible to require the judge to afford notice to the parties of its 
intention to rely on social facts that bear on dismissal of the 
complaint, and to do so before dismissing the complaint and not 
after. The court could issue an interim order that specifies the 
“facts” upon which it intends to rely, and could afford the plaintiff 
an opportunity to amend the complaint in response and to permit 
limited discovery to overcome any information asymmetries that 
might otherwise prevent amending the complaint and bar relief.288 
In other contexts, courts have “excuse[d]” pleading deficiencies 
even under the heightened particularity standard of Federal Rule 
9(b) for fraud when the deficiencies “result from the plaintiff’s 
inability to obtain information within the defendant’s exclusive 
control.”289 Another approach could build on Federal Rule 43(c), 
which governs the taking of testimony when a motion “relies on 
 
 287. Bulova Watch Co., 508 F. Supp. at 1328–29 (citations omitted). 
 288. See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 141–43 (2010) 
(discussing premotion discovery and collecting illustrative district court opinions and 
secondary material). 
 289. U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital, 895 F.3d 730, 745 (10th Cir. 2018). 
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facts outside the record.” Naturally, this approach has limits: the 
judge is not a party and is not subject to cross-examination. Judge 
Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, in a 
defamation case, convened a Rule 43(c) hearing “to help inform 
the Court of what inferences are reasonable or unreasonable” in 
the context of the lawsuit.290 Given the role of case management 
conferences in civil litigation, such a requirement could be 
integrated into Federal Rule 16 activities.291 In these ways, the 
court could seek to identify the value choices driving its decisions, 
while also acknowledging that those values are contested and 
contestable. 
In addition, we emphasize the importance of the formal 
requirement of decision writing, which has been disregarded on 
some Rule 12(b)(6) motions in favor of more conclusory 
dismissals.292 Of course, in some situations, the lower federal court 
has no obligation to provide a written decision, and, accordingly, 
no explanation will be given at all.293 However, the requirement 
of explanation, part of the duty of judicial candor,294 is widely 
recognized to be “a defining element of the judicial role.”295 As 
Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. has stated, judicial candor may 
be construed to mean “that judges not only avoid deliberate 
 
 290. See Order at 2, Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 
17-cv-4853 (JSR)), Docket No. 35; David McTaggart, Palin v. NY Times: The Case of the 
“Unusual” Iqbal Hearing, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2017); Pleading—Motions to Dismiss—
Twombly/Iqbal—Evidentiary Hearings, 32 NO. 10 FED. LITIGATOR NL 5 (Oct. 2017) 
(stating that “the lower court opinions are not uniform in their application of the 
plausibility standard, and the precise standard and procedure is a moving target. Whether 
Judge Rakoff’s approach is an outlier or signals another shift in this process is worth 
tracking”). 
 291. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. See generally Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have 
We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 78 LA. L. REV. 739, 795 (2018) (discussing 
the scope and centrality of the judge’s managerial authority). 
 292. See Brescia, supra note 266; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Revisiting the 
Integration of Law and Fact in Contemporary Federal Civil Litigation, 15 NEV. L.J. 1387, 
1391 (2015) (“Scholars who have analyzed district court determinations of motions to 
dismiss the complaint post-Iqbal suggest that 12(b)(6) decisions are now formulaic.”). 
 293. See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995) 
(discussing justification for judicial reason-giving in some situations but not others). 
 294. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common 
Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 515 (2002) (stating that judicial decision 
making involves “judicial judgments about how humans are likely to behave in particular 
contexts and the likely results of that behavior” and that “candor about that reality is 
essential,” adding “that candor must come with an active and engaged attitude towards 
information”). 
 295. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 
2266 (2017). 
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falsehoods, but also make forthright disclosures concerning 
vulnerabilities in, and possibly psychologically motivating 
influences on, their chains of formal legal reasoning.” He 
continues: “When judges or Justices rely on moral or policy 
considerations to determine their selection among otherwise 
legally eligible outcomes, principles of accountability and 
publicity might support a mandate that they should so disclose.”296 
Certainly a mere “formulaic” recital of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard 
of plausibility ought not to be sufficient.297 The process of writing 
a decision, of explaining why certain facts are disregarded, and of 
identifying the factors that the court found persuasive can have a 
salutary effect in bringing biases to the court’s attention before 
they become entrenched in official judgments.298 Moreover, 
decision writing and the giving of reasons makes more transparent 
the presence of impermissible stereotypes or counter-factual 
assumptions; it also facilitates appellate review.299 
To be sure, the problem that we discuss—a court’s “finding” 
of facts without record support—is not limited to the district 
courts. Both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals likewise 
engage in extra-record fact finding that is critical to their dispute 
resolution and lawmaking function and they do not always 
acknowledge the unsubstantiated assumptions upon which their 
legal rulings are based. Indeed, as Professor Kenneth Culp Davis 
pointed out forty years ago, the Supreme Court regularly assumes 
the existence of legislative facts and “is a major lawmaker, but it 
has no procedure designed for lawmaking.”300 In some of these 
 
 296. Id. at 2267, 2282–83, 2283 n.73 (“Many if not most theories of legal interpretation 
acknowledge that moral or policy considerations appropriately influence judicial 
decisionmaking under some circumstances, despite notorious disagreements about the 
proper occasions and mechanism of influence.”). 
 297. Cf. Guippone v. Bay Harbour Mgmt. LC, 434 Fed. App’x 4, 6 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We 
have repeatedly held that in making the ‘express determination’ required under Rule 
54(b), district courts should not merely repeat the formulaic language of the rule, but 
rather should offer a brief, reasoned explanation.”). 
 298. Mathilde Cohen, Reason-Giving in Court Practice: Decision-Makers at the 
Crossroads, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 257, 265 (2008) (warning that decisional reason-giving 
can be a form of judicial self-protection and career advancement). 
 299. Cf. Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit 
Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 97 (2010) (urging courts to apply motivating factor framework to 
mitigate effects of employer implicit bias). 
 300. Davis, supra note 284, at 5. 
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decisions, constitutional principles have been developed based 
upon gender assumptions that track traditional stereotypes.301 
The dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) prevents 
the public from hearing the facts about a woman’s workplace 
experience. It does so either by blocking the public from knowing 
what actually happened, because discovery is foreclosed, or by 
shaping the narrative in a way that normalizes the practice and 
makes it seem as if the challenged behavior is conventional and to 
be accepted. The decisions also potentially have a degrading 
effect on constitutional and statutory protections. Professor Neil 
S. Siegel has posited that the Supreme Court enhances its 
legitimacy by encouraging the lower federal courts to enforce a 
decision more broadly than announced.302 A reverse process of 
reciprocity might be hypothesized for a Court that is resistant to 
Congressional goals: encouraging the lower courts to enforce 
statutes less broadly than Congress intended. Twiqbal offers an 
unfortunate but clear pathway for these dynamics, exerting 
downward pressure on constitutional and statutory norms that are 
denied input from women’s actual experiences. Rather than 
engaging with factual complexity, the court instead deploys a 
“rhetoric of inevitability,”303 making it seem that alternative 
dispositions are irrational and simply incompatible with the way 
that the world works—in the language of Twiqbal, they are not 
plausible.304 In the process, the dismissal blunts the aspirational 
 
 301. See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record 
Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2011) (discussing the Court’s unsubstantiated assumptions 
about women’s regret about abortion, while acknowledging there was “no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon” (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007))). 
 302. See Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1242 (2017) (“For those who seek to understand how the American 
constitutional system operates, reciprocal legitimation—different courts invoking one 
another as authority in iterative fashion—warrants examination even without an assertion 
or proof of initial subjective intent.”). 
 303. Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Courtroom: Expanding the Possibilities of 
Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 4 (1996) (quoting Robert A. Ferguson, The 
Rhetorics of the Judicial Opinion: The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 201, 213 (1990)); see also Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results 
of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1387–88 (1995) (“Judges decide 
outcomes, and then tell the story in a way that makes the outcome look like a perfectly 
logical and necessary consequence of the law, handed to us from above, as applied to the 
facts, handed to us from below.”). 
 304. Consider whether the law has moved since 1991, when Professor Susan Estrich 
described evidentiary presumptions that systematically blocked female-plaintiffs from 
relief in actions alleging sexual harrassment in the workplace: 
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message of the woman’s lawsuit and the social movement’s 
broader message. 
3. Pretrial Termination of Claims Under Rule 56 
The application of Federal Rule 56—the motion for summary 
judgment—similarly has impacted the ways in which women’s 
experiences are communicated (or not) to the public, to the 
courts, and to policymakers, compounding the constitutional 
effects of women’s invisibility. The motion requires the judge to 
decide whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.305 In 
employment discrimination cases, the defendant typically is the 
movant; if the motion is granted, the case is terminated without 
the jury’s participation.306 As with motions to dismiss, the Rule 56 
motion is not designed to empower the judge to find the facts.307 
Rather, the judge is expected to ask how a reasonable jury would 
view the record, and if factual questions remain, let the case 
proceed to trial.308 The well-known and early debates about Rule 
 
It is . . . somewhat surprising, and even more disquieting, to read again and again 
in sexual harassment suits not only that the woman loses, but that her credibility 
suffers because no witnesses were present, or because she did not complain 
swiftly or publicly enough. Ironically, the forms of harassment most likely to 
occur in public, and thus be corroborated, are also those which courts are most 
likely to dismiss as trivial jokes and gestures rather than treat as harassment. But 
one should rarely expect nontrivial harassment, at least as judicially defined, to 
take place in public in front of witnesses, or to be memorialized in personnel files. 
More serious forms of harassment—explicit sexual overtures, threats of firing or 
promises of promotion, and actual acts of sexual intercourse—are less likely to 
be accompanied by corroboration, and consequently, the woman is less likely to 
be believed. 
 
Similarly, to read the judges’ opinions, one would expect that the first response 
of a harassed woman is to complain, both officially and privately. But in fact, one 
sees few cases of women who do this. Indeed, the opinions which most 
emphatically announce this standard of conduct almost always involve women 
who did not complain. 
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 851 (1991). 
 305. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 306. See Peter J. Ausili, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases in 
the Eastern District of New York, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1403, 1403, 1405 (2000) (stating “it is 
rare” for an employer in an employment discrimination case not to move for summary 
judgment, and that granting the motion “cuts off a party’s right to present his case to the 
jury” (citing Garza v. Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 861 F.2d 23, 26 (2d Cir. 1988))). 
 307. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2712 
(4th ed. 2018) (stating that “the court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion but only 
is empowered to determine whether there are issues to be tried”). 
 308. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (stating standard). 
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56—personified by Judges Charles E. Clark and Jerome N. Frank 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals309—spotlighted the ease 
with which a judge could use the summary judgment procedure to 
displace the jury’s experience and common sense with the judge’s 
own. Judge Patricia M. Wald of the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit warned against the danger twenty 
years ago: 
Summary judgment is not inherently a means for intellectually 
elitist judges to give their learned views precedence over those 
of less-educated veniremen, but it can be a handy device for an 
elitist bent on so doing. Nor is it by nature a firewall by which 
upper classes conspire to insulate themselves from the 
onslaughts of the hoi polloi regardless of the merits, but its 
existence definitely presents that temptation to a judge already 
inclined to think along these lines.310 
As with Rule 12(b)(6) dispositions, termination rates of suits 
involving women’s civil rights and other claims raise red flags 
about the misuse of Rule 56. The Federal Judicial Center’s 
November 2007 report analyzing summary judgment practice in 
federal district courts showed that in 2006, summary judgment 
was granted, in whole or in part, 77% in employment 
discrimination cases, 70% in other civil rights cases, 61% in tort 
cases, and 59% in contract cases.311 Likewise, Professor Deborah 
Thompson Eisenberg’s empirical study of 500 Equal Pay Act 
cases found that dismissing such claims “at the summary judgment 
stage is the modus operandi for most federal courts,” that female 
 
 309. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury 
Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1019–21 (2003) (discussing the debate 
between the two judges, but emphasizing that even Judge Clark would not “have endorsed 
the expanded summary judgment practices that have emerged”). 
 310. Wald, supra note 279, at 1903. 
 311. See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge 
Michael Baylson (Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sujulrs2.pdf. 
Commentators cite to the FJC’s report in support of the notion that summary judgment is 
granted in civil rights and employment discrimination cases at disproportionately higher 
rates than it is in other types of cases. See, e.g., Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 673 
n.9 (2012) (reporting rates); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and 
Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 225 (reporting findings based on 
data of Federal Judicial Center that in 2006, “courts granted in whole or in part 80% of 
defendants’ motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, and 
courts granted 62.6% of the motions in whole”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of 
Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 709–
10 (2007) (reporting findings). 
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judges granted such motions at a lower rate than their male 
counterparts and that the overall rate somewhat declined after 
President Obama enacted the Lily Ledbetter Act.312 In addition, 
Professors Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas have written at 
length about the ways in which courts have made aggressive use 
of Rule 56 to dismiss employment discrimination claims and to 
keep them away from the jury.313 
The civil jury trial certainly is in eclipse, but the jury’s 
constitutional significance as a check on the misuse of government 
power should not be ignored—especially when women’s loss of 
their civil jury right through devices such as mandatory 
contractual provisions is sanctioned by law and works to 
undermine the substantive protections of anti-discrimination 
laws.314 To be sure, a jury might reach the same bottom line as a 
judge on whether a woman who claims to have suffered 
discrimination (or harassment, or a loss of benefits, or whatever) 
ought to prevail. But perhaps not,315 given differences between 
judicial and lay perception of factual matters freighted with 
normative significance.316 For example, studies have shown that 
 
 312. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Stopped at the Starting Gate: The Overuse of 
Summary Judgment in Equal Pay Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 815, 817, 829 tbl.7, 839 
(2012/2013). 
 313. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 250; see Theresa M. Beiner, When Courts Run 
Amuck: Book Review, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 391 (2018). 
 314. See SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 
(2016); Richard Lorren Jolly, Expanding the Search for America’s Missing Jury, 116 MICH. 
L. REV. 925 (2018). 
 315. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Time’s Up, 104-JUN. A.B.A. 46, 49–50 (2018) 
(reporting studies showing “that if a woman is added to an appellate panel, the panel is 
more likely to find agains a summary judgment motion in a sex discrimination claim”); see 
also Michael W. Pfautz, What Would A Reasonable Jury Do? Jury Verdicts Following 
Summary Judgment Reversals, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1255 (2015) (finding a higher-than-
projected concentration of civil rights cases in which the district court granted summary 
judgment for defendant, the appeals court reversed, and the jury returned a verdict for the 
nonmovant). 
 316. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Taking Cognitive Illiberalism Seriously: Judicial 
Humility, Aggregate Efficiency, and Acceptable Justice, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 627, 657 
(2012): 
Although lay jurors of course will exhibit many of the same traits that make 
judges imperfect, the jury by definition involves a combination of individuals that 
logically mutes the extremes produced by cognitive error, cognitive illiberalism, 
conscious or unconscious bias, or different reasoning styles. Further, jurors 
combine differing life experiences. In addition, the trial judge supervising a case 
will make evidentiary rulings and give instructions designed to reduce jury errors. 
If this combination and cross-fertilization fails to sufficiently suppress human 
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judges in employment discrimination cases tend to give great 
weight to symbolic compliance with anti-discrimination norms, 
crediting the statements of management consultants, human 
resources administrators, and supervisors much more than they 
do women’s testimony.317 The discrediting of women’s testimony 
follows a traditional script that favors professionals—who often, 
but not always, are male;318 employees might not accord HR 
administrators the same level of deference whether male or 
female.319 On the other hand, in many cases expert testimony has 
proved critical in unpacking cultural stereotypes that infect 
“common sense” notions about women’s motivation (as, for 
example, the willingness to acquiesce in domestic violence).320 
 
divergence, myopia, or misjudgment, a trial judge stands by to grant judgment as 
a matter of law or a new trial as necessary. 
See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 517, 533–35 (2010) (stating that a judge “may be a less preferable decisionmaker” 
than a jury in a civil rights or employment discrimination case “where subtle issues of 
credibility, inferences, and close legal questions may be involved” because juries are likely 
“to be far more diverse and to bring a wider range or perspectives”). 
 317. See LAUREN B. EDELMAN, WORKING LAW: COURTS, CORPORATIONS, AND 
SYMBOLIC CIVIL RIGHTS 215 (2016) (“To the extent that legal institutions defer to 
organizations’ symbolic structures even when those structure are ineffective, law in essence 
condones discrimination.”); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. 
L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2016) (arguing that in administrative law cases, courts should defer “to 
reasonable agency decisions about the design of procedural arrangements”). Without 
stating an opinion on whether deference in the public law context is correct, we note that 
deference to a private actor’s procedural decisions raises different problems. See Matthew 
A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018) (examining private 
delegations in civil procedure and their potential for abuse). 
 318. Cf. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim’s Story, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 277 (1993) 
(discussing the role of cultural scripts). 
 319. Cf. Katherine M.K. Kimble, Katlyn S. Farnum, Richard L. Wiener, Jill Allen, 
Gwenith D. Nuss & Sarah J. Gervais, Differences in the Eyes of the Beholders: The Roles 
of Subjective and Objective Judgments in Sexual Harassment Claims, 40 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 319 (2016) (discussing the importance of multiple perspectives); see also Brooke 
D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought to 
Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 715 (2012) (noting the lack of “common identity” between 
a discrimination plaintiff and “the person judging her like there might be if she were before 
a jury”); Erika Fry & Claire Zillman, HR Is Not Your Friend, FORTUNE, Mar. 1, 2018, at 
98 (discussing systemic problems in HR’s approach to sexual harassment complaints). 
 320. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1991) (“Many cases review the jury’s common-
sense belief that women can and will leave violent relationships freely. The experts explain 
the women’s incapacity and failure as a function of many factors, especially the psychology 
of abused women and traditionalism about the family.”); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195 (1986). 
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Commentators point to multiple factors in explaining the 
high termination rates under Federal Rule 56 of civil rights 
claims—the drive toward efficiency, the desire for docket-
clearing, anti-plaintiff bias, pro-corporate preference, 
conservative judicial ideology, judges’ demographics, gender bias, 
and so forth.321 No civil procedure scholar would claim to know 
for sure why certain trends are occurring. However, empirical 
studies so far have provided no support for the view that 
employment discrimination cases are weaker than others at the 
summary judgment stage.322 
The high termination rates of gender claims negatively 
impacts not only the individual litigant, but also judicial and 
public perceptions of women’s place in society. As the academic 
literature already notes, dismissals have a snowball effect, 
operating along the lines of a self-fulfilling prophecy.323 Because 
judges write decisions when granting summary judgment but 
typically not when denying it, judges are encouraged, as retired 
Judge Nancy Gertner has explained, “to see employment 
discrimination cases as trivial or frivolous, as decision after 
decision details why the plaintiff loses.”324 Moreover, the decision 
 
 321. See, e.g., Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 455, 511 (2014) (“The disproportionate summary disposition of workplace 
discrimination and other civil rights cases has been prompted by familiar forces—Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, docket pressures and judicial bias.”). See generally Stephen N. Subrin 
& Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 
(2014) (noting the lack of public policy discussion about judicial trends and suggesting 
various causes). 
 322. See Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: 
An Examination of Ricci v. DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 867 (2012/2013) 
(finding “no evidence to support” the claim that employment discrimination cases are 
“weaker” at Rule 56 stage). 
 323. See ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 477 (1968) 
(coining the phrase and defining it as “a false definition of the situation evoking a new 
behavior which makes the originally false conception come true”). 
 324. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2012). Former 
Judge Gertner explained: 
When the defendant successfully moves for summary judgment in a 
discrimination case, the case is over. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the judge must “state on the record the reasons for granting or 
denying the motion,” which means writing a decision. But when the plaintiff wins, 
the judge typically writes a single word of endorsement—“denied”—and the case 
moves on to trial. Of course, nothing prevents the judge from writing a formal 
decision, but given caseload pressures, few federal judges do. (During one case-
management program in my district, the trainer, a senior judge, told the 
assembled judges, “If you write a decision, you have failed.” The message was 
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writing process depends upon heuristics that “serve to justify 
prodefendant outcomes and thereby exacerbate the one-sided 
development of the law.”325 We can add a further feedback effect: 
judges are likely to draw from this font of “judicial experience” 
when assessing the sufficiency of a claim before discovery. Given 
the rise in arbitration and the decline in trials, commentators 
observe that district court judges lack opportunities to evaluate 
the merits of claims outside the summary judgment stage;326 it 
seems reasonable to assume they will apply the same attitude and 
heuristic developed in the Rule 56 context at the earlier stage in 
the lawsuit, when asked to decide the sufficiency of a claim. Thus, 
rather than turn to discovery and case management, dismissal will 
seem the appropriate result. 
Further, the information gleaned from high disposition rates 
can be expected to produce adverse incentive effects on women—
not already barred by contract—who nevertheless may be 
discouraged from “speaking up,” “blowing the whistle,” or filing 
a lawsuit because the costs, financial and emotional, are thought 
to be not worth the candle. Suppressed litigation rates have 
spillover effects on public policy given the American system’s 
reliance on private litigation to enforce regulatory goals.327 Private 
litigation in the public interest could be especially important 
during the Trump presidency, when executive agencies have 
agendas that are at odds with civil rights and workplace protection 
 
clear: you would only write a decision when you absolutely had to.) Plaintiffs 
rarely move for summary judgment. 
Id. at 113. 
 325. Id. at 110. 
 326. Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767, 
1784 (2014) (explaining that judges have little experience in deciding claims and that “there 
are also reasons to question the ability of judges to resolve summary judgment motions 
without applying subjective standards of believability according to their own inaccessible, 
irrefutable, and arguably unrepresentative cultural norms”). 
 327. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2012) (“Whereas European nations 
regulate the conduct of their citizens largely using ex ante regulations promulgated by a 
centralized bureaucracy, we frequently rely on ex post law enforcement, much of which 
results from private suits rather than from governmental actions.”); see also John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory 
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
669, 669 (1986) (“Probably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants 
to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the 
discretion of public enforcement agencies.”). 
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statutes.328 Once again, procedural decisions indirectly but 
persistently may work to erode protections. Although in theory 
“superstatutes” may seem to have entrenched the goals of a social 
movement,329 the declining incidence in litigation gives the false 
impression that statutory protection is no longer needed, and 
companies are signaled that substantive compliance is neither 
required nor expected. 
Rule 56 decisions affect the flow of information in another 
way, as well. The development of social norms requires facts from 
which narratives can be constructed; summary judgment decisions 
in employment discrimination suits, because they typically reject 
a finding of liability, provide a one-sided account of gender 
relations, and so tend to ratify social practices even when those 
practices no longer align with popular understandings. 
Recognizing the irony of this example, we draw attention to Judge 
Kozinski’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,330 in which the appeals court 
upheld a requirement that employees wear makeup—only 
women did—and rejected the argument that the requirement 
imposed an impermissible burden on women. Judge Kozinski, by 
contrast, argued that whether the grooming policy imposed an 
impermissible burden on women ought to be decided by a jury 
and not according to the court’s common sense understanding of 
morning make-up routines: 
 
 328. By example, the Obama Administration took steps to halt the trend in non-
disclosure agreements. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Silencing Whistleblowers by Contract, 55 
AM. BUS. L.J. 261 (2018) (discussing SEC’s 2015 enforcement action against employer-
mandated confidentiality agreements). The Trump Administration sought to roll back the 
underlying substantive protections. See Elizabeth Dexheimer, Trump Signs Biggest 
Rollback of Bank Rules Since Dodd-Frank Act, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/trump-signs-biggest-rollback-of-
bank-rules-since-dodd-frank-act. On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission has filed a number of lawsuits against employers for sexual harassment in 
response to #MeToo complaints. See Daniel Wiessner, EEOC Monitor: Commission Turns 
Up the Heat with Wave of New Lawsuits, REUTERS LEGAL (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I9d686010a59a11e8a96dc40a4971d468/View/FullT
ext.html?transitionType=CategoryPageItem&contextData=(sc.Default). 
 329. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010). For a skeptical account, see Mathew D. 
McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and 
Normative Interrogatory, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 387 (2011) (questioning entrenchment as 
a sociopolitical fact, as a normative value, and as a political process). 
 330. Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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If you are used to wearing makeup—as most American women 
are—[the requirement of wearing makeup on the job] may 
seem like no big deal. But those of us not used to wearing 
makeup would find a requirement that we do so highly 
intrusive. Imagine, for example, a rule that all judges wear face 
powder, blush, mascara and lipstick while on the bench. Like 
Jespersen, I would find such a regime burdensome and 
demeaning; it would interfere with my job performance. I 
suspect many of my colleagues would feel the same way. 
Everyone accepts this as a reasonable reaction from a man, but 
why should it be different for a woman? It is not because of 
anatomical differences, such as a requirement that women 
wear bathing suits that cover their breasts. Women’s faces, just 
like those of men, can be perfectly presentable without 
makeup; it is a cultural artifact that most women raised in the 
United States learn to put on—and presumably enjoy 
wearing—cosmetics. But cultural norms change; not so long 
ago a man wearing an earring was a gypsy, a pirate or an oddity. 
Today, a man wearing body piercing jewelry is hardly noticed. 
So, too, a large (and perhaps growing) number of women 
choose to present themselves to the world without makeup. I 
see no justification for forcing them to conform to Harrah’s 
quaint notion of what a “real woman” looks like. . . . 
I would let a jury decide whether an employer can force a 
woman to make this choice.331 
As with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, there is a danger on summary 
judgment that a judge’s “common sense” may displace a disputed 
material fact or shift doctrine in subtle ways but not be made 
explicit in the decision making process. Take the example of the 
“reasonable woman standard” for sexual harassment. Back in 
1991, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, over a spirited dissent, 
announced that claims of sexual harassment would be judged 
from “the perspective of a reasonable woman,” explaining that 
although “there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as 
a group, . . . many women share common concerns which men do 
not necessarily share”; and further, that a “sex-blind reasonable 
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to 
systematically ignore the experiences of women.”332 The 
reasonable woman standard, the Ninth Circuit underscored, 
“does not establish a higher level of protection for women than 
 
 331. Id. at 1117–18 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 332. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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men”; rather, “a gender-conscious examination of sexual 
harassment enables women to participate in the workplace on an 
equal footing with men.”333 Judge Kozinski joined the majority, 
and the next year, he wrote the Foreword to a volume entitled 
Sexual Harassment in Employment Law, stating, “It is a sobering 
revelation that every woman—every woman—who has spent 
substantial time in the work force in the last two decades can tell 
at least one story about being the object of sexual harassment.” 
But he urged “caution and common sense” before letting law and 
lawyers attempt to remedy “this somewhat seamy, but highly 
pervasive, corner of workplace misconduct”: “[W]hen men and 
women are brought together in the workplace, sexual tensions 
and ambiguities are aggregated with the already formidable 
tensions and frustrations of the job. The results can be 
explosive.”334 
Substantively, the “reasonable woman standard has been 
criticized for putting into question the credibility of women’s 
plurality of experiences.335 On the other hand, defenders of the 
approach have emphasized the significance of a legal standard 
that directs judges to “think from a different perspective than that 
of the reasonable man.”336 However, in Judge Kozinski’s 
description of the standard, the reliance upon common sense 
reoriented the doctrine back to the perspective of the male judge 
at the expense of the female litigant.337 The judicial message, once 
 
 333. Id. The reasonable woman standard also has elicited criticism as reinforcing 
gender stereotypes. See, e.g., Robert Unikel, “Reasonable” Doubts: A Critique of the 
Reasonable Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 365 
(1992). 
 334. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Foreword, in BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW at v–vi (1992). 
 335. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist 
Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 558–67 (1992) 
(questioning whether the “reasonable woman” standard “penalize[s] women’s different 
experiences and women’s departures from a stereotypical norm”). 
 336. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman 
Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1434 (1992); see also Carol 
Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1413 
(1992) (stating that because the standard “assesses the harasser’s conduct from the 
perspective of the reasonable victim,” and because most victims are women, “the standard 
in most cases is the reasonable woman”). 
 337. Professor Deborah Rhode offers this example of the problem of leaving it to a 
male judge to identify and remedy sexual harassment in the workplace: 
The problem for female workers is that harassment remedies are designed by 
predominantly male judges and managers from a demonstrably male perspective. 
Through their eyes, dirty language or pornographic pictures appear part of the 
American way of life. . . . Even when judges talk about the reasonable woman’s 
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again, potentially blunted the communicative force of the 
woman’s experience, sending a false signal to the public. 
4. Class Certification Denials under Rule 23 
Finally, we see a similar dynamic—of the Court’s substitution 
of its own “common sense” of a situation in place of women’s 
testimony and expert analysis—in the operation of class action 
rules in gender discrimination suits. The class action is an 
important procedural mechanism for enforcing constitutional and 
statutory rights when the costs of individual litigation are too 
expensive for a single plaintiff to bear.338 But there are other 
reasons to file a class action, as well—the plaintiffs acquire greater 
leverage in their negotiations with defendants,339 and the potential 
for both social solidarity and media exposure is heightened.340 
Moreover, the class mechanism, as a device that aggregates claims 
on behalf of a group, highlights that a company’s discriminatory 
practice is not a single event directed at a single worker, but rather 
a structural or formal feature of the workplace. 
 
perspective, they often construct it from a male vantagepoint. According to the 
district court in one recent case involving workers who looked up the plaintiff’s 
skirt with a flashlight, the “reasonable woman” would view the conduct as 
“childish,” not harassing. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1464 (1992) (citing 
Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 607 (W.D. Mich. 1986)). 
 338. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive 
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710 (2006) 
(“The class action mechanism is important not just because it enables a group of litigants 
to conquer a collective action problem and secure relief, but also—perhaps more so—
because the litigation it engenders produces external benefits for society.”). 
 339. See William C. Martucci, Eric Smith & Karen K. Cain, Class Action Litigation in 
the Employment Arena—The Corporate Employers’ Perspective, 58 J. MO. BAR 332, 335 
(2002) (explaining that from the defendant’s perspective, the key threat of a class action is 
that it gives plaintiff “settlement leverage”). 
 340. See Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge Post-
Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and Other 
Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1022–23 (2017): 
[T]hose of us who have never lived outside Rule 23’s umbrella may undervalue 
how creative the Rule was in bringing into being new legal relationships among 
class members, their counsel, the public, and courts—played out in tens of 
hundreds of lawsuits. People who did not know each other and whose only 
commonality might be that they purchased the same product gained legal identity 
as a cohort advancing claims in court. The class became a litigating entity, able to 
produce binding outcomes for a host of diverse individuals. 
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Before a case may be certified, plaintiff must show that the 
action meets the requirements of a class.341 This requirement is 
not merely formal, but rather ensures that the named plaintiff is 
in a position to provide adequate representation to the unnamed 
members of the class who will be bound by any resulting 
judgment.342 One of the requirements is that of “commonality,” 
namely, that the named plaintiff and the unnamed class members 
share common questions of law and fact.343 Professor Arthur R. 
Miller and others have written at length about the ways in which 
Brown v. Board of Education and the struggle for racial equality 
influenced the 1966 revision of Federal Rule 23 which codified the 
commonality requirement.344 The Rule does not specify what is 
meant by commonality, but the rule makers intended “a low 
threshold of overlap” among the class’s claims.345 Initially, the 
standard in gender cases seeking injunctive relief, as in civil 
actions generally, was not hard to meet.346 In the generation after 
Title VII was adopted, as Professors Brooke D. Coleman and 
Elizabeth G. Porter have written, class litigation was critical to the 
statute’s enforcement and it “transformed the lives of women at 
 
 341. See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 425 (2014) (“[A]ssuming a plaintiff capably 
satisfies the implicit requirements for pleading a class, that plaintiff then carries the burden 
of satisfying the threshold Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation.”). 
 342. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 
780 (2013): 
Because class actions are representative actions, “adequacy” is the glue that holds 
a class together and ensures due process for absent class members. The system 
breaks down—and potential due process issues arise—if either the class 
representative or class counsel is incompetent, suffers from a conflict of interest, 
fails to assert claims with sufficient vigor, or suffers from other flaws that will 
detract from a full presentation of the merits. 
 343. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 344. See Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: 
A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014) (explaining that the Rules 
Committee sought “to create a receptive procedural vehicle for the explosion of civil rights 
cases”); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for 
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702 (1987) (discussing impact of 
desegregation lawsuits on the drafting of Rule 23(b)(2)). 
 345. Miller, supra note 344, at 298 n.25. 
 346. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining 
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 443 (2013) (stating that until Wal-Mart, the 
commonality requirement was “relatively easy to satisfy”). 
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work,”347 allied with social mobilization and government efforts 
aimed at eradicating gender discrimination.348 
As the literature widely notes, the Court revisited the 
standard for commonality in its 2011 decision in Dukes v. Wal-
Mart.349 In Wal-Mart, possibly the largest class action ever filed in 
federal court, 1.5 million women joined together challenging the 
company’s policy of giving individual store managers unfettered 
discretion to make salary and promotion decisions. The complaint 
alleged that this practice created a “corporate culture” that 
produced unequal benefits and diminished opportunities for 
women relative to men.350 The Court held that certification was 
inappropriate because the plaintiffs shared nothing legally 
relevant in common; the company had no explicit policy of 
discrimination and plaintiffs’ anecdotal and statistical evidence 
was “too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, 
discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory”351 or to 
show “a common mode of exercising discretion.”352 In so holding, 
Justice Scalia’s majority decision rejected expert testimony that 
drew from social framework theory, which the district court had 
found sufficient at the certification stage to show that the 
defendant company was “vulnerable” to gender bias.353 
In earlier employment actions, as Justice Ginsburg 
emphasized in dissent, the Court had recognized that 
“discretionary employment practices” that produce disparate 
results—as in Wal-Mart—could give rise to a Title VII claim. 
Justice Ginsburg questioned the Court’s use of appellate review 
to overturn the trial court’s “handling of factual disputes.” The 
majority effectively assumed, she explained, that “most managers 
in any corporation . . . would select sex-neutral, performance-
based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no 
actionable disparity at all,”354 resting on an unspoken and 
unsubstantiated presumption that the judiciary can trust a 
 
 347. Brooke D. Coleman & Elizabeth G. Porter, Reinvigorating Commonality: 
Gender and Class Actions, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 895, 905 (2017). 
 348. See Schultz, supra note 273, 1022–47 (discussing movement advances). 
 349. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 350. Id. at 345. 
 351. Id. at 358. 
 352. Id. at 356. 
 353. Id. at 354. 
 354. Id. at 355. 
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company’s managers to apply a neutral job rule in an unbiased 
way, even if the real-world effects showed a gender gap.  
In the Court’s view, as Justice Scalia concluded, the putative 
members of the class “ha[d] little in common but their sex and this 
lawsuit”355—borrowing his closing line from Judge Kozinski’s 
dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s decision to affirm the district 
court’s certification decision.356 Six years later, Judge Kozinski 
resigned from the bench, rather, as he stated, than “stay on, at 
least long enough to defend myself.” He apologized to those of 
his clerks who were made to “feel uncomfortable”; he questioned 
whether in displaying “a broad sense of humor and a candid way 
of speaking” he was not “mindful enough of the special challenges 
and pressures that women face in the workplace.”357 
In this light, Wal-Mart illustrates a trend, shown in the 
previous sections, of courts relying on their own “common sense” 
of a situation rather than on the evidence presented—evidence 
that pointed to the “special challenges and pressures” that women 
face in the workplace when supervisors are given unregulated 
discretion over the terms and conditions of employment.358 
 
 355. Id. at 359–60: 
In sum, we agree with Chief Judge Kozinski that the members of the class: “held 
a multitude of different jobs, at different levels of Wal–Mart’s hierarchy, for 
variable lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a 
kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional 
policies that all differed . . . . Some thrived while others did poorly. They have 
little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.” 603 F.3d, at 652 (dissenting 
opinion). 
 356. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 357. PUB. INFO. OFFICE, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, STATEMENT OF 
JUDGE ALEX KOZINSKI (2017), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2017/12/19/
AK_Retirement_Statement.pdf. 
 358. E.g., Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1, 30 (2016) (“Justice Scalia’s statement that managers will normally render 
sex-neutral decisions rests on a belief that the market generally cures discrimination, 
which, when it happens, is the result of deviant outliers.”); see also Lesley Wexler, Wal-
Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 121 (2011) (citing limited worker leverage, 
limited market competition, and little consumer influence as factors that explain why 
“highly rational and efficient companies need not always sacrifice the bottom line in order 
to maintain a preference for discrimination”; “economists and legal scholars are simply too 
sanguine about the rarity of quasi-monopsonistic hiring power and the value of worker 
productivity”). But see Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 26 (2011) (arguing that the Court correctly rejected the evidentiary 
showing and that “Wal-Mart behaved no differently than most American employers”). So 
far, the Court’s decision has not discouraged social mobilization around issues of corporate 
culture and gender discrimination. See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Compliance that 
Advances Racial Diversity and Justice and Why Business Deregulation Does Not Matter, 49 
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C. WOMEN, PROCEDURE, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Professor Judith Resnik, a noted procedure scholar, 
observed back in 1991 that the work of feminist procedure often 
refrains from providing answers and instead seeks to motivate the 
“opening up of a process of conversation in which, collectively, 
ideas are explored and then alternative modes suggested by virtue 
of an extended exchange.”359 Over the years numerous state and 
federal judicial task forces have started a conversation about 
women and law, asking whether judicial decisions reflect a gap 
between the world as experienced by women and the world as 
seen by judges of a certain background or disposition.360 Even 
raising the question as an agenda item has been an uphill battle. 
Back in 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee concluded 
that the establishment of a national gender bias task force for the 
federal courts was not needed because “the nature of federal law 
keep[s] such problems to a minimum.”361 Indeed, acknowledging 
that judging is anything but the automatic calling of “balls and 
strikes” according to neutral and fair rules cuts to the core of 
common law assumptions about the judicial process and the 
principle that lawsuits can and ought to be decided “to the 
exclusion of social norms”: 
 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 611, 635 (2018) (pointing to #MeToo and Time’s Up and stating that “[i]t 
is clear that the discourse, norms, and practices relating to sexual discrimination and 
harassment in the business context have evolved”). Moreover, advocates continue to file 
class actions but on a smaller scale against employers for workplace discrimination. 
Indeed, having identified individual corporate harassers through #MeToo, groups are 
investigating whether the companies themselves show company-wide wage disparities. See 
Tiffany Hsu, Ex-Employees Sue Nike, Alleging Gender Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
10, 2018) (“Claiming a culture of sexual harassment and gender bias at Nike that left 
women demeaned and underpaid, two former employees sued the sports apparel company 
late Thursday, demanding more equitable policies.”); Daniel Wiessner, Nike Hit with 
Equal Pay Claims on Heels of Sex Harassment Allegations, REUTERS LEGAL (Aug. 10, 
2018) (“Former Nike employees have accused the sporting apparel giant of paying women 
less than men at its Oregon headquarters, months after several top executives at the 
company stepped down amid claims of widespread sexual harassment.”). 
 359. Judith Resnik, Visible on “Women’s Issues,” 77 IOWA L. REV. 41, 53 (1991). 
 360. Marsha S. Stern, Courting Justice: Addressing Gender Bias in the Judicial System, 
1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 2 (1996) (reporting that since 1984, 34 state and 2 federal task 
forces had “documented that gender bias is alive and well in the American judicial 
system”). 
 361. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990). The Ninth 
Circuit was the first circuit to establish a task force on gender bias, in 1992. See Barbara 
Allen Babcock, Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts and Civic and Legal Education, 45 
STAN. L. REV. 2143, 2143 (1993) (examining the task force’s findings). 
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The view that written law drives legal outcomes is plausible 
only because written law (to the extent that it has any meaning 
at all) is usually in accord with social norms. . . . While written 
law is sufficiently flexible to support virtually any social norm, 
the social norms of a particular group are not sufficiently 
flexible to support virtually any written law.362 
Nevertheless, the question persists: whether and to what 
extent entrenched stereotypes about women, markets, and social 
arrangements continue to drive procedural decisions of the sort 
discussed in this Part. In answering the question, the legal 
community now has the benefit of a Bar that has become one-
third female363 and years of self-study. As Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg wrote two decades ago in her foreword to the Report of 
the Special Committee on Gender of the D.C. Circuit Task Force 
on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, “close attention to the 
existence of unconscious prejudice can prompt and encourage 
those who work in the courts to listen to women’s voices, and to 
accord women’s proposals the respect customarily accorded ideas 
advanced by men.” She added that “self-inspection heightens 
appreciation that progress does not occur automatically, but 
requires a concerted effort to change habitual modes of thinking 
and acting.”364 The Working Group convened in the wake of 
Judge Kozinski’s resignation did not discuss whether and how 
judicial attitudes about women might be affecting their 
disposition of lawsuits by women or suits involving gender 
equality claims. We understand the omission: the Working 
Group’s focus was narrowly tailored to the problem of sexual 
misconduct by judges as employers and supervisors.365 
 
 362. Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1434, 1435 (2000). 
See Chief Justice Roberts Statement, Nomination Process, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/chief-justice-
roberts-statement-nomination-process (“My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch 
or bat.”) See also Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
2118, 2120 (2016) (“Judges are umpires, or at least should always strive to be umpires.”). 
 363. Jennifer Cheeseman Day, More than 1 in 3 Lawyers Are Women, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (May 8, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/05/women-
lawyers.html (stating that the “number of women lawyers [is] at [a] record high but men 
[are] still [the] highest earners”). 
 364. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to Report of the Special Committee on Gender 
to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, reprinted in 84 GEO. L.J. 
1651, 1651–52 (1996). 
 365. See Helen Hershkoff, Some Questions about #MeToo and Judicial Decision 
Making, The Harbinger, N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript on file with author) (raising additional questions). 
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However, President Trump’s devaluation of women in his 
policies, rhetoric, and conduct makes it all the more imperative 
for the judiciary to hold a mirror up to itself and to uphold 
constitutional ideals. Certainly, the appearance of judicial 
impartiality can be as destructive to public trust as impartiality 
itself.366 At the least, the procedural trends we have identified 
deserve official consideration to assess whether the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are securing their stated goal of the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,”367 and not 
working to “abridge . . . any substantive right.”368 
IV. GENDERED INEQUALITY AND THE WOMAN’S 
CONSTITUTION 
Of course, rules of procedure cannot compensate for gaps 
and defects in substantive law. And so we return to the topic of 
this symposium: the Constitution in the age of Trump and 
whether a mobilized public can encourage constitutional law to be 
more responsive to women’s experiences.369 In our view, the 
Constitution is sufficiently capacious to remediate the structural 
nature of discrimination, to hold government and non-
governmental actors accountable for gender inequality, and to 
adapt anti-discrimination law to account for the changing nature 
 
 366. See The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh: Signed, 2,400+ Law Professors, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/03/opinion/
kavanaugh-law-professors-letter.html (letter submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee 
by law professors on the importance of impartiality to judicial character and to the integrity 
of the judiciary). For disclosure, both authors signed this letter. 
 367. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
 368. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012) (providing that the “general rules of practice and 
procedure” prescribed by the Supreme Court “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right”); see Maritza I. Reyes, Professional Women Silenced by Men-Made 
Norms, 47 AKRON L. REV. 897 (2014): 
So why is it that most employees lose their cases at the hands of federal judges? 
“Surprisingly, there have been few robust attempts to answer this core question. 
Thus, while we have extensive data demonstrating that discrimination litigants 
fare poorly in the courts, we know very little about why.” Therefore, we need to 
identify why the more systematic approach to eradicating unlawful workplace 
conduct is not occurring in the federal courts. We must inform judges about the 
realities of today’s workplaces and the abuse, discrimination, and harassment that 
some employees endure. And we must persuade judges to consider their own 
biases. 
Id. at 956–57 (quoting Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the 
Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2012)). 
 369. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1758 (2012) (calling for 
the constitutional “imposition of some institutional social responsibility”). 
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of the male/female divide. But we do not ignore that the current 
doctrine on gender equality leaves women unprotected in 
significant ways.  
In these times, we think it unlikely that the Trump Court will 
protect women unless women lay claim to an explicit place in the 
constitutional text.370 Mobilizing in favor of an Equal Rights 
Amendment offers significant strategic advantages371—as then-
Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg said in a lecture delivered in 1979, 
“to spark overdue change in laws and in the perspective of public 
officials—judges, legislators, and administrators” and “to 
establish firmly . . . the principle that women and men should be 
counted by their government as individuals of equal value and 
dignity.”372 At the same time, caution about achieving social 
change through constitutional change seems warranted. To 
borrow from Judge Patricia M. Wald, women should avoid 
putting all their “eggs” and “hopes” in “one basket or in one 
branch of government”: 
There are periods when courts are receptive to enforcing 
declarations of fundamental values or rights in constitutions 
and charters. This was so in the 1960s and 1970s for American 
women. But even then, . . . courts were willing to interpret the 
Constitution as guaranteeing equal rights for women only in 
 
 370. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 545 TEX. L. REV. 
693, 705 (1976): 
Success in amending the Constitution would, of course, preclude succeeding 
transient majorities in the legislature from tampering with the principle formerly 
[sic] added to the Constitution. 
 
I know of no other method compatible with political theory basic to democratic 
society by which one’s own conscientious belief may be translated into positive 
law and thereby obtain the only general moral imprimatur permissible in a 
pluralistic, democratic society. 
 371. See, e.g., Editorial Bd., Editorial, A Rebuke to Trump, a Century in the Making, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/opinion/a-rebuke-to-
trump-a-century-in-the-making.html (“The E.R.A. would add an extra layer of legal 
protection for women—and men—against discrimination.”); Jessica Neuwirth & Molley 
Tormey, The Time Is Now for the Equal Rights Amendment, FORBES (March 7, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/break-the-future/2018/03/07/the-time-is-now-for-the-equal-
rights-amendment/#5a6483015e71 (“It’s time to translate social consciousness into 
political action and pass the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) once and for all. If not 
now—the “Year of Women”—then when?”). 
 372. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question 
of Time, 57 TEX. L. REV. 919, 945 (1979). 
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the “easy cases” where laws treated men and women 
differently based on archaic notions of women’s roles.373 
Mobilizing for an ERA thus must be combined with engagement 
on other fronts, including the local, the legislative, and the media, 
taking seriously the extreme economic inequality that has come 
to define America and women’s lives. 
In this Part we identify judicially created “gaps” in the 
Constitution that work to the detriment of women,374 which, we 
argue, could be overcome by a constitutional amendment. We 
explore the likely impact of President Trump’s judicial 
appointments on women’s constitutional progress. And we close 
by discussing the ways in which a constitutional amendment could 
invigorate constitutional enforcement, both by the Court and by 
the elected branches. We put to the side questions about the 
ratification deadline for the existing version of the Equal Rights 
Amendment375 and whether a “fresh start” is needed for the 
language of a proposed amendment.376 We do not need to resolve 
these questions to sketch out the ways in which an equal rights 
amendment could alter constitutional understandings and 
improve women’s lives—and in the process, the lives of all 
Americans. 
A. GENDER EQUALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
POTENTIAL 
The Constitution—as law, as metaphor, and as aspiration—
has enabled women to overcome traditional social barriers and to 
claim important legal rights, including the right to sit on a jury, to 
 
 373. Patricia M. Wald, Some Unsolicited Advice to My Women Friends in Eastern 
Europe, 46 SMU L. Rev. 557, 568 (1992). 
 374. See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law 
Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). 
 375. Congress set a ratification deadline of seven years for the Equal Rights 
Amendment, which later was extended for ten years. See Ginsburg, supra note 372. For a 
discussion of the “fresh start” approach, see THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42979, THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONTEMPORARY 
RATIFICATION ISSUES (2018). 
 376. See Wendy McElroy, An Amendment Takes Congress Back in Time, HILL (Sept. 
16, 2014), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/217789-an-amendment-takes-
congress-back-in-time (explaining that the “fresh start” approach to an ERA is set out in 
H.J. Res. 56 and S.J. Res. 10, which would “restart the ERA process with a need to secure 
38 ratifications but without a deadline”). 
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own property, to enter into contracts, and to enter professions.377 
Moreover, through the enforcement power of Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has enacted laws that bar the 
formal exclusion of women from workplace opportunities and 
that provide remedies for some of the more manifest and 
egregious effects of gendered exclusion.378 However, the Supreme 
Court has blunted the Constitution’s egalitarian potential by 
curtailing legislative remedies in cases that directly involve gender 
discrimination, as well as in cases that indirectly affect women’s 
interests.379 
These decisions are well known. In the Civil Rights Cases, the 
Court limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to state 
action, thus restricting future legislative efforts to regulate private 
conduct that subordinates women.380 In Dandridge v. Williams,381 
involving rights to public assistance, the Court narrowed rights 
under the Constitution to classical liberal rights usually described 
with the adjective “negative” and exclude any duty to provide 
services such as education, housing, or food or for the government 
to take responsibility for the gendered effects of market 
relations.382 In United States v. Morrison,383 the Court limited 
Congress’s power to devise remedies under the Commerce Clause 
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for gender-based 
 
 377. See Sylvia A. Law, In Defense of Liberal Feminism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Cynthia Bowman & Robin West eds. forthcoming, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript on file at New York University School of Law); see also Julie C. 
Suk, The Constitution of Mothers: Gender Equality and Social Reproduction in the United 
States and the World, 9 CONLAWNOW 23, 31 (2017–2018) (discussing exclusion of women 
from professions and politics). 
 378. For an overview of the Supreme Court’s treatment of Title VII, see, e.g., GILLIAN 
THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE LAW, TEN CASES, AND FIFTY YEARS THAT CHANGED 
AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK (2016). 
 379. See Sarah M. Stephens, At the End of Our Article III Rope: Why We Still Need 
the Equal Rights Amendment, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 397 (2015) (summarizing advantages of 
an ERA over the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 380. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 381. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
 382. See Jamal Greene, A Private Law Court in a Public Law System, 12 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 37, 37 (stating that the “United States Supreme Court does not 
recognize social and economic rights”). 
 383. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 136 
(2000) (arguing that Morrison “can be seen to employ ostensibly gender-neutral tools to 
achieve a substantive victory for the social institution of male dominance”); Judith Resnik, 
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 624 (2001) 
(criticizing the Court’s reliance on a theory of “categorical federalism” that is “factless” 
and challenged by feminism). 
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violence. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,384 the Court 
limited Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
under Article I of the Constitution, impeding relief for state 
violations of federal statutes that involve social and economic 
protections (for example, back-pay for state employees, of 
particular importance to women). In Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 
31,385 the Court held that the First Amendment limits state 
authority to authorize public-sector agency-shop arrangements 
(thus jeopardizing the collective ability of women unionists to 
bargain for higher wages and benefits). To these we can add the 
overall problem of the Court’s singular focus on a bad-actor 
approach to discrimination, which imposes high evidentiary 
standards of intent upon plaintiffs and withholds remedies for the 
gendered effects of structural arrangements.386 
At the same time, we recognize that Court precedent could 
support a counter-narrative that is more hospitable to women’s 
claims.387 The Hibbs Court gestured at the idea of treating 
pregnancy discrimination as gender discrimination, incorporating 
an anti-subordination principle into equality doctrine.388 VMI 
 
 384. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 385. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 
(2018). 
 386. See generally Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet & Phyllis Tropper 
Baumann, The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 
BUFF. L. REV. 573, 641–42 (1987) (stating that discrimination law “cannot address the 
structural inequities of the labor market that make rights of equal access hollow for women 
struggling to fulfill familial obligations”). See also Spencer, supra note 346, at 441 
(criticizing Wal-Mart as reflecting “bad actor” theory of discrimination). 
 387. See generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010) 
(discussing the role of anti-subordination principles in Justice Ginsburg’s concept of 
gender equality); Siegel, supra note 35, at 1003–04 (explaining that in Young v. UPS, 
“comparison is no longer the sole determinant of pregnancy discrimination”; “[p]robing 
an employer’s reasons in a balancing framework . . . may bring to light implicit biases”). 
 388. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); see also Neil S. Siegel 
& Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1095, 1113 (2009) (“As Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent cautions, when 
regulation of pregnant women reflects or enforces sex-role stereotypes of the separate 
spheres’ tradition, the law may violate equal protection.”). For a less celebratory reading, 
see Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a Success (?) of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 544 (2005) (“While Hibbs 
shares the strengths of the Ginsburg strategy, the protection afforded by Hibbs may share 
also the weaknesses of the earlier Ginsburg cases. Namely, Hibbs does not fully address or 
recognize the disparate impact issues that prompted the FMLA, nor does it lend itself to 
advances in recognizing ‘difference theory’ in pregnancy discrimination or other areas 
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underscored that sex classifications may be used “to compensate” 
for “disabilities . . . suffered.”389 Obergefell, recognizing that two 
people of the same sex have a right to marry, highlighted the 
significance of intimate and associational choices to dignity and 
autonomy.390 Likewise, scholars now question whether 
constitutional equality actually is “empty,”391 providing strong 
arguments for locating a positive concept of social citizenship at 
the core of the federal Constitution.392 Indeed, some 
commentators have argued that the existing statutory safety net, 
as interpretations of the Constitution, provides a foundation for 
recognizing specific positive rights in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In particular, they ascribe to the Affordable Care 
Act evidence of an emerging doctrine of affirmative government 
duty.393 Relatedly, other commentators read the Court’s decision 
in Sebelius,394 affirming the constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act, as “in strong tension with the absence of positive rights 
under the Constitution.”395 Nevertheless, there is no ignoring the 
fact that under current doctrine, given the absence of affirmative 
constitutional commitments, gender equality scores a victory 
when the gender gap is closed by denying benefits to men as well 
as to women—the remedy of leveling down instead of up.396 
 
affecting women in the workforce. Furthermore, the male bias exhibited by formal equality 
theory is also present in Hibbs.”). 
 389. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 390. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 391. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
 392. E.g., William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 
166 (2001) (justifying a Constitution that afforded all Americans “rights to decent work 
and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic democracy, including rights 
on the part of wage-earning Americans to organize and bargain collectively with 
employers”). Others have found in the Court’s Tenth Amendment cases a source for 
“ascribing special service responsibilities to states.” See Frank I. Michelman, States’ Rights 
and States’ Roles: Permutations of “Sovereignty” in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 
YALE L.J. 1165, 1174 (1977). 
 393. See Edward Rubin, The Affordable Care Act, the Constitutional Meaning of 
Statutes, and the Emerging Doctrine of Positive Constitutional Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1639 (2012). 
 394. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 395. Jack M. Beerman, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 277, 278 (2015). 
 396. E.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (redressing gender 
differential in immigration law by withholding benefit from mothers and fathers); see 
Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 Harv. L. 
Rev. 170, 171 (2017) (characterizing the decision as developing “a progressive vision of 
gender equality for the non-marital family,” but one that left the plaintiff with “an empty 
victory for the individual who came to the Court seeking justice and recognition”); see also 
Julie Suk, Gender Equality and the Protection of Motherhood in Global Constitutionalism, 
12 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 151, 175 (2018) (“In the United States, several Supreme 
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B. THE PRESIDENT’S ARTICLE III LEGACY 
Barring unexpected developments, President Trump leaves a 
mark on the federal judiciary—some would call it a stain—that 
will last well into the middle of the twenty-first century.397 His 
Article III legacy goes beyond the usual influence that a president 
has on doctrinal developments through the appointment 
process—although because of his unusually high number of 
judical appointments, his doctrinal influence on matters affecting 
women will be stark.398 As with other aspects of his presidency, 
Trump has been a disrupter of norms.399  In his tweets and 
statements, he has expressed a view of the Article III courts that 
subverts and even mocks the concept of judicial independence, 
and he has contributed to an increasingly political understanding 
of the Supreme Court and of the lower courts that runs counter to 
democratic principles.  He seems to view federal judges as party 
loyalists; rule-of-law values and judicial temperament do not 
figure in his conception.400   Indeed, this disregard of norms began 
even before Trump entered the White House, with the Senate’s 
 
Court decisions have explicitly stated that special protections for mothers are in tension 
with constitutional guarantees of due process or equal protection, and/or statutory 
guarantees of nondiscrimination.”). 
 397.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn in After Close Confirmation Vote 
in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-
kavanaugh-supreme-court.html (reporting that “[w]hile the brawl over Judge 
Kavanaugh’s confirmation may be over, people on both sides of the debate agree that it 
will have lasting ramifications on the Senate, the country and the court”). 
 398. See Stuart Chinn, Disagreement and Resentment in Contemporary Politics, 53 
TULSA L. REV. 219, 219 (2018) (“The influence of presidential elections in shaping 
constitutional doctrine through the judicial appointments mechanism has long been noted 
among scholars.”). 
 399. See Garrett Epps, Requiem for the Supreme Court, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/supreme-court-loses-its-special-
status/572416/ (observing that the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court 
is “a demonstration that in the new order there is no individual, no norm, no institution 
not subject to the control of the ruling party”).  
 400. See Matt Ford, Brett Kavanaugh Disqualified Himself from the Supreme Court, 
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 27, 2018) (stating that the nominee confirmed that “he would be a 
partisan warrior for the right,” defending against charges of sexual misconduct as “a 
calculated and orchestrated political hit fueled with apparent pent-up anger about 
President Trump and . . . revenge on behalf of the Clintons”); see also Adam Liptak, 
Retired Justice John Paul Stevens Says Kavanaugh Is Not Fit for Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/us/politics/john-paul-stevens-
brett-kavanaugh.html (“In an unusual rebuke from a former member of the Supreme 
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens said on Thursday that Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh was not 
qualified to sit on the court.”). 
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refusal to consider President Obama’s nominee to the Supreme 
Court.401  
Trump has shaped his judicial legacy in conscious disregard 
and indeed opposition to women’s constitutional aspirations. The 
future composition of the Supreme Court was front and center 
during the  2016 presidential campaign,402  and as a candidate 
Trump made clear his determination to make appointments that 
run counter to women’s constitutional equality. Since taking 
office, President Trump has filled more than a third of the seats 
on the Article III courts, including two appointments to the 
Supreme Court,403 and, as he has put it, with judges “picked by the 
Federalist Society.”404  By attitude and act, he has made clear that 
in his view, federal judges are the President’s men—both literally 
and figuratively. His appointments have been  lacking in gender 
and racial diversity,405 and driven by the most rigid of 
constitutional litmus tests—tests that include the overruling of 
Roe v. Wade.406  His chararacterization of federal judges who 
 
 401. See Carl Tobias, Confirming Supreme Court Justices in a Presidential Election 
Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (217) (“In sum, affording Judge Garland no process 
was unprecedented and further subverted public regard for the Supreme Court and the 
confirmation process, while the nomination and confirmation of Justice Gorsuch may have 
had similar effects.”). 
 402. See Christopher W. Schmidt, The Forgotten Issue? The Supreme Court and the 
2016 Presidential Campaign, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 411, 414–15 (2018) (stating that 
“according to exit polls, more than any election in recent memory, the voters placed the 
Supreme Court at or near the top of their list of issues that affected their selection”). 
 403. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Trump’s Judicial Victory, 87 U.S.L.W. 209 
(Aug. 2, 2018) (“[T]he Trump Administration broke the record for the most circuit court 
judges confirmed.”); see also Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Confirmation Fast Track, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 23, 2018) (reporting that as of this date, the Trump Administration 
had secured confirmations of 24 appellate judges; President Obama confirmed 16 during 
his first two years in office, President Bush, 17, President Clinton, 22, and President George 
H.W. Bush, 22); Stephen B. Presser, Evaluating President Obama’s Appointments of 
Judges from a Conservative Perspective: What Did the Election of Donald Trump Mean for 
Popular Sovereignty?, 60 HOW. L.J. 663 (2017) (predicting that Trump’s judicial 
appointments would follow a “conservative” ideology). 
 404. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017) (quoting 
President Trump); see also Caroline Fredrickson, The Least Dangerous Branch—And the 
Last Hope of the Left, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 144 (2018) (acknowledging that the 
“Trump agenda” could “take over the courts” through the judicial appointment process 
and the fact that 38% of court seats will become vacant during the Trump presidency). 
 405. See Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump and Federal Bench Diversity, 74 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 400, 415 (2018) (providing statistics and discussing “Trump’s 
neglect of ethnic minorities, LGBT individuals, and women when considering and 
confirming jurists”). 
 406. See Tobias, supra note 401, 1103 (“President Trump’s putative deployment of 
litmus tests, specifically regarding the very divisive abortion issue, was especially 
problematic.”). 
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oppose his views as “Obama judges” and “so-called judges” 
produced an unusual response by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court.407 
As Professor Jack M. Balkin has put it, “Stocking the 
judiciary with jurists of roughly similarly ideological views can 
produce, over time, significant changes in constitutional 
doctrine.”408 The President’s approach to the Article III courts 
have put him on a collision course with separation of powers and 
with the nation’s constitutional commitment, at times honored in 
the breach, to judicial neutrality and professional competence.409 
He also deeply resists the counter-majoritarian role of the courts 
as protectors of the dispossessed and downtrodden. Our criticisms 
of judicial decisions in the previous Parts should not put in 
question our view of the Article III courts as an institution 
marked by collegiality, tradition, and professionalism, and our 
hope that the federal judiciary will be more than Trump’s Court 
despite the power politics that have accompanied the nomination 
process.410 At the least, we know that political tides change, and 
the Court’s approach to the Constitution changes as well. 
Although the social process is not determinate and the time frame 
never certain, the Supreme Court responds to public opinion, to 
elections, to war, and to relations with law clerks and other 
judges.411 President Eisenhower’s confession that his appointment 
 
     407.  See Adam Liptak, Roberts Rebukes Trump for Swipe at ‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2018, at A-1 (reporting that “Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. defended 
the independence and integrity of the federal judiciary on Wednesday, rebuking President 
Trump for calling a judge who had ruled against his administration’s asylum policy ‘an 
Obama judge.’”). 
 408. Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the 
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 30 (2005). 
 409. See Adam Gopnik, What Most Disqualifies Brett Kavanaugh for the Supreme 
Court?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/what-most-disqualifies-brett-kavanaugh-for-the-supreme-court (stating that 
until Trump no “democratically elected leader has openly sneered at women,” that 
“Trumpism has now become the central and defining faith of the Republican Party,” and 
that Justice Kavanaugh is “an insurance policy” for the executive). 
 410. See Erin Kelly, Supreme Court Justices Condemn Partisan Treatment of Nominee 
Brett Kavanaugh by Senators, USA TODAY (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/14/brett-kavanaugh-justices-
condemn-partisan-treatment-nominee/1303030002/ (quoting Justice Kagan saying that the 
confirmation process has been “an unfortunate thing . . . . Because it makes the world think 
we are sort of junior varsity politicians. I think that’s not the way we think of ourselves, 
even given the fact that we disagree.”). 
 411. See Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2017, 2068 (2016) (“At the risk of generalizing, [studies] tend to find that 
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of Earl Warren to the Court was “the biggest damned-fool 
mistake I ever made”412 may be unusual, but it illustrates the 
unknown effects of life-time tenure, reputational concerns, and 
external events on Supreme Court Justices’ attitudes and the 
development of constitutional doctrine.413  
  
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND GENDER EQUALITY 
Even before Trump became President, political support for 
an equal rights amendment had regained steam. Proponents 
argue that an ERA can encourage development of a “responsive 
state” that recognizes and gives respect to the social and economic 
requirements of contemporary life.414 They see an ERA as 
necessary institutional support for “congressional authority to 
legislate” the kinds of affirmative and regulatory programs that 
are essential for all Americans.415 And they see an ERA as the 
basis for securing a “social reproduction infrastructure” that 
enables society to grow and flourish.416  
These different visions converge on an important point: that 
an ERA will not simply extend the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments with all of their judicially-created doctrinal gaps to 
women, but rather will entail a more robust and substantive 
notion of gender equality. This is so for a number of reasons. 
First, the scope and content of an equal rights amendment 
would not be tied to originalist arguments that look to the 
intentions of the eighteenth-century Founding Fathers or even to 
 
when the ‘mood of the public’ is liberal (or conservative), the Court is significantly more 
likely to issue liberal (or conservative) decisions.”). 
 412. Ed Whelan, This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—January 11, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 
11, 2014). Another version has it as “the biggest damn fool thing I ever did.” Michael 
O’Donnell, Commander v. Chief, ATLANTIC (April 2018). 
 413. See Todd S. Purdum, Presidents, Picking Justices, Can Have Backfires, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 5, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/05/politics/politicsspecial1/
presidents-picking-justices-can-have-backfires.html (discussing presidential judicial 
appointments whose judicial philosophies differed from those of their nominating 
president). 
 414. Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an 
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1763 (2012). 
 415. MacKinnon, supra note 44, at 578. 
 416. See Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: 
Bringing Global Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 381, 444 (2017). 
3 - HERSHKOFF & SCHNEIDER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/19  8:30 PM 
126 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:43 
 
those of the post-Reconstruction period.417 Indeed, many leading 
proponents of originalism recognize that the theory can be 
normatively attractive only if it is allied with a dynamic approach 
to Article V—“an effective amendment process” that “permits 
each generation to change the Constitution.”418 Without entering 
the debate of whether originalism is at odds with a “living 
constitution,”419 an ERA, adopted in the twenty-first century, 
would draw from a different founding history that acknowledges 
structural discrimination as a cause of gendered inequality and 
subordination, recognizes the importance of public goods, and 
appreciates the role of law in creating, sustaining, and 
perpetuating social and market relations that disadvantage 
women.420 Moreover, the amendment would build on the 
Constitution’s existing protection for reproductive and marital 
choice—and move forward from those baselines. 
Second, an ERA would not be constrained by the Court’s 
interpretive approach to the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
builds on three tiers of scrutiny accompanied by three standards 
of review—rationality (or minimal), intermediate, and strict.421 
This is not the occasion to review criticisms of the Court’s 
approach or to argue in favor of a new approach.422 Our point is 
 
 417. See Donna J. King, The War on Women’s Fundamental Rights: Connecting U.S. 
Supreme Court Originalism to Rightwing, Conservative Extremism in American Politics, 19 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 99, 135 (2012) (arguing that originalism as an interpretive 
theory has ensured that the Court reflects “pre-Reconstruction era ideologies”); see also 
Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits 
of Originalism, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 446 (2014) (“Giving feminists cause for worry, 
however, some of the most prominent self-proclaimed originalists have announced 
themselves perfectly comfortable with the conclusion that the Constitution does not 
prohibit sex discrimination.”). 
 418. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, An Originalist Future, 15 ENGAGE: 
J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 34, 38 (2014). 
 419. On the view that originalism can support a dynamic reading of the Constitution, 
see James E. Fleming, The Inclusiveness of the New Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 433 
(2013); see also Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the 
“Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456 (2001) (describing how early suffragists 
pushed for an evolutionary approach to the Constitution in reaction to originalism). 
 420. See Suk, supra note 416, at 444 (“A twenty-first-century ERA could serve as the 
foundation for collective efforts to complete the revolution in the way Americans work, 
reproduce, and raise the next generation in the post-industrial age.”). 
 421. See Ryan James & Jane Zara, Equal Protection, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2002) 
(setting forth tiers and standards in the context of gender decisions). 
 422. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 
(2011) (“The words ‘scrutiny’ and ‘review’ suggest an examination rather than a result. Yet 
in this jurisprudence, looks can kill.”). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality 
Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004). 
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that an ERA would not be bound by the Court’s past approaches 
to standards of review.423 As an example, the Court could decide 
to take gender differences openly into account when reviewing 
legislation, but invalidate only those laws that treat such 
differences as grounds for gendered subordination.424 
Third, an ERA need not be constrained by the judicially-
created state action requirement that the Court has imposed upon 
the Fourteenth Amendment and which in practice has limited the 
scope of judicial remedies and legislative solutions.425 Models of 
alternative approaches are available from constitutions abroad 
and from state constitutions, not all of which track federal 
interpretive doctrine.426 Indeed, alternative approaches remain 
embedded in the Court’s abandoned or ignored Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment decisions; as Professor Archibald Cox 
explained in 1966: 
To transfuse into the enforcement provision of the fifteenth 
amendment the familiar necessary and proper clause principle 
that “Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the 
constitutional prohibition” implies that under the parallel 
enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment Congress 
may regulate activities which do not themselves violate the 
prohibitions of that amendment, where the regulation is a 
rational means of effectuating one of its prohibitions. The 
formula, moreover, might supply an answer, in many instances, 
to the argument that Congress cannot regulate private conduct 
under the fourteenth amendment because the amendment 
deals only with state action. One could well say, “Granted that 
 
 423. See Patricia Thompson, The Equal Rights Amendment: The Merging of 
Jurisprudence and Social Acceptance, 30 W. ST. U. L. REV. 205 (2003) (discussing the 
relation between constitutional amendment and standards of review). 
 424. We differentiate between gender classifications that benefit women for past 
injustice and those that perpetuate harm. Compare Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the 
Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 289 (1996), with Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah 
Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 253 (1999). 
 425. See Louis Michael Seidman, State Action and the Constitution’s Middle Band, 117 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2018) (questioning the “dichotomous” nature of the state action 
doctrine). For a history of the debates concerning the ERA and private conduct, see 
Serena Mayeri, A New E.R.A. or a New Era? Amendment Advocacy and the Reconstitution 
of Feminism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1223 (2009); see, e.g., Bruce E. Altschuler, State ERAs 
and Employment Discrimination, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1267 (1992). 
 426. See Paul Taylor & Philip G. Kiko, The Lost Legislative History of the Equal Rights 
Amendment: Lessons from the Unpublished 1983 Markup by the House Judiciary 
Committee, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 341, 369–71 (2007) 
(discussing state action and the Pennsylvania ERA); Altschuler, supra note 425 (surveying 
state ERA treatments of a governmental-involvement requirement). 
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the prohibitions in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment are 
addressed only to the states and not to private persons, still the 
congressional power to enact measures helping to effectuate 
those prohibitions may include the regulation of private 
activities where that is a means of implementing the 
prohibition against the state.” For example, a law prohibiting 
discrimination against Negroes in the sale and rental of housing 
could well be viewed as a means of bringing about the breakup 
of the urban ghettos which are serious obstacles to the states’ 
performance of their constitutional duty not to discriminate in 
the quality of education and other public services.427 
These judicial decisions reveal that it is not necessary to take 
a binary approach to constitutional enforcement—targeting all 
state action and excluding all private action—and instead more 
sensitive and nuanced approaches are possible.428 In appropriate 
cases, the ERA could be a source of redress for the gendered 
effects of laws that create, enable, and sustain social and economic 
arrangements that produce not “simply losers,” as Professor 
Robert M. Cover wrote in discussing discrete and insular 
minorities, but also “perpetual losers”—women who for 
generations have carried the burden of cumulative 
disadvantage.429 
Finally, a major advantage of an ERA would be the 
decoupling of its enforcement power from the Court’s current 
approach to Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.430 By its history and text, the Fourteenth 
Amendment looks to Congress, and not the Court or the 
 
 427. Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of 
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 103 (1966). 
 428. On the relation between state action and social and economic rights, see Gary 
Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779 (2004). 
See generally Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State 
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010) (discussing a 
hybrid approach to the enforcement of state constitutional law and common law); Helen 
Hershkoff, Horizontality and the “Spooky” Doctrines of American Law, 59 BUFF L. REV. 
455 (2011) (discussing the “radiating” effects of constitutional rights on private law 
doctrines even in federal law). 
 429. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982). 
 430. The ERA that so far has been ratified by thirty-six states includes as Section 2 
the following language: “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.” See Roberta W. Francis, The History Behind the 
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President, as the primary enforcer of the Constitution’s guarantee 
of equality and due process.431 However, the Supreme Court has 
inverted the constitutional design, with the Court claiming that 
because it has supreme and exclusive authority to give substantive 
content to constitutional rights,432 it may limit Congress’s power 
to devise remedies and, further, may limit such remedies only for 
a violation of a right that the Court already has specifically 
identified.433 The practical effect has been to roll back legislative 
solutions that could carry forward gender equality434—as the 
invalidation of the Violence Against Women Act amply shows.435 
To be sure, leaving rights enforcement to Congress poses a 
significant risk. Political sympathies may shift, and 
representatives may be self-interested or venal.436 But as Justice 
William H. Brennan famously argued in Katzenbach v. Morgan,437 
the power to enforce equality provisions does not include the 
power to dilute or contract them.438 As he put it, the enforcement 
power is a one-way ratchet. The Court’s 1997 decision in City of 
 
 431. See Garrett Epps, The Struggle Over the Meaning of the 14th Amendment 
Continues, ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/07/
the-struggle-over-the-meaning-of-the-14th-amendment-continues/564722/ (“Section 5 put 
Congress, not the president or the (hitherto) pro-slavery Supreme Court, in charge of 
enforcing the new democratic rules.”). 
 432. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001) (discussing the rise during the Rehnquist Court of the 
Court’s view that its power of judicial review is not only supreme, but also “that 
interpretation by non-judicial actors is somehow unnatural”); see also GARRETT EPPS, 
DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL 
RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 269 (2006) (“Relying almost entirely on 
segregation-era analyses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held [in City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)] that it, not Congress, had ‘primary authority’ for 
determining how to protect minority rights in the states.”). 
 433. See Vada Berger, Nicole Walthour, Angela Dorn, Dan Lindsey, Pamela 
Thompson & Gretchen von Helms, Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 437, 481 (1989) 
(“Congress’ Section 5 enforcement authority is subservient to the Supreme Court’s 
authority to interpret the substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment.”). 
 434. See Patricia A. Seith, Congressional Power to Effect Sex Equality, 36 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 1 (2013) (discussing the demise of the ERA and the legislative campaign for 
the Economic Equality Act). 
 435. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 
(2001) (discussing invalidation of the Violence Against Women Act). 
 436. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, How Long Is History’s Shadow?, 127 YALE L.J. 880 
(2018) (reviewing JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE 
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017)). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, In 
Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
673, 683 (defending a court-centric approach over popular constitutionalism). 
 437. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 438. Id. at 651 n.10. 
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Boerne439 undermined the utility of the ratchet approach under 
the Fourteenth Amendment by invalidating legislative 
enforcement measures that were said to implement notions of 
equality that the Court had not yet recognized.440 An ERA need 
not track this doctrinal gloss.441 We leave to another day the 
possibility that politics will fail, that Congress abdicates its 
responsibility, and that judicial review will be needed to overcome 
legislative blockage. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration has produced a firestorm of 
tweets, protests, and headlines about the place of women in our 
current constitutional regime. As significant, it has highlighted the 
nation’s constitutional failure to promote substantive gender 
equality and to take responsibility for laws and programs that 
exacerbate women’s subordinate position.442 The invisible hand of 
 
 439. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For criticisms, see Post & Siegel, 
supra note 37, at 1946 (equating Boerne with an enforcement model and stating that the 
model “seeks to exclude Congress from the process of constitutional lawmaking because 
it regards the integrity of our system of constitutional rights as dependent upon its 
complete insulation from the contamination of politics”); Michael W. McConnell, 
Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
153 (1997) (“[A]lthough the Boerne Court properly rejected the plenary ‘substantive’ 
interpretation of Section Five, the Court’s conclusion that judicial interpretations of the 
provisions of the Amendment are the exclusive touchstone for congressional enforcement 
power finds no support in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 440. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify 
Public Affirmative Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1641 (1998) (“We are not unmindful 
that—especially in the civil rights arena—the Supreme Court of late has been willing to 
interpret away . . . settled precedents [involving civil rights].”); see also William E. Forbath, 
Why Is this Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and 
Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994) (discussing rejection of 
“the idea that the Court is the sole significant source of constitutional interpretation and 
innovation”). 
 441. We note as well the concerns expressed by courts and commentators about 
judicial capacity to enforce social and economic rights. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, 
Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212, 1213–20 (1978) (arguing that certain affirmative claims function as constitutional 
principles that inform legislative activity but are not judicially enforceable). At least one 
of the current authors disagrees with the view that socio-economic rights are non-
justiciable. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of 
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999). Our emphasis on 
congressional enforcement power in part meets these criticisms; it would protect new rights 
against invalidation, and it would leave space for a mobilized public to participate in 
political activity. 
 442. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive 
State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010). 
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the market, propped up by law, courts, and custom, has relegated 
too many Americans—male, female, cis, trans, inter, homosexual, 
heterosexual, queer—to lives of stunted opportunity, violence, 
and economic pain. An Equal Rights Amendment, conceived as 
a substantive commitment to equality, liberty, and dignity, could 
provide a remedy for historic gender subordination; it could 
protect against plutocratic greed; and it would give expression to 
liberal democratic ideals. The Constitution in the age of Trump is 
yet to be written, and it is time for women—together with men—
to write it. 
 
